SOLUTION CONCEPT FOR A TWO PERSON BARGAINING PROBLEM WITH UNKNOWN PARAMETERS

2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (01) ◽  
pp. 39-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
ACHEMINE FARIDA ◽  
MERAKEB ABDELKADER
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Solution ◽  
Unknown Parameters ◽  
Complete Ignorance ◽  
The Nash Solution

In this paper, we study a concept of solution for a bargaining problem involving two players and unknown parameters in the case of complete ignorance. The solution we propose is based on the Nash solution for a bargaining problem and the maxmin principle of Wald. We also give some properties of this solution and sufficient conditions for its existence. Finally, we propose an adequate procedure for its determination and an illustrative example.

SOLUTION CONCEPT FOR A NON-COOPERATIVE GAME WITH FUZZY PARAMETERS

2006 ◽  
Vol 08 (03) ◽  
pp. 489-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
FATIHA KACHER ◽  
MOUSSA LARBANI
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Decision Making Under Uncertainty ◽  
Unknown Parameters ◽  
Complete Ignorance ◽  
Payoff Functions ◽  
Fuzzy Parameters

In this paper, we study a non cooperative game with payoff functions involving fuzzy parameters. We introduce a concept of solution for this game that we call α-N-S- equilibrium. Our definition is derived from the concept of N-S equilibrium introduced by Zhukovskii for a non cooperative game with payoffs involving unknown parameters in the case of complete ignorance of their behavior. The α-N-S- equilibrium takes into account both the aspect of conflict and the aspect of decision making under uncertainty related to the presence of fuzzy parameters. For the aspect of conflict we adopted the Nash equilibrium, for the aspect of uncertainty we adopted the maximin approach through weak Pareto optimality. Furthermore, we give sufficient conditions for its existence.

Bargaining and Justice

1985 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gauthier
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Solution ◽  
Bargaining Process ◽  
Independence Of Irrelevant Alternatives ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Nash Solution

My concern in this paper is with the illumination that the theory of rational bargaining sheds on the formulation of principles of justice. I shall first set out the bargaining problem, as treated in the theory of games, and the Nash solution, or solution F. I shall then argue against the axiom, labeled “independence of irrelevant alternatives,” which distinguished solution F, and also against the Zeuthen model of the bargaining process which F formalizes.

The Nash Solution to the Bargaining Problem

2012 ◽  
pp. 30-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon C. Rausser ◽  
Jo Swinnen ◽  
Pinhas Zusman
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Solution ◽  
The Nash Solution

Ultimatum Game Bargaining Behaviour: A Classroom Experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. 232102222110244
Author(s):  
Metin Tetik ◽  
Gamzegül Tetik
Keyword(s):  
Classroom Environment ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Nash Solution ◽  
Final Exam ◽  
Jel Codes ◽  
Classroom Experiment ◽  
Ultimatum Bargaining Game ◽  
The Nash Solution

This study aims to investigate the types of bargaining behaviour students have and the variables that affect these bargaining behaviours by designing an ultimatum bargaining game in the classroom environment (during the real exam). The experimental group consists of 202 students who took the spring term economics final exam. The strategic interaction between students was formulated as a two-person bargaining problem. A cooperative solution was based on the Nash solution also obtained for bargaining problem among students. The findings of this study show that the highest bargaining equilibrium in this game is the equilibrium status based on the Nash solution. Moreover, we concluded that the success of the economy course and the grade-level affect the students’ behaviour according to the equilibrium strategy based on the Nash solution. JEL Codes: C90, C70, C78, C57

Complex projection synchronization of fractional order uncertain complex-valued networks with time-varying coupling

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (29) ◽  
pp. 1950351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dawei Ding ◽  
Xiaolei Yao ◽  
Hongwei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Fractional Order ◽  
Coupling Strength ◽  
Dynamic Networks ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Feedback Gain ◽  
Time Varying ◽  
Order Complex ◽  
Unknown Parameters ◽  
Synchronization Problem ◽  
Complex Valued

In this paper, the complex projection synchronization problem of fractional complex-valued dynamic networks is investigated. Considering the time-varying coupling and unknown parameters of the fractional order complex network, several decentralized adaptive strategies are designed to adjust the coupling strength and controller feedback gain in order to investigate the complex projection synchronization problem of the system. Moreover, based on the designed identification law, the uncertain parameters in the network can be estimated. Using adaptive law which balances the time-varying coupling strength and the feedback gain of the controller, some sufficient conditions are obtained for the complex projection synchronization of complex networks. Finally, numerical simulation examples are provided to illustrate the efficiency of the complex projection synchronization strategies of the fractional order complex dynamic networks.

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