Harsh but Expedient: Dominant Leaders Increase Group Cooperation via Threat of Punishment

2021 ◽  
pp. 095679762110312
Author(s):  
Fan Xuan Chen ◽  
Xinyu Zhang ◽  
Lasse Laustsen ◽  
Joey T. Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Personality Profiles ◽  
Nonsignificant Trend ◽  
Facial Masculinity ◽  
Intergroup Competition ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
Bidding Process

Dominant leadership is, surprisingly, on the rise globally. Previous studies have found that intergroup conflict increases followers’ support for dominant leaders, but identifying the potential benefits that such leaders can supply is crucial to explaining their rise. We took a behavioral-economics approach in Study 1 ( N = 288 adults), finding that cooperation among followers increases under leaders with a dominant reputation. This pattern held regardless of whether dominant leaders were assigned to groups, elected through a bidding process, or leading under intergroup competition. Moreover, Studies 2a to 2e ( N = 1,022 adults) show that impressions of leader dominance evoked by personality profiles, authoritarian attitudes, or physical formidability similarly increase follower cooperation. We found a weaker but nonsignificant trend when dominance was cued by facial masculinity and no evidence when dominance was cued by aggressive disposition in a decision game. These findings highlight the unexpected benefits that dominant leaders can bestow on group cooperation through threat of punishment.

Group Cooperation, Carrying-Capacity Stress, and Intergroup Conflict

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (9) ◽  
pp. 760-776
Author(s):  
Carsten K.W. De Dreu ◽  
Jörg Gross ◽  
Andrea Fariña ◽  
Yina Ma
Keyword(s):  
Carrying Capacity ◽  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Group Cooperation

scholarly journals Parochial Versus Universal Cooperation: Introducing a Novel Economic Game of Within- and Between-Group Interaction

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hillie Aaldering ◽  
Robert Böhm
Keyword(s):  
Social Dominance ◽  
Social Dominance Orientation ◽  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Social Value Orientation ◽  
Group Interactions ◽  
Group Relations ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Natural Groups

Engaging in personally costly within-group cooperation benefits one’s in-group members but also impacts other groups by benefiting, neglecting, or harming out-group members, leading to a range of potential consequences for between-group relations (e.g., collaboration vs. competition). We introduce the Intergroup Parochial and Universal Cooperation (IPUC) game to investigate the prevalence of the individual preferences underlying these different expressions of within-group cooperation: universalism, weak parochialism, and strong parochialism. In two online experiments with natural groups, we show that the IPUC has value beyond existing economic games in measuring these preferences separately. In a third experiment conducted in the lab, we show how dispositional measures traditionally associated with within- and between-group cooperation, that is, social value orientation, social dominance orientation, honesty-humility, and empathic concern, predict different preferences. Thus, the IPUC provides a tool to better understand within- and between-group interactions and to test interventions to overcome intergroup conflict.

scholarly journals Asymmetries in Altruistic Behavior during Violent Intergroup Conflict

2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 147470491301100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes Rusch
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Behavioral Responses ◽  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Experimental Investigations ◽  
Historical Case ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
Attack And Defense ◽  
Attacks And Defenses ◽  
Case Data

Recent theoretical and experimental investigations of altruistic behavior in intergroup conflict in humans frequently make use of the assumption that warfare can be modeled as a symmetrical n-person prisoner's dilemma, abstracting away the strategic differences between attack and defense. In contrast, some empirical studies on intergroup conflict in hunter-gatherer societies and chimpanzees indicate that fitness relevant risks and potential benefits of attacks and defenses might have differed substantially under ancestral conditions. Drawing on these studies, it is hypothesized that the success of defenses was much more important for individual and kin survival and that a disposition to act altruistically during intergroup conflict is thus more likely to evolve for the strategic situation of defense. It is then investigated empirically if such asymmetries in the occurrence of altruistic behavior during intergroup conflict can be found. Analyzing detailed historical case data from 20th century wars, this study finds that altruistic behavior towards members of the in-group indeed seems to occur more frequently when soldiers are defending themselves and their comrades against enemy attacks. It is proposed that this asymmetry reflects adaptive behavioral responses to the materially different strategic character of attacks and defenses under ancestral conditions. If true, this would call for a refinement of theories of the evolutionary interaction of intergroup conflict and altruism.

Towards the elucidation of evolution of out-group aggression

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nobuhiro Mifune ◽  
Dora Simunovic
Keyword(s):  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Evolutionary Perspective ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Experimental Protocols

Abstract We focus on the implications of De Dreu and Gross's findings for the evolutionary perspective on out-group aggression and in-group cooperation. Although their experimental protocols are potentially useful in determining the origins of out-group aggression in humans, they so far provide inconclusive evidence only. We suggest ways of furthering our understanding of the connection between parochial cooperation and intergroup conflict.

scholarly journals The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denis Tverskoi ◽  
Athmanathan Senthilnathan ◽  
Sergey Gavrilets
Keyword(s):  
Social Dynamics ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Collective Actions ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Equilibrium Dynamics ◽  
Analytical Approximations ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
Stable Equilibria ◽  
Large Groups

Most human societies are characterized by the presence of groups which cooperate through joint actions but also compete for resources and power. The processes of within- and between- group cooperation and competition have shaped human history over the last several millennia. To deepen our understanding of the underlying social dynamics, we model a society subdivided into groups with constant sizes and dynamically changing powers. Both individuals within groups and groups themselves participate in collective actions. The groups are also engaged in political contests over power which determines how resources are distributed. Using analytical approximations and agent-based simulations, we show that the model exhibits rich behavior characterized by multiple stable equilibria and, under some conditions, non-equilibrium dynamics. The strength of democratic institutions plays a key role: increasing it promotes cooperation, reduces variation in power, and mitigates inequality among groups. We show that increasing potential benefits of between-group cooperation promotes it only in societies with strong democratic institutions. We show that small groups are successful in competition if the jointly-produced goods are rivalrous and the potential benefit of cooperation is small. Otherwise large groups dominate. Overall our model contributes towards a better understanding of the causes of variation between societies in terms of the economic and political inequality within them.

Anger, legacies of violence, and group conflict: An experiment in post-riot Acre, Israel

2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 402-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Zeitzoff
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Intergroup Relations ◽  
Representative Sample ◽  
Neutral Condition ◽  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Group Conflict ◽  
Qualitative Information ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
High Aggression ◽  
Field Setting

Extant research hypothesizes that anger over past intergroup conflict serves as a catalyst for future conflict. However, few studies have experimentally tested this hypothesis on a representative sample in a high-stakes, field setting. I use a behavioral economics experiment to measure how anger over past conflict influences intergroup relations. Subjects were sampled proportional to population and ethnicity in Acre, Israel, a mixed city of Jews and Palestinian Citizens of Israel that experienced ethnic riots in 2008. The experiment randomly assigned subjects to an anger treatment about the riots or a neutral condition. Subjects then allocated income between themselves and three partners: one from their ingroup, one from their outgroup, and one whose identity was unclear. I find that priming anger over the riots did not increase discrimination. Rather, it reduced altruism to all groups, and this result was strongest for “high aggression” types. Qualitative information suggests that blame for the riots falls on both ingroup and outgroup members.

scholarly journals Oxytocin modulates selection of allies in intergroup conflict

2011 ◽  
Vol 279 (1731) ◽  
pp. 1150-1154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carsten K. W. De Dreu ◽  
Lindred L. Greer ◽  
Michel J. J. Handgraaf ◽  
Shaul Shalvi ◽  
Gerben A. Van Kleef
Keyword(s):  
Controlled Experiment ◽  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Double Blind ◽  
Double Blind Placebo ◽  
Intergroup Competition ◽  
Selection Decisions ◽  
High Threat ◽  
Selection Of

In intergroup competition and conflict, humans benefit from coalitions with strong partners who help them to protect their in-group and prevail over competing out-groups. Here, we link oxytocin, a neuropeptide produced in the hypothalamus, to ally selection in intergroup competition. In a double-blind placebo-controlled experiment, males self-administered oxytocin or placebo, and made selection decisions about six high-threat and six low-threat targets as potential allies in intergroup competition. Males given oxytocin rather than placebo viewed high-threat targets as more useful allies and more frequently selected them into their team than low-threat targets.

Intergroup competition may not be needed for shaping group cooperation and cultural group selection

2016 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carsten K. W. De Dreu ◽  
Daniel Balliet
Keyword(s):  
Group Selection ◽  
Cultural Group ◽  
Group Effectiveness ◽  
Intergroup Interactions ◽  
Cultural Group Selection ◽  
Intergroup Competition ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Group Trust

AbstractBecause intergroup interactions often are mixed-motive rather than strictly zero-sum, groups often negotiate settlements that enable both cultures to thrive. Moreover, group prosperity rests on in-group love (rather than out-group hate) that emerges also absent intergroup competition or comparison. It follows that cultural group selection (CGS) reflects group effectiveness in organizing in-group trust and cooperation, rather than winning (in)direct intergroup competitions.

scholarly journals Oxytocin reactivity during intergroup conflict in wild chimpanzees

2016 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 268-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liran Samuni ◽  
Anna Preis ◽  
Roger Mundry ◽  
Tobias Deschner ◽  
Catherine Crockford ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Last Common Ancestor ◽  
Potential Threat ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Neuropeptide Hormone ◽  
History Of ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Intergroup Conflicts ◽  
Natural Settings

Intergroup conflict is evident throughout the history of our species, ubiquitous across human societies, and considered crucial for the evolution of humans’ large-scale cooperative nature. Like humans, chimpanzee societies exhibit intragroup coordination and coalitionary support during violent intergroup conflicts. In both species, cooperation among group members is essential for individuals to gain access to benefits from engaging in intergroup conflict. Studies suggest that a contributive mechanism regulating in-group cooperation during intergroup conflicts in humans involves the neuropeptide hormone oxytocin, known to influence trust, coordination, and social cognition, although evidence from natural settings is lacking. Here, applying a noninvasive method, we investigate oxytocinergic system involvement during natural intergroup conflicts in wild chimpanzees. We found that chimpanzees of both sexes had significantly higher urinary oxytocin levels immediately before and during intergroup conflict compared with controls. Also, elevated hormone levels were linked with greater cohesion during intergroup conflicts, rather than with the level of potential threat posed by rival groups, intragroup affiliative social interactions, or coordinated behavior alone. Thus, the oxytocinergic system, potentially engendering cohesion and cooperation when facing an out-group threat, may not be uniquely human but rather a mechanism with evolutionary roots shared by our last common ancestor with chimpanzees, likely expediting fitness gains during intergroup conflict.

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