The Quantitative Evaluation of the Political Cost of Environmental Issues: A Case Study of a Typical Public Protest in China

It is of great reference significance for broadening the research perspective of environmental issues, improving the efficiency of government environmental governance and the credibility of the government, to scientifically measure and analyze the political cost of environmental issues. This article takes the typical case “protest event of power generation project of R steel plant in T city, China” as the research background. First, the generation process and action mechanism of the political cost of environmental issues in the actual situation are investigated. Then, through in-depth interview, multi-case grounded theory and fuzzy subordinate function analysis, the scientific construction of the political cost index system of environmental issues are completed. Finally, based on G1 method/entropy method combined with weighting and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method, the political cost of the protest events of R iron and steel plant in T city is measured. The results show that (1) it is important that good single dimensions and reliable indicators are embodied in the overall political cost scale. Among them, the behavioral political cost of the masses is the largest proportion of all indicators; (2) after the entire environmental mass incident is over, the political costs are difficult to repair, and some lagging ideas and behaviors shown by local governments lead to a continuous expansion of the political cost associated with environmental issues; and (3) local governments should not conceal information asymmetry. Instead, local governments should give greater freedom to other actors to deal with environmental problems. This will mitigate the effect of political costs. Corresponding policy recommendations are proposed.

Governing the covid-19 Pandemic in the Middle East and North Africa: Containment Measures as a Public Good

What determined how governments in the Middle East and North Africa reacted to the global covid-19 pandemic? We develop a theoretical argument based on the political costs of different policy options and assess its empirical relevance. Distinguishing between the immediate costs associated with decisive action and the potential costs of uncontrolled spread that are likely to accrue over the long term, we argue that leaders who have fewer incentives to provide public goods to stay in power will lock down later than their more constrained counterparts. We find empirical support for this argument in statistical analyses covering the 1 January – 30 November 2020 period using the Oxford covid-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) and our own original data on the timing of mosque closures and strict lockdowns across the region. We also illustrate our argument with a description of the response to the pandemic in Egypt.

Perceptions and purpose of the bomb: Explaining India's nuclear restraint against China

Much of the literature on India's nuclear programme assumes that China's nuclear capability drove New Delhi, the strategically weaker actor, to pursue a nuclear weapons capability. China's nuclear tests not only rendered New Delhi militarily insecure and dented its claim for the leadership of the Third World but they also polarized the domestic debate over the utility of the bomb. In the global scheme of nuclear proliferation, therefore, India was just another fallen nuclear domino. Marshalling recently declassified documents, this article revisits India's nuclear behaviour during the crucial decade between 1964 and 1974. By focusing on threat assessments made at the highest levels and internal deliberations of the Indian Government, this article shows how, contrary to the claims made in the literature, Indian decision-makers did not make much of the Chinese nuclear threat. This conviction emanated out of their distinct reading of the purpose of nuclear weapons in China's foreign and military policy; their perceptions of how India could achieve nuclear deterrence against China by using the bipolar international politics of the Cold War; and, finally, their understanding of the political costs of developing an indigenous nuclear response to China's nuclear threat. New Delhi's nuclear restraint resulted from its perceptions of Chinese nuclear intentions and its beliefs about the purpose of the bomb in Sino-Indian relations. India's perceptions of China as a nuclear adversary and its decision-makers’ views on the purpose of nuclear weapons in this rivalry were fundamentally different from the expectations set out by the domino theory of nuclear proliferation.

Attitudes Towards Refugees & Immigrants in Greece: a national-local comparative analysis

Over the past decade, Greece has received a significant number of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers who, due to specific decisions taken at both the EU and the national levels, have been “trapped” in Greece for an indefinite period. Dealing with this situation was, and still is, a hot issue, with state policies remaining focused on reception and control rather than on integration. Moreover, the spatial allocation of refugees in specific places throughout the country raised further debate, as they often provoked reactions (of substantial political costs), given that different localities tend to exhibit different attitudes and views towards refugees and immigrants. Since these perceptions seem to exert a significant effect on the direction of public debate and state policy there have been a number of nationwide surveys that have sought to shed light on them. These studies certainly advance our understanding on how Greeks in totality perceive those issues, but they also suffer from serious limitations regarding the specificities that different localities exhibit. On their grounds, the current works seek to provide a comparative analysis between the results of a nation-wide survey and a locally contacted one, contrasting perceptions between people living in Athens metropolitan area and in three small-medium size cities in central Greece (Trikala, Larisa, and Volos), in order to identify similarities and differences in views between the different spatial scales.

Global Capital Cycles and Market Discipline: Perceptions of Developing-Country Borrowers

Developing countries are often thought to be particularly exposed to the constraints of global markets. Facing scrutiny from foreign investors, why do developing-country governments enter international bond markets, especially when they can access cheaper finance from international financial institutions? I argue that borrowing governments' perception of market constraints depends on global liquidity. When bond markets are highly liquid, investors become more risk acceptant and governments perceive the political costs of borrowing to be lower, especially compared to the conditionality of concessional loans. I use data on the timing of bond issues and three case studies—Ethiopia, Ghana, and Kenya—to demonstrate that choices to issue debt were shaped by global liquidity. These findings nuance debates about how markets constrain governments, emphasizing that market constraints are conditional on systemic factors, including, global liquidity.

Financing the Grand Strategy of Great and Rising Powers

How can great and rising powers finance their grand strategy? What enables and constrains a state’s ability to finance its grand strategic needs? Under what conditions are leaders able to implement their desired financial strategy? When considering the various means available for financing grand strategy, leaders are concerned with raising revenue to implement their grand strategy as well as staying in power. Financing grand strategy, however, presents an intertemporal dilemma for leaders: a politically costly fiscal sacrifice today for benefits accrued in the future. This chapter advances an analytical framework and offers illustrative examples to understand how leaders navigate this intertemporal dilemma. First, the chapter addresses the scope of the study: military spending of great and rising powers. Second, it presents the various financing options and addresses the short- and long-term political and economic costs of each. Third, it offers three variables that condition leader willingness to incur the short-term political costs of financing grand strategy: regime type, whether a state is a rising or great power, and the degree of clarity in the threat environment.

Audience Costs and the Credibility of Commitments

Threats and promises are prevalent in international relations (IR). However, deception is also a possibility in diplomacy. Why should one state believe that another state is not merely bluffing? How can a state credibly communicate its threats and promises to others? The IR scholarship suggests that one way by which a state may make its commitments credible is by generating audience costs—the political costs a leader suffers from publicly issuing a threat or promise and then failing to follow through. There is a broad and methodologically diverse literature on the existence, mechanisms, and effectiveness of audience costs. The concept of audience costs has also been applied to explain many phenomena in IR. This article examines the IR scholarship on audience costs across different methodological approaches, including qualitative case studies, large-N statistical tests, and survey experiments.