scholarly journals Epistemic vice predicts acceptance of Covid-19 misinformation

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Marco Meyer ◽  
Mark Alfano ◽  
Boudewijn de Bruin

Abstract Why are mistaken beliefs about COVID-19 so prevalent? Political identity, education and other demographic variables explain only part of the differences between people in their susceptibility to COVID-19 misinformation. This paper focuses on another explanation: epistemic vice. Epistemic vices are character traits that interfere with acquiring, maintaining, and transmitting knowledge. If the basic assumption of vice epistemology is right, then people with epistemic vices such as indifference to the truth or rigidity in their belief structures will tend to be more susceptible to believing COVID-19 misinformation. We carried out an observational study (US adult sample, n = 998) in which we measured the level of epistemic vice of participants using a novel Epistemic Vice Scale that captures features of the current competing analyses of epistemic vice in the literature. We also asked participants questions eliciting the extent to which they subscribe to myths and misinformation about COVID-19. We find overwhelming evidence to the effect that epistemic vice is associated with susceptibility to COVID-19 misinformation. In fact, the association turns out to be stronger than with political identity, educational attainment, scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test, personality, dogmatism, and need for closure. We conclude that this offers evidence in favor of the empirical presuppositions of vice epistemology.

2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Białek ◽  
Przemysław Sawicki

Abstract. In this work, we investigated individual differences in cognitive reflection effects on delay discounting – a preference for smaller sooner over larger later payoff. People are claimed to prefer more these alternatives they considered first – so-called reference point – over the alternatives they considered later. Cognitive reflection affects the way individuals process information, with less reflective individuals relying predominantly on the first information they consider, thus, being more susceptible to reference points as compared to more reflective individuals. In Experiment 1, we confirmed that individuals who scored high on the Cognitive Reflection Test discount less strongly than less reflective individuals, but we also show that such individuals are less susceptible to imposed reference points. Experiment 2 replicated these findings additionally providing evidence that cognitive reflection predicts discounting strength and (in)dependency to reference points over and above individual difference in numeracy.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kilian James Garvey ◽  
Laura Folse ◽  
Crystal Curry

2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110693
Author(s):  
Cyril Thomas ◽  
Marion Botella ◽  
André Didierjean

To facilitate our interactions with the surroundings, the human brain sometimes reshapes the situations that it faces in order to simplify them. This phenomenon has been widely studied in the context of reasoning, especially through the attribute substitution error. It has however been given much less attention in the field of perception. Recent research on the bat-and-ball problem suggests that reasoners are able to intuitively detect attribute substitution errors. Using a perceptual illusion drawn from the field of magic, we investigate the extent to which a perceptual form of attribute substitution depends on executive resources and can be detected. We also investigate the relationship between susceptibility to attribute substitution error in the flushtration count illusion and in a French adaptation of the bat-and ball problem. Finally, we investigate the link between the intuitive cognitive style (assessed by the Cognitive Reflection Test) and the susceptibility to the flushtration count illusion. Our results suggest that participants do not detect perceptual attribute substitution error, that this phenomenon could be independent of the executive resources allocated to the task, and could rest on mechanisms distinct from those that produce errors in reasoning. We discuss differences between these two phenomena, and factors that may explain them.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 207-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Szaszi ◽  
A. Szollosi ◽  
B. Palfi ◽  
B. Aczel

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eoin Travers ◽  
Jonathan J. Rolison ◽  
Aidan Feeney

2020 ◽  
Vol 284 ◽  
pp. 112683 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pugaliya Puveendrakumaran ◽  
Gagan Fervaha ◽  
Fernando Caravaggio ◽  
Gary Remington

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (7) ◽  
pp. 890-897 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik L. Knight ◽  
Blakeley B. McShane ◽  
Hana H. Kutlikova ◽  
Pablo J. Morales ◽  
Colton B. Christian ◽  
...  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document