Minimal Realism about ordinary objects

<p>In 2015 Daniel Korman published an incredibly important book called Objects: Nothing out of the ordinary, in which he defends a position known as conservatism about ordinary objects. He contrasts this position with two other positions – eliminativism and permissivism – and provides comprehensive arguments against these two positions. Korman takes eliminativism to be the view that ordinary objects do not exist. Even though this is indeed one of the claims eliminativists make, by itself it is not a good description of what eliminativism entails. For eliminativism, as ordinarily conceived, contains three main claims: i) the anti-realist claim that certain entities do not exist, ii) the claim that we are making an error when we assert that those entities do exist, and iii) the prescriptive claim that we should eliminate talking and thinking about those entities. These three claims together entail eliminativism. Korman, however, identifies eliminativism merely with the first anti-realist claim. Since Korman‟s focus is on the anti-realist claim, this thesis departs from Korman‟s tripartite division and instead frames the debate in terms of Minimal Realism and Minimal Anti-Realism about ordinary objects. Minimal Realism is simply the view that ordinary objects exist, and includes views such as conservatism and permissivism. Minimal Anti-Realism, by contrast, is the view that ordinary objects do not exist, such as eliminativism as Korman defines it. By refocussing the debate in terms of Minimal Realism and Minimal Anti-Realism, it becomes apparent that there are a variety of Minimal Realist positions which claim that ordinary objects do indeed exist, but which have been left out by Korman. My goal is to supplement Korman‟s arguments with literature published since the publication of his book, and to show how Minimal Realism responds to the arguments for eliminativism. In particular, I focus on the Debunking Argument, the Argument from Arbitrariness, the Overdetermination Argument, the Argument from Vagueness, the Argument from Material Constitution, and the Problem of the Many. After setting out these arguments, I discuss some recent objections, and show how Minimal Realism can respond to the proposed arguments and objections.</p>

Minimal Realism about ordinary objects

<p>In 2015 Daniel Korman published an incredibly important book called Objects: Nothing out of the ordinary, in which he defends a position known as conservatism about ordinary objects. He contrasts this position with two other positions – eliminativism and permissivism – and provides comprehensive arguments against these two positions. Korman takes eliminativism to be the view that ordinary objects do not exist. Even though this is indeed one of the claims eliminativists make, by itself it is not a good description of what eliminativism entails. For eliminativism, as ordinarily conceived, contains three main claims: i) the anti-realist claim that certain entities do not exist, ii) the claim that we are making an error when we assert that those entities do exist, and iii) the prescriptive claim that we should eliminate talking and thinking about those entities. These three claims together entail eliminativism. Korman, however, identifies eliminativism merely with the first anti-realist claim. Since Korman‟s focus is on the anti-realist claim, this thesis departs from Korman‟s tripartite division and instead frames the debate in terms of Minimal Realism and Minimal Anti-Realism about ordinary objects. Minimal Realism is simply the view that ordinary objects exist, and includes views such as conservatism and permissivism. Minimal Anti-Realism, by contrast, is the view that ordinary objects do not exist, such as eliminativism as Korman defines it. By refocussing the debate in terms of Minimal Realism and Minimal Anti-Realism, it becomes apparent that there are a variety of Minimal Realist positions which claim that ordinary objects do indeed exist, but which have been left out by Korman. My goal is to supplement Korman‟s arguments with literature published since the publication of his book, and to show how Minimal Realism responds to the arguments for eliminativism. In particular, I focus on the Debunking Argument, the Argument from Arbitrariness, the Overdetermination Argument, the Argument from Vagueness, the Argument from Material Constitution, and the Problem of the Many. After setting out these arguments, I discuss some recent objections, and show how Minimal Realism can respond to the proposed arguments and objections.</p>

The Material Constitution in Crisis: Telos, Nomos, and Demos

<Online Only>This chapter explores how the crisis of the material constitution was underpinned by the erosion of democracy, and not only by the dominance of ordoliberalism and neo-liberalism. It discusses how the deepening of the liberal market rationality of integration came to occur in a more disciplinary mode throughout the euro crisis, dismantling domestic social contracts, if ultimately still under the guidance of domestic elites. This was contested by extraordinary popular countermovements, which emerged to break out of the straitjacket of austerity. In particular, the chapter discusses the election to government in Greece of a left-wing party, Syriza, reflecting broader anti-systemic currents across Europe. The chapter concludes by examining how Syriza’s subsequent capitulation symbolized not merely the increasingly powerful external constraints of EU membership, but the homegrown roots of the dominant constitutional imaginary: a fear of popular sovereignty and of radical democracy under the veil of an ideological Europeanism.</Online Only>

The Material Constitution: There is no Alternative … or is There?

This chapter examines how the material constitution of economic liberalism was entrenched after Maastricht, with Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the neo-liberal drift. In the domain of political economy, the deepening and widening of post-war trends was most evident, the logic of the market being brought to bear on macroeconomic policy with a near-complete political abdication to ordoliberal and neo-liberal demands. The chapter also discusses the dramatic geographical extension of these trends via the process of enlargement of the Union. And, yet, in the socio-economic domain, certain discontinuities could also be identified, and the chapter discusses the opposition to the Maastricht settlement and its political orthodoxy that started to bubble below the surface. It concludes with a discussion of the growing social fractures that developed after Maastricht, albeit without being channelled into a significant political countermovement.</Online Only>

On the Possibility of Presentism with Occurrents

This paper defends the possibility of admitting occurrents in a presentist ontology. Two ways of doing so are proposed, the first one involves Meinongian presentism. By using the notion of non-existent object and coherently modifying some mereological principle, it is argued, the presentist can allow for occurrents. The second proposal involves ex-concrete objects. Ex-concrete objects, i.e. objects that are contingently not concrete, have been used by Linsky and Zalta (Philosophical Perspectives, 8 (Logic and Language), 431-458, 1994), Williamson (2002) in the modal metaphysics debate, by Orilia (Philosophical Studies, 173 (3), 589-607, 2016) in the presentism-eternalism debate, and by Longenecker (Synthese 195 (11), 5091-5111, 2018) in the debate about material constitution. I argue that, just by admitting ex-concrete objects, it is possible to have occurrents even for the presentist. Of course, in order to do so we must modify our definitions of occurrent and continuant. Nevertheless, I argue that my theory is metaphysically sound, at least for the presentist persuaded by the intuitive claim that there are occurrents, which otherwise she must reject.

Ion-adsorption rare earth ores of China

Geology and geochemistry of China’s ion-adsorption rare earth ores are discussed. The structure and material constitution of Lognan, Huashan, Guposhan and Heling deposits are compared. The weathered layer structure, as well as the distribution, differentiation and occurrence forms of rare earth elements (REE) in the weathered layer are described. The prospecting indicators and criteria of readily dissociated adsorbed REE ore are identified to find this type ores in the territory of Russia. The weathered layer enclosing ion-adsorption rare earth ore features specific differentiation of REE. General composition of such ores is governed by the composition of the primary rare earth mineralization in mother granites. If granites contain much yttrium and heavy lanthanides, then ion-adsorption rare earth ore contain also much yttrium and heavy lanthanides. Regarding differentiation of REE, yttrium and heavy lanthanides mainly concentrate in the middle, most clayey part of the weathered layer, while cerium accumulates in subsurface lateritic soil. The prime feature of ion-adsorption rare earth ore is the prevalence of readily dissociated REE, which can reach a quantity of 80% and more but not less than a half. The rest REE concentrate in relict rock-forming minerals and accessories. The quantitative estimation of adsorption form of REE is necessary for the geological and economic appraisal of a deposit. It is assumed that the quantity of readily soluble REE should be not less than 0.05–50% of the total content. Russia has many regions with such geotectonic environment. It is required to explore ion-adsorption rare earth ore occurrences in these regions.

Electronic Music and the Problem of Electricity

For the past twenty years, South African popular music has been dominated by electronic genres such as house, kwaito, and hip-hop—especially among the Black population living in and around major urban centers. Based on fieldwork in the townships of Soweto, this chapter focuses on a fundamental condition of possibility for any kind of electronic music: electricity. Since 2008, South Africa has experienced massive problems with its electricity infrastructure. These problems resulted in widespread rolling blackouts between 2008 and 2009, and since 2014 the situation has worsened. The chapter asks what becomes of electronic music in a context where access to electricity is radically unreliable, if not completely absent. What do musicians do when the electricity supply stops? What kinds of affect become impossible, and what kinds of affect are generated? How do power outages impact a musician’s relationship to citizenship and to the state? The chapter traces the lines of connection between informal home studios and Eskom (South Africa’s state-owned electricity utility) as way of listening to and for infrastructure—developing a critique regarding the tropes of invisibility and breakdown in infrastructural research along the way. It further illuminates the ways that electronic musicians in South Africa are compelled to engage the very material basis of their activities. With this approach, the meaning of the term “electronic music” is revealed to be much more than a generic or stylistic description. In South Africa, electronic music refers first and foremost to its material constitution as electrical energy.