Do low-confidence individuals decrease group judgments’ accuracy? Investigations in terms of the wisdom of crowds framework

In group judgments in a binary choice task, the judgments of individuals with low confidence (i.e., they feel that the judgment was not correct) may be regarded as unreliable. Previous studies have shown that aggregating individuals’ diverse judgments can lead to high accuracy in group judgments, a phenomenon known as the wisdom of crowds. Therefore, if low-confidence individuals make diverse judgments between individuals and the mean of accuracy of their judgments is above the chance level (.50), it is likely that they will not always decrease the accuracy of group judgments. To investigate this issue, the present study conducted behavioral experiments using binary choice inferential tasks, and computer simulations of group judgments by manipulating group sizes and individuals’ confidence levels. Results revealed that (I) judgment patterns were highly similar between individuals regardless of their confidence levels; (II) the low-confidence group could make judgments as accurate as the high-confidence group, as the group size increased; and (III) even if there were low-confidence individuals in a group, they generally did not inhibit group judgment accuracy. The results suggest the usefulness of low-confidence individuals’ judgments in a group and provide practical implications for real-world group judgments.

Do low-confidence individuals decrease group judgments’ accuracy? Investigations in terms of the wisdom of crowds framework

In group judgments in a binary choice task, the judgments of individuals with low confidence (i.e., they feel that the judgment was not correct) may be regarded as unreliable. Previous studies have shown that aggregating individuals’ diverse judgments can lead to high accuracy in group judgments, a phenomenon known as the wisdom of crowds. Therefore, if low-confidence individuals make diverse judgments between individuals and the mean of accuracy of their judgments is above the chance level (.50), it is likely that they will not always decrease the accuracy of group judgments. To investigate this issue, the present study conducted behavioral experiments using binary choice inferential tasks, and computer simulations of group judgments by manipulating group sizes and individuals’ confidence levels. Results revealed that (I) judgment patterns were highly similar between individuals regardless of their confidence levels; (II) the low-confidence group could make judgments as accurate as the high-confidence group, as the group size increased; and (III) even if there were low-confidence individuals in a group, they generally did not inhibit group judgment accuracy. The results suggest the usefulness of low-confidence individuals’ judgments in a group and provide practical implications for real-world group judgments.

The Wisdom of Crowds in FinTech: Evidence from Initial Coin Offerings

Certification by analysts on a FinTech platform that harnesses the “wisdom of crowds” is associated with successful initial coin offerings (ICOs). We show that favorable ratings by a group of analysts with diverse backgrounds positively predict fundraising success and long-run token performance. Analysts’ ratings also help detect potential fraud ex ante. We document that analysts have career concerns and are incentivized by the platform to issue informative ratings. Overall, our results suggest that a market-based certification process that relies on a diverse group of individuals is at play in financing blockchain startups. (JEL D82, G11, G24, G32, G34, L26). Received February 25, 2021; editorial decision July 7, 2021 by Editor Andrew Ellul. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Enhanced or distorted wisdom of crowds? An agent-based model of opinion formation under social influence

We propose an agent-based model of collective opinion formation to study the wisdom of crowds under social influence. The opinion of an agent is a continuous positive value, denoting its subjective answer to a factual question. The wisdom of crowds states that the average of all opinions is close to the truth, i.e., the correct answer. But if agents have the chance to adjust their opinion in response to the opinions of others, this effect can be destroyed. Our model investigates this scenario by evaluating two competing effects: (1) agents tend to keep their own opinion (individual conviction), (2) they tend to adjust their opinion if they have information about the opinions of others (social influence). For the latter, two different regimes (full information vs. aggregated information) are compared. Our simulations show that social influence only in rare cases enhances the wisdom of crowds. Most often, we find that agents converge to a collective opinion that is even farther away from the true answer. Therefore, under social influence the wisdom of crowds can be systematically wrong.