Partisan polarization and resistance to elite messages: Results from survey experiments on social distancing

COVID-19 compelled government officials in the U.S. and elsewhere to institute social distancing policies, shuttering much of the economy. At a time of low trust and high polarization, Americans may only support such disruptive policies when recommended by same-party politicians. A related concern is that some may resist advice from “elite” sources such as government officials or public health experts. We test these possibilities using novel data from two online surveys with embedded experiments conducted with approximately 2,000 Pennsylvania residents each, in spring 2020 (Study 1 in April and Study 2 in May-June). We uncover partisan differences in views on several coronavirus-related policies, which grew larger between surveys. Yet overall, Study 1 respondents report strong support for social distancing policies and high trust in medical experts. Moreover, an experiment in Study 1 finds no evidence of reduced support for social distancing policies when advocated by elites, broadly defined. A second experiment in Study 2 finds no backlash for a policy described as being backed by public health experts, but a cross-party decline in support for the same policy when backed by government officials. This suggests that, in polarized times, public health experts might be better advocates for collectively beneficial public policies during public health crises than government officials.

Party decline or social transformation? Economic, institutional and sociological change and the rise of anti-political-establishment parties in Western Europe

The rise in support for anti-political-establishment parties (APEp), especially since the beginning of the 2008 Great Recession, has put democracy in peril. Some scholars have warned us about the negative implications the recent rise of APEp might have for the development of democracy in Western Europe. For that reason, it is important we begin to understand what generates APEp’s electoral success. Drawing on a new comparative dataset that examines all Western European democracies from 1849 until 2017, the current article attempts to provide an explanation. In particular, our analyses examine three alternative explanations put forward by the literature: economic, institutional, and sociological. Our results show that it is not economic performance but both institutional and sociological change which together can help to understand the current wave of support for APEp.

Demokracja w recesji? Diagnozy i projekty naprawcze

Democracy in a recession? Diagnosis and repair projects The essay examines two of the most prominent developments in contemporary democratic politics, party change and political personalization, and the relationship between them. It presents a broad-brush, cross-national comparison of these phenomena that covers around fifty years in twenty-six countries through the use of more than twenty indicators. It demonstrates that, behind a general trend of decline of political parties, there is much variance among countries. In some, party decline is moderate or even small, which may point to adaptation to the changing environments these parties operate in. In others, parties sharply decline. Most cases fall between these two poles. A clear general trend of personalization in politics is identified, but there are large differences among countries in its magnitude and manifestations. Surprisingly, the online world seems to supply parties with an opportunity to revive. When parties decline, personalization increases. Yet these are far from being perfect zero-sum relationships, which leaves room for the possibility that other political actors may step in when parties decline and that, in some cases, personalization may not hurt parties; it may even strengthen them. Personalization is a big challenge to parties. But parties were, are, and will remain a solution to the problem of collective action, of channeling personal energies to the benefit of the group. Thus they can cope with personalization and even use it to their advantage.

Party Change and Political Personalization

The chapter presents an empirical cross-national analysis of the relationship between the two processes of party change and political personalization. It demonstrates that there is indeed a moderate negative correlation between partyness and personalization when we focus on what happens off-line in the more veteran democracies. It also explains why, in some cases, partyness and personalization will not be in zero-sum relationships. It then turns to the question of the causal direction of this relationship: does party decline cause personalization, or is it the other way round? While it makes sense that the two should interact, our argument is that decline in partyness occurred first and was in fact one of the causes of personalization.

Party Change and Political Personalization

Scholars tend to see the relationship between parties and personalization as a zero-sum game: when one declines, the other is expected to rise. Yet, while scholars of political personalization regard party decline as the starting point of their story, for scholars of party change personalization is only one of the possible outcomes of party decline. These two perspectives are critically examined here. Then the chapter surveys Wattenberg’s works, the only scholar who accorded the two phenomena equal weight. Next the challenges encountered by this common representation of the relationship between party change and political personalization as a zero-sum game are examined. The chapter ends by reviewing the issue of the causal direction of this relationship.

A Cross-National Comparison of Party Change

The chapter presents an integrative cross-national comparative analysis of party change in all twenty-six countries under study. It finds that, apart from often sharing the same decline trend, the various indicators of party change appear to be independent of one another. The indicators that refer to the various mediators and those that refer to voters point clearly to decline, while those that look at the party background of representatives stand out as prominent survivors of a major decline trend. Party decline is evident in almost all countries, but its levels vary. Many explanations for variance are ruled out, leaving room for the possibility that human agency rather than environmental factors may prove to be the cause. Parties are not on their way out, but in some countries they have already experienced sharp decline, while in others their experience may be better described as adaptation. In many others still, parties lie somewhere in-between these poles.

Summary and Conclusions

The concluding chapter presents a summary of the main findings concerning party change, personalization, and the relationship between them. It then proposes directions for future research on these phenomena and their interaction. It also suggests that it makes sense to see the combination of party decline and personalization as a potential threat to the quality of modern representative democracy, and maybe even to democracy per se. Finally, it makes preliminary suggestions as to how personalized energies could be rechanneled into the party. The chapter ends by claiming that there is no reason why parties should not revitalize their abilities to reorient personal energies toward collective action. After all, that is what parties were—and still are—about.

From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?

The book examines two of the most prominent developments in contemporary democratic politics, party change and political personalization, and the relationship between them. It presents a broad-brush, cross-national comparison of these phenomena that covers around fifty years in twenty-six countries through the use of more than twenty indicators. It demonstrates that, behind a general trend of decline of political parties, there is much variance among countries. In some, party decline is moderate or even small, which may point to adaptation to the changing environments these parties operate in. In others, parties sharply decline. Most cases fall between these two poles. A clear general trend of personalization in politics is identified, but there are large differences among countries in its magnitude and manifestations. Surprisingly, the online world seems to supply parties with an opportunity to revive. When parties decline, personalization increases. Yet these are far from being perfect zero-sum relationships, which leaves room for the possibility that other political actors may step in when parties decline and that, in some cases, personalization may not hurt parties; it may even strengthen them. Personalization is a big challenge to parties. But parties were, are, and will remain a solution to the problem of collective action, of channeling personal energies to the benefit of the group. Thus they can cope with personalization and even use it to their advantage.