Mine or ours? Unintended framing effects in dictator games

This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. The results show that seemingly small and typically unreported differences in standard instructions induce different perceptions regarding entitlement and ownership of the money to be distributed, and that these perceptions influence behaviour. Less is given when the task is described as a task of generosity and more when the task is a task of distribution (average 35 % vs. 52 %). The results can contribute to explaining the large variation in dictator game giving reported in the literature and show that even small and unreported differences in instructions change how the game is perceived. JEL codes: C70; C91; D63

The Peace of God

Scholars have argued that the politically fractured landscape of medieval Western Europe was foundational to the evolution of constitutionalism and rule of law. In making this argument, Salter and Young (2019) have recently emphasized that the constellation of political property rights in the High Middle Ages was polycentric and hierarchical; holders of those rights were residual claimants to the returns on their governance and sovereign. The latter characteristics—residual claimancy and sovereignty—imply a clear delineation of jurisdictional boundaries and their integrity. However, historians’ description of the “feudal anarchy” that followed the tenth-century disintegration of the Carolingian Empire does not suggest clearly delineated and stable boundaries. In this paper, I highlight the role of the Peace of God movement in the 11th and 12th centuries in delineating and stabilizing the structure of political property rights. In terms of historical political economy, the Peace of God movement provides an important link between the early medieval era and the constitutional arrangements of the High Middle Ages.

A formal model of street-level bureaucracy

Different from a classic Weberian bureaucracy, public service bureaucrats directly interact with citizens at the frontlines of government. These first responders use their discretion to meet some citizens’ needs but deliberately overlook the other clients. What lies beneath the street-level bureaucrats’ behavior in their contacts with citizens? This study develops a model to explain how street-level bureaucrats are motivated to move toward the public and the extent to which they are engaged in helping their citizens. The model is driven by costs and benefits of behavior based on the assumption that street-level bureaucrats are rational actors trying to maximize their utility. However, utility here is defined as more than self-interest; it is the set of outcomes valued by the bureaucrats such as reducing job-related stress, pursuing work-generated ends, serving needy citizens, and implementing good public policy.

A picture of regret: An empirical investigation of post-Brexit referendum survey data

Whilst the properties of decision regret have been widely explored in experimental and game theoretic studies, the empirical features of regret from large-scale ‘binary decision’ national events in practice have garnered less scrutiny. This study is an empirical investigation of novel survey data reporting ‘Brexit’ voting choices and expressions of a desire to change voting choices post-referendum. We investigate if Leave voters are more or less likely to express a change to their binary referendum vote choice than those who voted Remain or abstained and then identify the particular characteristics of those who regret their vote choice. A large-scale pan-European survey is used to capture citizens’ perceptions of the European Union containing 17,147 interviews of adults from 15 EU member states. Using responses from UK citizens ( n = 1500), focus is directed to the vote choice for the ‘Brexit’ referendum and the corresponding choice if the referendum were held ‘today’. Probit regression estimation identifies the key differences in the characteristics of those who expressed regret by indicating a desire to change voting choices. Results show that knowledge of EU funding policies, permanence of residential location, population size of the local area, educational attainment, employment status and income are key drivers for regretting the referendum voting decision.

Social movements and exchanges: Sketch of a theory

Using social exchange theory, this article presents a new theory for understanding the strategic choices made by social movement leaders—the “movement exchanges” theory. It looks at how leaders engage in exchanges of valued rewards with constituencies, institutional political players, bystander publics, and voluntary organizations. Leaders receive from these players important rewards (like committed activists, political leverage, and resources) for achieving movement goals. In turn, leaders make strategic choices (expressed in frames, tactics, targets, and claims) that other players find rewarding, favoring persistent exchanges across time. By considering movements’ simultaneous exchanges with several players, the theory makes sense of choices that remain puzzling for major movement theories. It also blends strategic behavior with culture (in the form of utopias, ideology, and emotions) but does not require the maximizing assumption of the homo economicus. I use the case of the contemporary Chilean student movement to illustrate the theory.

Do informal reasoning fallacies really shape decisions? Experimental evidence

Informal reasoning fallacies belong to a persuasive tactic, leading to a conclusion that is not supported by premises but reached through emotions and/or misleading and incomplete information. Previous research focused on the ability to recognize informal reasoning fallacies. However, the recognition itself does not necessarily mean immunity to their influence on decisions made. An experiment was designed to study the relationship between the presence of informal reasoning fallacies and a consequent decision. Having conducted paired comparisons of distributions, we have found some support for the hypothesis that informal reasoning fallacies affect decision-making more substantially than non-fallacious reasoning—strong support in the case of a slippery slope, weak in that of appeal to fear, anecdotal evidence argument defying evaluation. Numeracy and cognitive reflection seem to be associated with higher resistance to the slippery slope, but do not diminish appeal to fear.

They can’t treat you well under abusive supervision: Investigating the impact of job satisfaction and extrinsic motivation on healthcare employees

Building on the emerging research that has demonstrated the adverse effects of abusive supervision on employee performance, this research draws on the theories of prosocial motivation and action identification. We develop and empirically test a mediation model to examine the indirect impact of abusive supervision on employee performance. Data were obtained from 430 Chinese healthcare employees to validate and test our proposed hypotheses and generalize the findings from Western settings in the Eastern context. The findings indicate that abusive supervision is negatively related to employee performance. Job satisfaction and extrinsic motivation mediated this relationship. The study has some important theoretical and practical implications, and we have also discussed some future directions.

From green to ripe: Dynamics of peacemaking in Colombia (1998–2016)

Armed conflict in Colombia with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) was only settled after fifty years and several attempts at negotiations. This sequence of events fits the pattern of “conflict ripeness” first proposed by William Zartman. But using a successful settlement as a way to determine ripeness can be tautological. To address this issue, we develop a formal model to identify the level of ripeness at which a conflict is settled. In an overripe conflict both parties end up spending resources in a military build-up that is out of proportion with what they obtain in the final settlement. We show that such overripeness is exacerbated by the access to resources and by the factional heterogeneity within the two sides. We illustrate these dynamics by looking in detail at the attempts at negotiation between Colombia’s government and the FARC-EP. To that end, we combine statistical data, some previously undisclosed, and interviews with some key participants.

Efficiency loss and support for income redistribution: Evidence from a laboratory experiment

Income redistribution with an efficiency loss is expected to have a twofold negative effect on support for redistribution, as it lowers egoistic support for redistribution and activates efficiency preferences. This study tests whether such a negative relationship exists, increases with the size of efficiency loss and interacts with group communication and the income position. We present a laboratory experiment in which subjects receive a randomly allocated income and must coordinate on a majority tax rate using a deliberative communication tool. The rate of money lost as a part of the redistribution process is manipulated as a treatment variable (0%, 5%, 20%, or 60%). Experimental evidence shows that efficiency loss exerts a robust negative effect on support for redistribution. The effect shows a tipping point pattern, is stronger at the lower end of the income distribution and is not fully explained by egoistic preferences. Inefficiency matters mostly for the chosen tax rate after group communication. At an efficiency loss of 60%, however, group communication does not affect support for redistribution, which implies that inefficiencies tend to play a minor role in the context of redistribution as long as they are within a moderate range. JEL Classification: C91, C92, D63, D72