7. Law, Politics, and the Use of Force

Author(s):  
Justin Morris

This chapter examines the place of international law in international politics, with particular emphasis on whether legal constraint is effective in averting or limiting the use of force by states. It begins with a discussion of the efficacy of international law in regulating the behaviour of states, focusing on the so-called perception–reality gap in international law. It then considers various reasons why states obey the law, from fear of coercion to self-interest and perceptions of legitimacy. It also explores the role and status of breaches of international law in international politics as well as the functions of the two laws of armed conflict, namely, jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Finally, it analyses the apparent paradox of legal constraint on warfare in relation to power politics and the mitigatory effects of norms governing the conduct of war.

Author(s):  
Justin Morris

This chapter explores the role of international law in international politics, with particular emphasis on the effectiveness of legal constraint of the use of force by states. It first considers the effect of international law on state behaviour, focusing on the so-called ‘perception–reality gap’, before discussing three reasons why states obey the law: coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy. It then examines the concepts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello; the former governs and seeks to limit resort to armed force in the conduct of international relations, while the latter governs and seeks to moderate the actual conduct of hostilities. Jus in bello is further subdivided into Geneva law and Hague law, both of which generally have the status of jus cogens.


2019 ◽  
pp. 377-406
Author(s):  
Gleider Hernández

This chapter assesses the law of armed conflict. The right to resort to armed force, known as ‘jus ad bellum’, is a body of law that addresses the permissibility of entering into war in the first place. Despite the restrictions imposed by this body of law, it is clear that international law does not fully forbid the use of force, and instances of armed disputes between and within States continue to exist. Consequently, a second, older body of law exists called ‘jus in bello’, or the law of armed conflict, which has sought to restrain, or at least to regulate, the actual conduct of hostilities. The basic imperative of this body of law has been to restrict warfare in order to account for humanitarian principles by prohibiting certain types of weapons, or protecting certain categories of persons, such as wounded combatants, prisoners of war, or the civilian population.


2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (864) ◽  
pp. 779-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Enzo Cannizzaro

AbstractThis article analyses the role and content of proportionality under contemporary international law governing the use of force, with a view to clarifying the legal framework governing the conduct of the parties to an armed conflict. In the system of jus ad bellum, protection is primarily granted to the interest of the attacked state in repelling the attack; the other competing interests are considered only to curtail the choice of the means to be employed in order to achieve that aim. Conversely, in the system of jus in bello there is by definition no prevailing interest, but instead a variety of interests and values which are entitled to equal protection of the law and must be balanced against each other. The existence of two distinct normative systems, with distinct standards of legality applicable to the same conduct, does not as a rule give rise to major problems. The legality of recourse to force is measured against the proportionality of self-defence, whereas individual actions would have to conform to the requirement of proportionality in jus in bello. However, beyond the large area in which these two standards overlap, there might be situations in which the strict application of the jus ad bellum standard makes it impossible to achieve the aims of jus in bello. In these cases, the proportionality test under jus in bello must be regarded as part of the proportionality test under jus ad bellum. States must thus take humanitarian implications into account in determining the level of security they may seek to obtain using military action.


2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 203-237
Author(s):  
Nicholas Tsagourias ◽  
Russell Buchan

Automatic cyber defence describes computer operations to neutralise a cyber attack. Once a system detects that it is under cyber attack, it automatically launches offensive cyber operations that pursue the attacker back to its own network with the objective of rescuing stolen data or disabling or destroying the computer hardware and software that is responsible for hosting and distributing the attacking code. The aim of this article is to examine the legality of automatic cyber defence under the law regulating the use of force in international law (jus ad bellum) and under international humanitarian law (jus in bello). Thus, the first part of this article examines automatic cyber defence in the context of the jus ad bellum by considering the legal requirements of an armed attack, necessity, and proportionality. In the second part, it examines the jus in bello aspects of automatic cyber defence and, in particular, whether it triggers an international or a non-international armed conflict and, if so, whether it can comply with the principles of distinction and proportionality.


2014 ◽  
Vol 96 (893) ◽  
pp. 67-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jelena Pejic

AbstractThe use of “drones” has grown exponentially over the past decade, giving rise to a host of legal and other issues. Internationally, it is the utilization of armed drones by States for the extraterritorial targeting of persons that has generated significant debate. This article attempts to outline some aspects of the relevant legal framework, with a focus on the international law applicable to drone strikes in situations of armed conflict. It briefly addresses thejus ad bellumand then centres on thejus in bello, addressing, in turn, questions related to when there is an armed conflict, what the rules on targeting are, who may be targeted and where persons may be targeted.


2009 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 53-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Goodman

AbstractAccording to a bedrock principle of international law, the rules regulating the recourse to war and the rules regulating conduct during war must be kept conceptually and legally distinct. The purported independence of the two domains – the ‘separation principle’ – remains unstable despite its historic pedigree. This essay explores recent developments that threaten to erode the separation. The author analyzes, in particular, doctrinal innovations that result in the regulation of the recourse to war through alterations of jus in bello. International and national institutions have incentivized states to pursue particular paths to war by tailoring the rules that regulate conduct in armed conflict. Some warpaths are accordingly rewarded, and others are penalized. The article then explores potential consequences, first, on state behavior involving the use of force and, second, on state behavior involving the conduct of warfare. One significant conclusion is that these recent developments channel state behavior and justifications for using force toward security-based and strategic rationales. These efforts – whether intended or not – risk suppressing ‘desirable wars’ and inspiring ‘undesirable wars.’ These recent developments also undercut humanitarian protections by undermining the mechanisms for compliance with legal norms on the battlefield.


2020 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-62
Author(s):  
Ka Lok Yip

This article examines the tendencies to define the scope of application of jus ad bellum negatively in relation to the scope of application of jus in bello and demonstrates their neutralizing effect on the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. It argues that individual acts of use of force during an international armed conflict regulated by jus in bello, whether in combat, in restricting the freedom of enemy nationals or in maintaining an occupation, are equally regulated by jus ad bellum. It clarifies the concept of ‘separation’ between jus ad bellum and jus in bello as the insulation between the results of their respective application, not the differentiation between their respective temporal, material and normative scopes of application. It also addresses the practical concerns raised by this conception of ‘separation’ between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Cet article examine les tendances à définir négativement le champ d’application du jus ad bellum par rapport au champ d’application du jus in bello et démontre l’effet neutral­isateur qu’elles ont sur l’emploi de la force tel que défini à l’article 2(4) de la Charte des Nations Unies. L’auteur affirme que les actes individuels de recours à la force lors d’un conflit armé international réglementé par le jus in bello, que ce soit lors d’un combat, en limitant la liberté des ressortissants ennemis ou en maintenant une occupation, sont réglementés de façon identique par le jus ad bellum. Il clarifie le concept de ‘séparation’ entre le jus ad bellum et le jus in bello comme étant l’isolation entre les résultats de leur application respective, et non comme la différenciation entre leurs champs d’application temporel, matériel et normatif. Il aborde également les préoccupations pratiques engen­drées par cette conception de la « séparation » entre jus ad bellum et jus in bello. In dit artikel worden de tendensen onderzocht om het toepassingsgebied van het jus ad bellum negatief te definiëren ten opzichte van het toepassingsgebied van het jus in bello en wordt het neutraliserende effect ervan op het verbod op het gebruik van geweld volgens artikel 2(4) van het Handvest van de Verenigde Naties aangetoond. De auteur betoogt dat het individuele gebruik van geweld tijdens een internationaal gewapend conflict dat door het jus in bello wordt geregeld, hetzij in gevechtssituaties, hetzij bij de vrijheidsbeperking van vijandige staatsburgers, hetzij bij de handhaving van een bezetting, evenzeer door het jus ad bellum wordt geregeld. Het artikel verduidelijkt het begrip ‘scheiding’ tussen het jus ad bellum en het jus in bello als de isolatie van de resultaten van hun respectieve toepassing en niet het onderscheid tussen hun respectieve temporele, materiële en normatieve toepassingsgebieden. In het artikel wordt ook ingegaan op de praktische bezwaren die deze opvatting van 'scheiding' tussen jus ad bellum en jus in bello met zich meebrengt. El artículo examina las tendencias conducentes a definir el ámbito de aplicación del jus ad bellum por defecto frente al ámbito de aplicación del jus in bello y demuestra su efecto inocuo partiendo de la prohibición del uso de la fuerza prevista en el Artículo 2(4) de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas. Se mantiene que los actos individuales de uso de la fuerza durante un conflicto armado internacional regulados por el jus in bello y ya sea en combate o restringiendo la libertad de ciudadanos enemigos o durante la ocupación, se encuentran igualmente regulados por el jus ad bellum. Se aclara el concepto de “separación” entre el jus ad bellum y el jus in bello partiendo de la base de los resultados de su aplicación respectiva y no a través de sus correspondientes ámbitos de aplicación temporal, material y normativa. También se abordan los problemas prácticos suscitados por el concepto de “separación” entre el jus ad bellum y el jus in bello. Questo articolo esamina le tendenze a definire negativamente il campo di applicazione dello jus ad bellum in relazione al campo di applicazione dello jus in bello e dimostra il loro effetto neutralizzante sulla proibizione all’uso della forza ai sensi dall’Articolo 2(4) della Carta della Nazioni Unite. L’articolo sostiene che i singoli atti dell’uso della forza durante un conflitto armato internazionale disciplinato dallo jus in bello, che siano in combattimento, nella limitazione della libertà dei cittadini nemici o nel mantenere un’occupazione, siano ugualmente disciplinati dallo jus ad bellum. Chiarisce il concetto di "separazione" tra jus ad bellum e jus in bello isolandone gli effetti della loro rispettiva applicazione, non come differenziazione tra i rispettivi ambiti di applicazione temporale, materiale e normativa. Risponde anche alle preoccupazioni pratiche sollevate da questa concezione di 'separazione' tra jus ad bellum e jus in bello. Dieser Artikel prüft die Tendenzen, den Anwendungsbereich des jus ad bellum im negativen Sinne gegenüber dem Anwendungsbereich des jus in bello zu bestimmen, und weist ihre neutralisierende Wirkung auf das Verbot der Gewaltanwendung gemäß Artikel 2(4) der Charta der Vereinten Nationen nach. Der Autor behauptet, dass individuelle Taten der Gewaltanwendung während eines internationalen bewaffneten Konflikts, die dem jus in bello unterliegen – sei es im Kampf, bei der Freiheitsbeschränkung feindlicher Staatsangehöriger oder bei der Aufrechterhaltung einer Besatzung – ebenso gut dem jus ad bellum unterliegen. Er erklärt das Konzept der ‘Trennung’ zwischen dem jus ad bellum und dem jus in bello als die Isolierung der Ergebnisse ihrer jeweiligen Anwendung, und nicht als Differenzierung zwischen ihren jeweiligen zeitlichen, materiellen und normativen Anwendungsbereichen. Er befasst sich auch mit den praktischen Fragen, die diese Auffassung der ‘Trennung’ zwischen dem jus ad bellum und dem jus in bello aufwirft.


2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jann K Kleffner

Section IX of the ICRC Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities asserts: ‘In addition to the restraints imposed by international humanitarian law on specific means and methods of warfare, and without prejudice to further restrictions that may arise under other applicable branches of international law, the kind and degree of force which is permissible against persons not entitled to protection against direct attack must not exceed what is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing circumstances’. The present article scrutinises arguments that have been, or can be, advanced in favour of and against a ‘least harmful means’ requirement for the use of force in situations of armed conflict as suggested in Section IX. The principal aim of the article is to examine the question whether such an additional proportionality requirement forms part of the applicable international lex lata.


2016 ◽  
Vol 110 (4) ◽  
pp. 646-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashley S. Deeks

When President Barack Obama came into office in 2009 in the midst of serious, ongoing terrorist threats to the United States, he confronted important choices about how to approach the bodies of international law that regulate the resort to force and the conduct of armed conflict. By many accounts, the Bush administration had taken a maximalist approach to those bodies of international law, staking out broad substantive claims about what international law permitted in resorting to force and in detaining and treating members of Al Qaeda, and asserting those claims publicly and frequently.The Obama administration has repeatedly taken a notably different tack, employing an approach that we might characterize as “executive minimalism.” That is, the Obama administration has signaled to other states its interest in self-constraint by making fewer bold substantive and rhetorical claims related to the jus ad bellum and jus in bello. It has pursued this objective partly by establishing various policies that authorize a narrower scope of action than what some believe international law permits. In particular contexts, it has also been more hesitant as a rhetorical matter to assert precise legal claims about what international law allows or where international law's limits lie. Accordingly, the Obama administration has sometimes taken action in the face of two (or more) possible legal theories without articulating its specific rationale.


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