scholarly journals A Henkin-Style Completeness Proof for the Modal Logic S5

2021 ◽  
pp. 459-467
Author(s):  
Bruno Bentzen
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 637-662
Author(s):  
MATTHEW HARRISON-TRAINOR

AbstractThis article builds on Humberstone’s idea of defining models of propositional modal logic where total possible worlds are replaced by partial possibilities. We follow a suggestion of Humberstone by introducing possibility models for quantified modal logic. We show that a simple quantified modal logic is sound and complete for our semantics. Although Holliday showed that for many propositional modal logics, it is possible to give a completeness proof using a canonical model construction where every possibility consists of finitely many formulas, we show that this is impossible to do in the first-order case. However, one can still construct a canonical model where every possibility consists of a computable set of formulas and thus still of finitely much information.


2021 ◽  
Vol Volume 17, Issue 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ki Yung Ahn ◽  
Ross Horne ◽  
Alwen Tiu

Open bisimilarity is defined for open process terms in which free variables may appear. The insight is, in order to characterise open bisimilarity, we move to the setting of intuitionistic modal logics. The intuitionistic modal logic introduced, called $\mathcal{OM}$, is such that modalities are closed under substitutions, which induces a property known as intuitionistic hereditary. Intuitionistic hereditary reflects in logic the lazy instantiation of free variables performed when checking open bisimilarity. The soundness proof for open bisimilarity with respect to our intuitionistic modal logic is mechanised in Abella. The constructive content of the completeness proof provides an algorithm for generating distinguishing formulae, which we have implemented. We draw attention to the fact that there is a spectrum of bisimilarity congruences that can be characterised by intuitionistic modal logics.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 123
Author(s):  
Max Cresswell

In 1945 J.C.C. McKinsey produced a ‘semantics’ for modal logic based on necessity defined in terms of validity. The present papers looks at how to update F.R. Drake’s completeness proof for McKinsey’s semantics by comparing McKinsey ‘models’ with the now standard Kripke models. It also looks at the motivation behind the system McKinsey called S4.1, but which we now call S4M; and use this motivation to produce a McKinsey semantics for that system. One lesson which emerges from this work is an appreciation of the superiority of the current possible worlds semantics based on frames and models, both in terms of an intuitive understanding of modality, and also in terms of the ease of working with particular systems.


2005 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greg Restall

his paper provides a sound and complete axiomatisation for constant domain modal logics without Boolean negation. This is a simpler case of the difficult problem of providing a sound and complete axiomatisation for constant-domain quantified relevant logics, which can be seen as a kind of modal logic with a two-place modal operator, the relevant conditional. The completeness proof is adapted from a proof for classical modal predicate logic (I follow James Garson’s 1984 presentation of the completeness proof quite closely), but with an important twist, to do with the absence of Boolean negation.


2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Cresswell

  The paper first proves the completeness of the (non-modal) first-order predicate logic presented in Carnap’s 1946 article ‘Modalities and quantification’. By contrast the modal logic defined by the semantics Carnap produces is unaxiomatisable. One can though adapt Carnap’s semantics so that a standard completeness proof for a Carnapian version of predicate S5 turns out to be available.//


Author(s):  
Brian F. Chellas
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-27
Author(s):  
Ja. O. Petik

The connection of the modern psychology and formal systems remains an important direction of research. This paper is centered on philosophical problems surrounding relations between mental and logic. Main attention is given to philosophy of logic but certain ideas are introduced that can be incorporated into the practical philosophical logic. The definition and properties of basic modal logic and descending ones which are used in study of mental activity are in view. The defining role of philosophical interpretation of modality for the particular formal system used for research in the field of psychological states of agents is postulated. Different semantics of modal logic are studied. The hypothesis about the connection of research in cognitive psychology (semantics of brain activity) and formal systems connected to research of psychological states is stated.


2007 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-27
Author(s):  
Gerald Massey

Contending that the quest for a logic of scientific discovery was prematurely abandoned, the author lays down eight phenomena that such a logic or theory must explain: the banality of scientific discovery; the trainability of scientists; the high incidence of simultaneous discoveries; the ubiquity of relative novices; the fact of scientific genius; the barrenness of isolated workers; the incommensurability of concepts of successive theories; and the quasi-incorporation of old concepts, objects, and methods in successor theories, The author then presents a new theory or logic of discovery according to which discoveries are the termini of "tweak paths" generated when scientists "tinker" with the laws, concepts, methods, and instruments of a given theory. Tinkering and tweaking are illustrated by examples from many-valued and modal logic and from Darwinian biology. Through the history of planetary discovery, the accidental role played by luck or good fortune in some discoveries is explored, but the author emphasizes that in a deep sense serendipity is an in eliminable feature of all scientific discovery because scientists never know m advance whether their tweaks will lead to dead ends or to positive developments. The author's new theory of scientific discovery is shown to account for all eight explananda, ft also reveals science to be a more egalitarian enterprise than the traditional view of scientific discovery as ultimately inexplicable depicts it.


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