Serfdom of the Glebe and Its Fiscal Regime:

2021 ◽  
pp. 213-234
Author(s):  
GHEORGHE I. BRĂTIANU
Keyword(s):  
1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Drudi ◽  
Alessandro Prati
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 179-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rowland Atkinson ◽  
Simon Parker ◽  
Roger Burrows

In this article we examine elite formation in relation to money power within the city of London. Our primary aim is to consider the impact of the massive concentration of such power upon the city’s political life, municipal and shared resources and social equity. We argue that objectives of city success have come to be identified and aligned with the presence of wealth elites while wider goals, of access to essential resources for citizens, have withered. A diverse national and global wealth-elite is drawn to a city with an almost unique cultural infrastructure, fiscal regime and ushering butler class of politicians. We consider how London is being made for money and the monied – in physical, political and cultural terms. We conclude that the conceptualization of elites as wealth and social power formations operating within urban spatial arenas is important for capturing the nature of new social divisions and changes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 32-68
Author(s):  
Cielo Magno ◽  
Ricardo Rafael S. Guzman

Abstract Economies that derive substantial government revenues from natural resources face the unique challenge of implementing fiscal regimes that deliver a fair share of rents without discouraging private investment in extractive sectors. However, designing progressive and non-distortionary fiscal tools requires an evaluation of the current fiscal regime and the extent to which it captures the resource rent – the surplus return above the value of capital, labor, and opportunity costs incurred to exploit the resource. To evaluate the efficiency of the Philippines’ fiscal regime, we compare the resource rent to government revenues from mining activity. Then, we estimate the effective tax rates under the current fiscal regime and other combinations of fiscal tools. First, we look at aggregated tax payments of all large-scale mining companies over a ten-year period and compare them with the estimated resource rent. Second, we model the different tax regimes using firm-level data from a nickel mine. We propose a fiscal regime for the mining sector in the Philippines that is least distortionary while appropriate given the country’s regulatory context and administrative capacity.


2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Hellinger

In the final 15 years of the Punto Fijo era (1958–1998), as state institutions and socioeconomic conditions deteriorated, the executive class of Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. broke free from state control. In his 15 years as president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez reasserted the state’s control over the company and reestablished a fiscal regime that brought the country enormous financial benefits. It is a legacy, however, that has an uncertain future. En los últimos 15 años de la era del Punto Fijo (1958–1998), mientras las instituciones estatales y las condiciones socioeconómicas se deterioraban, los ejecutivos de Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. se independizaron del control estatal. Durante sus 15 años como presidente de Venezuela, Hugo Chávez reafirmó el control del estado sobre esta compañía y reestableció un régimen fiscal que le rindió grandes beneficios económicos al país. Se trata, sin embargo, de un legado que tiene un futuro incierto.


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