Bargaining and Justice
1985 ◽
Vol 2
(2)
◽
pp. 29-47
◽
Keyword(s):
My concern in this paper is with the illumination that the theory of rational bargaining sheds on the formulation of principles of justice. I shall first set out the bargaining problem, as treated in the theory of games, and the Nash solution, or solution F. I shall then argue against the axiom, labeled “independence of irrelevant alternatives,” which distinguished solution F, and also against the Zeuthen model of the bargaining process which F formalizes.
Keyword(s):
2011 ◽
Vol 19
(01)
◽
pp. 39-49
◽
2012 ◽
pp. 30-49
◽
2016 ◽
Vol 1
(1)
◽
pp. 83-106
Keyword(s):