The certainty–offending relationship as a function of a nation's free market cultural ethos

The current study sought to integrate aspects of classic strain and institutional anomie theories with concepts from deterrence and rational choice theories for application in a large sample of European respondents. Participants were 52,458 individuals (55% female, average age = 48 years) from the fifth round of the 27-country European Social Survey. Each participant rated their involvement in three relatively minor offenses (false insurance claims, buying stolen property, and traffic offenses) over the past five years along with their perceived certainty of getting caught and punished should they commit one or more of these prohibited acts. Each country's total 2010 Index of Economic Freedom score was also included in the study as a level 2 variable in a two-level multilevel modeling analysis. Consistent with predictions, participants from countries with higher Index of Economic Freedom scores displayed a significantly stronger connection between certainty of punishment and involvement in minor offending than participants from lower Index of Economic Freedom countries. An additional individual-level variable, the marketized mentality, was also included in the analysis and while it correlated with minor offending, it failed to interact with the Index of Economic Freedom or alter free market cultural ethos moderation of the certainty-offending relationship. These findings suggest that individuals living in a country with a strong free market cultural ethos are more apt to incorporate rational choice principles like certainty into their crime-related decisions than individuals residing in a country with a weaker free market cultural ethos.

Moral Truth and Criminology: Back to Its Classical Roots

This paper argues for the relevance of classical criminology for addressing contemporary problems of the criminal justice system. Despite many fundamental differences in political and cultural contexts, the central themes of classical crimino­logy continue to be relevant for our time. One such theme is the criticism of criminal law for imposing very harsh penalties. Penalties become cruel if they produce fear rather than moral responsibility. Criminal laws based on fear rather than conscience and reason are the expressions of political tyranny. The importance of developing moral responsibility has been reflected in a number of contemporary criminological theories. They, however, differ from classical criminology in one important aspect. Contemporary criminology, even though accepting the importance of morality in preventing crimes, does not affirm the existence of a moral truth. Classical criminology, as developed by Beccaria and Bentham, is based on a belief in moral truth as the criterion for evaluating contemporary institutions of criminal law. One instance of moral truth is that crimes are acts of free will. In contrast, many contemporary criminological theories do not recognize the concept of free will, which still remains the underlying principle of responsibility in criminal law. Rational choice theory is an exception. The paper highlights some shortcomings of the classical and rational choice theories from the viewpoint of a criminal law theorist. However, these shortcomings do not reduce the overriding importance of the unity of law, morals, and criminology. In order to reach a greater unity between the disciplines of criminology and criminal law, there is a need for the return to, and the acceptance of the main ethical tenets of classical criminology.

Rationality, strategic interactions, and theories of middle range

Various versions of rational choice theories exist. In the face of common misconceptions of the approach, this comment aims to make two contributions. First, it informs about different variants and emphasizes the essential component of strategic uncertainty in game theory. Second, this article highlights the role of bridge assumptions when applying rational choice theories in practice. Hence, the rational choice approach is not a theory which can be directly applied in practice without further assumptions. Instead the rational choice approach is an analytical framework which leads to theories of middle range by combining a theoretical core with additional auxiliary assumptions which are tailor-made for a specific explanatory problem.

Theories of the Intellectual Commons

Noting the growth of academic interest in the concept of the commons this chapter introduces the main theoretical trends that have been formulated in relation to the analysis of the intellectual commons and their relation with capital. In this context, four families of theories are distinguished on the grounds of their epistemological foundations, their analytical tools with regard to social actors, social structures and the dynamics between them, their normative criteria and, finally, their perspectives on social change. Rational choice theories draw from the work of Elinor Ostrom offering a perspective of complementarity between commons and capital. Neoliberal theories elaborate on the profit-maximising opportunities of the intellectual commons and further highlight their capacities of acting as a fix to capital circulation/accumulation in intellectual property-enabled commodity markets. Social democratic theories propose the forging of a partnership between a transformed state and the communities of the commons and put forward specific transition plans for a commons-oriented society. Critical theories conceptualise the productive patterns encountered within intellectual commons as a proto-mode of production which is a direct expression of the advanced productive forces of the social intellect and has the potential to open up alternatives to capital. In the conclusion, of the chapter the four theoretical frameworks are compared, with the aim of formulating a strong theory of the intellectual commons evaluated from the standpoint of their approach to social change. Critical tenets from each theory are utilised as the bedrock for the moral justification of an intellectual commons law.

Under What Conditions are Students Willing to Protest? Selective Incentives, Production Functions, and Grievances

This article tests a theory of student protest based on collective action theories. Drawing on rational choice theories of selective incentives, critical mass theories of production functions, and social psychological theories of protest, the present article specifies a theory of willingness to protest. To test our model, we administer a factorial survey experiment of student protest to a random sample of undergraduate students. We find that both the perceived likelihood of a protest’s success and one’s intention to protest are affected by the magnitude of the grievance, selective rewards and punishments, and the number of participants. The latter effect suggests a decelerating production function. Finally, we find that the likelihood of success mediates much of the effect of social context on intention to protest, implying that actors consider the effects of incentives not only on their own behavior but also on the behavior of others.

Keeping a cool head at all times. What determines choice consistency?

Many rational choice theories posit that rational decision makers assign subjective values to all available choice options and choose the option with highest subjective value. Choice options are usually composed of multiple attributes, e.g. healthiness and taste in dietary choice or risk and expected returns in financial choice. These attributes have to be integrated into a single subjective value. Subjective value maximizing choice requires choice consistency, i.e. consistent weighing of the choice attributes across choices. However, empirical work suggests that perfect choice consistency is often violated, for example when decision makers weigh choice attributes differently across multiple decisions. Some researchers propose to extend certain bounds of rationality or to abandon the concept of rationality as adherence to consistency principles altogether. A more conservative stance assumes that perfect consistency can be violated by decision makers in practice, but that consistency principles still can explain large parts of behavior. In a review of the recent literature, we identify factors for compromised consistency relative to baseline conditions. Broadly, we distinguish between undynamic trait factors and fluid state factors. We find evidence for an influence of age, education, intelligence, and neurological status. In contrast, choice consistency appears to be relatively robust to the influence of sex, personality traits, cognitive load, sleepiness and blood alcohol levels. We conclude, that, according to the current state of the literature, only fundamental differences in decision makers, that is, trait differences, have a significant impact on choice consistency.

“The Bureaucracy” as an Interest Group

Rational choice theories of bureaucratic interests started simple and have become somewhat more sophisticated over time. Early, “classical” models stressed either budget maximization or rent seeking as dominant motivations and predicted chronically unbalanced or dysfunctional outcomes—respectively, bureaucratic oversupply or radical undersupply (to create artificial scarcity rents). They also assumed a woefully uninformed legislature or ministers. Revisionist models stress more complex pictures. Bureau-shaping theory argues that the diversity of agency structures creates differing motivations—so that some top officials may oversupply (e.g. in defense), while others create queues or overcut budgets (e.g. in welfare areas). Some agencies or nongovernmental organizations achieve particular “market” constructs, where a pooling equilibrium is successfully created, attracting only intrinsically motivated staff to work in a mission-specific organization. Bureaucracies’ use of hierarchy has also been defended in economic terms—for reasons analogous to those maintaining large firms, or as a rational response to delegation issues in “normal” democracies, where delegation is straightforward. In the United States, delegation to bureaucracies is more complex and directly contingent on political factors, in Congress especially.