The Use of Primaries by Political Parties: The Case of PASOK - A Comment

This paper comments on Professor Papanikos’ recent publication in this journal entitled, “The Use of Primaries by Political Parties: The Case of PASOK”. I make a number of observations regarding the argument of the author that primary elections are an application of democracy in the internal procedures of a political party. The question raised is whether primaries enhance democracy, or restrict it, by diminishing the role of party members only in selecting party representatives and have no role in the discussion of policies. Another important issue is the age structure of the participants in the primary elections. Did it matter? More analysis and evidence is needed on this issue to find out whether the relatively younger candidate mobilized more young members and friends to participate in the primary elections of PASOK. Keywords: primaries, elections, voting, political parties, PASOK, Greece

Peran Organisasi Sayap Partai Politik dalam Kaderisasi Partai Politik di Indonesia

The political parties that emerge in Indonesia have a distinct catch-all character; they are dependent on individual figures and lack a defined socioeconomic foundation. For political parties, the regeneration process has become a struggle. Because certain political parties lack a clear regeneration system, oligarchic recruiting is a common occurrence. Religious affiliations, local links, local commonalities, and proximity to political party leaders all have a role in recruitment trends. This research aims to explain the role of the under bow of the political party on regeneration. This is a legal-normative study that relies on secondary data. The research material is divided into three categories: primary, secondary, and tertiary. The following factors, according to this study, influence political party regeneration and recruitment: 1) political dynasty has an impact on unhealthy regeneration; 2) political dowry has an impact on unhealthy competition among political party members; and 3) popularity factor has an impact on how quickly people can become political party members. Political parties' inability to recruit and regenerate has an impact on their capacity to fulfill their role as the primary source of national leadership selection. Alternative solutions to these problems include strengthening the under bow of political parties. The existence of under bow of political parties will aid in the transmission of political party doctrine. Political parties will be rewarded with the best members who will fight for their vision and goals. Furthermore, the under bow of political parties can serve as educational institutions for potential members before they join the party.

The perception of the basic state laws by the Constitutional Democrats during the work of the first State Duma: the ideas of Vasily Maklakov

The article gives an interpretation of the ideas of the liberal politician Vasily Maklakov on the Basic State Laws of 1906. He assessed these laws as the Russian Constitution of 1906. Vasily Maklakov gave an interpretation of the relationship between the Constitutional Democrats and the government in connection with the restriction of the rights of the State Duma. The novelty of the research lies in the analysis of the perception by the Constitutional Democrats of the Basic Russian Laws as amended on April 23, 1906. Sources on the topic include the texts of the leaders of the K-D Party – the memoirs of Vasily Maklakov and Pavel Milyukov, Maxim Vinaver, as well as the Basic State Laws of 1906, materials of the III Congress of the K-D Party. The article reveals the political views of Vasily Maklakov, characterises his communicative culture, the views of the lawyer about the reasons for the illegal actions of the Constitutional Democrats in the First State Duma, the origins of their conflict with the government. An analysis of Vasily Maklakov's ideas about the degree of constitutionality of the government's steps towards the Duma in 1906 is given, his judgements about autocracy, law and order, the need to form a parliamentary culture of deputies are revealed. It is proved that Vasily Maklakov criticised the tactics of the Constitutional Democrats s in the First State Duma in the context of the idea of legality. He saw the main mistake of his fellow party members in their ignoring of a number of legal norms prescribed in the Basic Laws.

Are they different?A comparative study of European populist party members

Party membership is in decline across the established democracies, but populist parties appear to be reversing this trend. The expansion of populist parties’ membership base raises the question whether these parties are fulfilling their role as actors who serve as a “corrective to democracy” by mobilizing the socially and politically marginalized to become politically active. Using large comparative datasets from the European Social Survey and the World Values Survey, we examine the characteristics of populist party members in terms of their socio-demographic background and their political attitudes. We show that, with the exceptions of income levels and church attendance, the members of populist and non-populist parties look very much alike and hold similar political attitudes. These findings imply that mobilizing the politically disaffected remains a challenge, even for populist actors.

The Smell of Factionalism: Left Opposition in the Vyatka Provincial Organization of the Bolshevik Party in 1923-1924

The activity of the Vyatka left opposition that arose during the internal party discussion in the fall of 1923 and the spring of 1924 is studied. The work is based on archival documents from the Central State Archive of Kirov Region, as well as on materials from the Vyatka Pravda party newspaper. The platform of the local opposition opposed the formation of factions but insisted on clarifying what factionalism is supposed to mean. The Left Opposition united the party community of the provincial city and adjacent working areas. Most party members initially expressed full confidence in the partys Central Committee. An analysis of archival material shows that the Vyatka opposition tried to establish a broad discussion of problems in internal party life. In the provincial center there was a party discussion club that organized heated discussions. The focus on clarifying the concepts of factions and groups reflected the desire of opposition supporters to avoid being accused of betraying the party and the cause of the revolution. Remarkably, until early January 1924 the left opposition had absolute support among party members in Vyatka. The article analyzes the Central Committees suppression of the local opposition in January - February 1924, and in particular the skillful techniques of Aron Solts and his supporters. At the final stage of the struggle, a group of conciliators arose among the members of the opposition, and contributed to the victory of the Central Committee line. The article clarifies reasons and circumstances of the defeat of the opposition, none of whose representatives openly stood in opposition to the majority of the Central Committee or called on ordinary members to protest. The authors demonstrate that the local left opposition was a situational unification of diverse forces, dissatisfied with the bureaucratization of the party, the growing dictatorship of the Central Committee, the newcomers, as well as the dominance of appointees from the Party and the Soviets. During the discussion in the organizations of the Party, the need for developing internal party democracy and a free discussion of the problems emerged, showing that there was a potential alternative to Stalinism. The main feature of the left opposition was that it formed and temporarily won the predominantly non-proletarian Vyatka, where before the 1917 revolution the zemstvo and city democratic self-government has gained roots; this is interpreted as a preservation of the demand for freedom and democracy in local society.

Dancing with Diversity?

Rapid market transition in post-reform China has created various socioeconomic spaces that fall beyond the Leninist mode of control by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and thus constitutes a formidable challenge to its ruling capacity. This article examines the evolving adaptations of the CCP and the rise of a new form of Party-society nexus in urban China. We found that Party organisers have been fostering a spatial strategy in the context of ‘disorganised urban socialism’. By spanning institutional and sectoral gaps, engaging so-called ‘floating party members’, and developing community-based service networks, the Party has deliberately combined a specific social mechanism with the Leninist logic of organising. We conclude with a broader discussion of the possible scenario and political implication of CCP’s organisational consolidation from below.

Inequality, identity, and partisanship: How redistribution can stem the tide of mass polarization

The form of political polarization where citizens develop strongly negative attitudes toward out-party members and policies has become increasingly prominent across many democracies. Economic hardship and social inequality, as well as intergroup and racial conflict, have been identified as important contributing factors to this phenomenon known as “affective polarization.” Research shows that partisan animosities are exacerbated when these interests and identities become aligned with existing party cleavages. In this paper, we use a model of cultural evolution to study how these forces combine to generate and maintain affective political polarization. We show that economic events can drive both affective polarization and the sorting of group identities along party lines, which, in turn, can magnify the effects of underlying inequality between those groups. But, on a more optimistic note, we show that sufficiently high levels of wealth redistribution through the provision of public goods can counteract this feedback and limit the rise of polarization. We test some of our key theoretical predictions using survey data on intergroup polarization, sorting of racial groups, and affective polarization in the United States over the past 50 y.

The Vlaams Belang: A Mass Party of the 21st Century

Throughout its 40-year history, the Vlaams Belang (VB, Flemish Interest) has established itself as an important player within the Belgian party system, albeit with significant electoral fluctuations. In 2019, it became the second largest party in Flanders. The party developed and maintained a mass-party organisation by investing significantly in local party branches and in a rigid vertically articulated structure. It relies heavily on social media, particularly Facebook, to communicate to supporters beyond the more limited group of party members. Using both modern and traditional tools, VB representatives aim to create communities of supporters bonded to the party, facilitating dissemination of the party’s messages. Despite this investment in a grassroots organisation, the VB’s decision-making remains highly centralised. Social media and local branches allow informal consideration of members’ views, but the party has not created significant mechanisms for internal democracy. While it is often claimed that political parties have moved away from the “mass-party” model, this article demonstrates that the VB still maintains characteristics of the mass party, albeit with a modern twist. New social media tools facilitate attempts to foster communities and disseminate party messages among a wider group of supporters, both formal members and more informal sympathisers.

“Mass,” “Movement,” “Personal,” or “Cartel” Party? Fidesz’s Hybrid Organisational Strategy

In the last decade, Fidesz has dominated the Hungarian political landscape, becoming the most extensive Hungarian party organisation in terms of party members, structuration, resources, and influence. The party’s organisational development has been determined by a constant strategic adaptation to new circumstances of political reality and new demands of the electorate. The article argues that in three phases of its development, Fidesz adopted different party organisation guidelines. As a result, a hybrid party architecture was formed involving various characteristics and strategies of mass parties (e.g., relatively large membership and ideological communication), movement parties (i.e., top-down generation of mass rallies and protest activities), personal parties (i.e., personalisation, centralisation of party leadership), and cartel parties (i.e., use of state resources, control over party competition). Instead of switching from one strategy to another, the party often used these strategies simultaneously. This flexible party organisation can balance among the different needs of effective governance, constant mobilisation, and popular sovereignty. The article aims to dissect these building blocks of Fidesz to gain insight into the emergence of the hybrid party model.