Problemy Prawa Karnego
Published By University Of Silesia In Katowice
The aim of this article is to draw attention to an issue that has a long history: the problem of hate crimes in the United States of America. There is no doubt that hate crimes are the type of crime that attack the very principle of individuality that is an entitlement under the equal protection of the law (in the U.S.). Bearing the foregoing in mind the above, and that the number of such crime has increased at an alarming rate, this article describes and discusses types of hate crimes such as: Racist and Religious Hate Crimes, Sexual Orientation-Based Hate Crimes and Disability Hate Crimes as an extended projection of the analysis, several solutions have been proposed to mitigate tensions and combat the prevalence and severity of hate crime in all its forms.
Wybrane zagadnienia związane ze stosowaniem instytucji usiłowania we współczesnym orzecznictwie sądów polskich
The institution of attempt is used relatively frequently in the practice of justice system.Importantly, it always separates the punishable stage of attempt from punishable preparatory activities, and therefore constitutes the limit of criminalization. Despite its practical importance, using of the indicated legal structure, raises a number of doubts that are related to the proper interpretation of the normative concepts comprising it. A consequence is moving the limit of punishability of the crime by adjudicating authorities. It can raise some objections – from fundamental principle of criminal law inthe form of nullum crimen sine lege point of view. The article discusses the problems of that appear in jurisdiction in connection with the application of the attempt institution; these problems raise interest among doctrine. The author confronts irreconcilable judgments. The Author searches interpretative solutions that seem the most appropriate from theoretical and dogmatic structure of the successful attempt and inept attempt point of view.
The aim of this work is to establish to what extent discrepancies of substantive misdemeanour law (relating to criminal law), which stem from simplification of responsibility rules, impact the position of victim. There are no general rules and principles relating to formation of the position of victim in either criminal law or misdemeanour law. Only by analysing particular regulations of the both respective codes allows one to reconstruct the status of victim and confronting it on the plain of the two responsibility regimes in question. The said confrontation reveals far-reaching differences within the scope of victim’s position in substantive regulations of misdemeanour law, some of which weaken the victim’s position, while other – strengthen it. Although those differences vary to their weight, yet it seems that regulations restricting the presence of the figure of victim are more significant – they genuinely decrease the competence of a person to whom the harm was made. Amongst the said regulations, first and foremost, have to be counted those that relate to possibility of ruling compensatory penal measures, as well as regulations defining the periods of limitation (aside from other discussed regulations). The assumed dual model of responsibility within this scope, in some cases, compromises the principle of equality before the law enshrined in Article 32 paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
The author discusses the problem of excessive normative production in Polish legal system on the example of the changes implemented by amending the Code of Criminal Procedure. The article presents the changes implemented in the particular codes of criminal proceedings, starting with the first code of the independent Poland, the Code of 1928, followed by the amendments to that code, which remained in effect until December 31, 1969, as well as modified normative solutions remaining in effect prior to the change of the political and economic system, and concluding with the Code of Criminal Procedure which came into force on September 1, 1998. Such comparative study of the activity of the Polish Parliament between 1928 and 2017 reveals a severe excessive normative production with regard to criminal law in the recent years. The author argues that any normative changes to code regulations should be implemented only once the regulations subject to change have been tested in practice and have undergone an in-depth discussion in all groups that use the modified norms. As a positive example, the author enumerates the efforts of the Codification Commission of the Criminal Law, which resulted in the amendment of September, 2013, and compares it with the procedure of amending the Code of Criminal Procedure in March, 2016.
Względna przyczyna odwoławcza związana z błędem w rekonstruowaniu podstawy faktycznej orzeczenia w perspektywie prawnomiędzynarodowej i konstytucyjnej
From the perspective of legal-international and constitutional guarantees of a two-instance procedure one should consider admissible the exclusion of the control of the actual basis in reference to guilt and punishment when such an adjudication constituted the object of a lawsuit-related contract, for the right to instance-based control of adjudications is relinquishable, and the limitations of the challengeability of contractual rulings was regulated in the Polish criminal procedure as not to exclude the right of the parties to bring about control of contractual rulings in a general manner, but only to constrain the catalogue of the admissible appeal-based accusations. However, the complete liquidation of the instance-based control of the establishment of the actual state of affairs contradicts the legal-international and constitutional guarantees, for the reconstruction of the actual state of affairs constitutes a component of the adjudication about someone’s culpability in the trial-related sense, and the control of the solution of this problem is guaranteed at the international level. The abolishment of instance-based control of the establishment of the actual state of affairs, being a manifestation of the pursuit of praxeological economical arrangements, also results in the reduction of the probability of reaching material truth. Moreover, it changes the model of a multi-faceted verification based activities realised within the framework of a typical instance-based course into control which is similar to an analysis and correction peculiar to the extraordinary modes of control-related proceedings.
Brak obowiązku stawiennictwa oskarżyciela publicznego na rozprawie w kontekście podstawowych zasad procesu karnego
The principle of legalism places upon the public prosecutor the obligation o pressing charges to a court of law and then to support this claim in the course of the lawsuit. It seems obvious that in order to execute this duty in an appropriate manner, the public prosecutor should attend the trial and actively participate in it. However, in regulation Art. 46 §2 k.p.k., which was introduced by way of an amendment issued on 11 March 2016, the legislator stipulated a regulation which permits the public prosecutor not to appear during the trial, if the preliminary legal proceedings concluded in the form of investigation. Obviously, the task of this regulation is to accelerate the proceedings in cases of lesser calibre, which are cases in which an investigation is conducted. However, it is necessary to consider the aforementioned regulation in the context of the basic principles of a criminal lawsuit and the analysis of the consequences of such regulations. Therefore, in the first instance one made reference to the most important regulations contained in the basis acts of international law, i.e. the European Convention of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which emphasise above all the significance of independence and impartiality, as well as the principle of a quick and efficient operation of the procedure. It was also necessary to refer the substantive regulation to the principle of the contradictoriness of the criminal lawsuit, which stipulates inter alia the separation of lawsuit-related roles and the passivity of the court in reference to the initiative of the parties who argue their cases.
The aim of the following article is to consider the possibility of accepting the admission of guilt by the defendant as the primary condition for conclusion of the court proceedings in all consensual modes of trial as delineated by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The article contests the validity of the criterion of the seriousness of the act, which has been established by the legislator for the purposes of distinguishing a separate consensual model of court proceedings. At the same time, the article aims to consider whether it would be more reasonable to broaden the possibility of plea bargaining to include all cases, regardless of the seriousness of the act, if the defendant pleads guilty. Moreover, the author considers the prerequisites for sentencing without court proceedings, provided for under Article 335 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including the assessment of the defendant’s own account in the context of all evidence collected in the investigation.
Pozaustawowy kontratyp działania w ramach uprawnień wynikających z prawa do obrony w kontekście nowelizacji art. 233 §1 Kodeksu karnego
The work is devoted to the non-statutory justification of action in the scope of the right to defence, whose purpose was the exclusion of criminal responsibility for giving false testimony by a witness – the actual perpetrator – in his or her case. It was emphasised that the defence which heretofore resulted from Art. 182 and 183 kk was insufficient for the witness. One discussed inter alia the legal basis of the justification, its constituent elements, one indicated the controversies which were caused by the concept of justification, and which to a great extent were associated with the violation, by the Supreme Court, of the constitutional principle of the tripartite division of powers and with the substantive and temporal limits of the right to defence which result both from the norms of international and domestic law. One indicated the position of the representatives of the doctrine as to the concept of justification. Scholarship on the subject, even though it did not take a uniform stand in reference to the problem in question, basically discerned the necessity of the improvement of the situation of the witness – the actual perpetrator, who, testifying in his or her own case, would run the risk of self-incrimination. The considerations of the doctrine resulted in numerous alternative propositions de lege ferenda. In the work, one suggests to seek such a solution in the substantive approach to the nemo se ipsum accusare tenetur rule. Then it was emphasised that the problem of justification once again became the subject of discussion owing to the amendment issued on 11 March 2016 about the modification of the act of law – The Code of Criminal Procedure and certain other acts of law Art. 233 §1a kk. At that time one penalised the behaviour of a witness, who in fear of criminal liability to be faced by the witness or his relatives gives false testimony or conceals the truth. For the sake of recapitulation, one indicated that the amendment which was described above rendered the justification in question invalid, and the perpetrator who is heard in a court of law as a witness continues de lege lata to be entitled to use the right to refuse to answer the question from Art. 183 §1 kpk. One emphasised that the doctrine recurrently discerned the shortcomings of defence which result from Art. 183 §1 kpk. Above all the institution from Art. 183 §1 kpk was not intended for a witness – the actual perpetrator. Therefore, in the article, in order to realise the warranty nature of the entitlement in question one suggests that this admonishment should be rendered obligatory, so that every witness would be aware that the right exists and that he or she may exercise it.
In the doctrine of criminal law, the term “qualified attempt” denotes two cases. Firstly, the term “qualified attempt” describes a situation in which, when the perpetrator, in their intent to commit a criminal act, directly aims to commit it but does not succeed (attempt), while fulfilling all premises of another criminal act (commission). In the second case, the term “qualified attempt” describes a situation in which the attempt at the commission of a criminal act is covered by the impunity clause on the basis of active grief, while the act of the perpetrator needs to be classified as a commission of a different criminal act. The article, following a general overview of the literature on the subject, presents the author’s own understanding of the term “qualified attempt”, which consists in the differentiation among attempt, cumulatively qualified attempt with commission, and non-punishable attempt subsumed as a punishable commission.
The penal measure of a prohibition on being in certain communities and locations, on contacting certain individuals or on approaching certain individuals or on leaving a specific place of residence without the court’s consent, evidently restricts the liberty of a person sentenced. The said restriction most of all serves to implement the preventative function of penal law, particularly the protection of the victim against the repeat victimisation. At the same time, however, implementing this measure interferes with the victim’s life. Insofar as the restriction of the perpetrator’s liberty is in this case fully justified, ignoring the opinion of the victim in decision-making process pertaining to implementation of the discussed legal measure does not meet the constitutional criterion of proportionality.