Regspraak: Troosgeld is deel van ’n reghebbende se afsonderlike boedelbates en nie deel van die gemeenskaplike boedel nie – verpligte deling troos nie

Although a husband and wife married in community of property share by default, if not design, all their patrimonial assets in the common estate, the solatium or compensation received by an injured person as satisfaction for the unjustified injury to his or her personality rights is not supposed to form part of the common estate – simply because it happened to be received in the form of a patrimonial asset. It is meant to be private or separate and for the comfort of the injured only. The purpose of the compensation received as solatium is not to fill a vacuum left by the delict in the injured party’s assets, but to serve as the only mode of solace available to law to provide redress for the wrong. Other than the position where a patrimonial asset of the claimant had been damaged, eg by the negligent car accident caused by the respondent, and where the awarded damages neatly compensate the wronged party for the damage caused, thereby placing the total estate in the same position where it was before the intervening delict, the solatium paid to the injured for the non-patrimonial damages suffered by the delictual inroad on his/her personality rights is not supposed to redress a negative impact on the total estate of the wronged. The spouse of the injured party, even where they are married in community of property, would never have been able to lay claim to those personality traits or attributes of the other spouse. Personality rights, per definition, never form part of the assets of any patrimonial estate and should not be shared simply because the matrimonial property regime happens to be community of property. The legislature correctly stipulated in section 18(a) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984: “Notwithstanding the fact that a spouse is married in community of property – (a) any amount recovered by him or her by way of damages, other than damages for patrimonial loss, by reason of a delict committed against him or her, does not fall into the joint estate but becomes his or her separate property” – emphasis added. This formulation echoes what has been the legal position for ages. Along those lines Hiemstra J in Potgieter v Potgieter correctly held that the amount awarded as contumelia to the injured husband for the harm done to his personality rights by the adultery of his wife and the third party, would not form part of the joint estate but would be his separate property. In so doing, the court precluded the adulteress from further sharing in the spoils of her doing. In the underlying decision by the majority of the supreme court of appeal, however, it was held that section 18(a) should be read to be limited: “The context of s 18 must be read in its entirety, and apparent therefrom is the plain language and words used. [This] … section highlights that delictual damages received by a spouse during the course of a marriage in community of property, which are nonpatrimonial in nature (s 18(a)); and damages for bodily injuries owing to the fault of one’s spouse in terms of s 18(b) must be excluded from the division of the joint estate on divorce” (par 9 – emphasis added). In this case a very significant amount was received by the lady for the non-patrimonial loss suffered by her more than four years before the marriage had been concluded. According to the reading-in exercise of the supreme court of appeal it was not received “during the course of the marriage” and not ringfenced. As a consequence, the court upheld the appeal of the erstwhile husband after a marriage of very short duration (barely two years). He consequently successfully laid claim to fifty per cent of the more than half a million paid as non-patrimonial compensation to his wife, more than four years before he married her in community of property and only after becoming aware of the significant amount of that compensation invested by her. This decision not only flies in the face of logic and the legal principles underlying South African common law; it is in conflict with the latest developments in comparable Continental legal systems sharing the same historical and societal foundations as the South African law. This judgment provides poor consolation and it leaves a deeply imbedded discomfort, because the result is vehemently contrary to the outcome in comparable legal systems for a similar scenario. Dividing the solatium under the pretext of a division of the joint estate diminishes the solace intended for the injured.

APPEAL PROCEEDINGS: HISTORY, THEORY, PRACTICE

History, theory, and court practice are the basis of judicial reform. If the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation was created considering this with, but subsequent changes of the procedural law show the opposite. Changes of procedure in the appellate court are not an exception, and that is why for the last 10 years theoretical and practical problems of appeal proceedings have existed. The article aims to draw attention to the reasons of occurrence of these problems; mistakes made in the course of its solution; ways of error correction with due regard for experience of Russian civil procedure, achievements of the civil procedure doctrine, needs of Russian judicial practice; necessity of complex approach in reforming proceedings in the court of appeal instance.

The Elevation of the See of Constantinople at the Council of Chalcedon: The Course of the Procedure

Introduction. Despite multiple references to the proposed topic in the scholarly literature, it still seems relevant to identify and consistently describe the entire set of measures taken at the Council of Chalcedon in order to raise the status of the see of Constantinople. Methods. The work is based on the application of the historicalcritical method of analysing source data of the original text, compiled in Greek and Latin. Analysis. The article consistently describes and analyses the church-political steps and actions taken during the conciliar meetings, which paved the way for the elevation (“addition to honour”) of the see of Constantinople, which took place during the 17th conciliar act. These measures included the corroboration of the status of the Council of Constantinople in 381 as the Second Ecumenical Council, the use of the ecclesiastical and political actions of the see of Constantinople in the previous period as court of appeal and “superprovincial” instance as precedents, as well as a demonstration of the equal status of the Archbishop of Constantinople in relation to his Roman counterpart. The result was the adoption of the so-called 28th canon and its approval by the officials presiding at the council, and then by the emperor Marcian himself. Results. The author concludes that the actions taken by the officials, who were presiding at the council, and the representatives of the Church of Constantinople during the council were planned and consistently aimed at establishing the equal honour of the see of Constantinople in relation to the see of Rome and its second place in regard to the latter. He also points to certain similarities in the process of elevation of both sees.

EXTRAJUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS IN RESOLUTION OF SPORTS DISPUTES

The article analyzes extrajudicial instances for resolving sports disputes, identifies their role and advantagesover courts. It is noted that in practice, sports relations cannot exist without disputes, and the latter can take placebetween athletes, on the one hand, and coaches, sports organizations, mediators, etc., on the other hand; betweenathletes (on both sides), or when an individual athlete is not a party to the dispute at all. It is established that the mostcommon disputes today are about objective judging, anti-doping, fair play.As a result of the analysis of literature sources, it was found that in all national federations of Ukraine orassociations (except the Football Federation) such specialized bodies, as a rule, do not exist. The executive bodiesof the federation are empowered to resolve disciplinary disputes, and the powers to review them on appeal arevested in higher governing bodies (for example, congresses, conferences, general meetings). This provokes situationswhere sports disputes are considered by federation leaders who do not have the appropriate legal education, or evenhave a legal education but do not have relevant experience in resolving such disputes, which negatively affects thequality of sports disputes, as often unfair decisions are made or those that contradict the regulations of internationalfederations in certain sports.The work of such an independent international arbitration body as the Court of Arbitration for Sport, which isauthorized to resolve sports or sports-related disputes, is analyzed. These disputes are divided into two groups; GroupI includes commercial disputes arising from contractual relations between professional clubs, between clubs andathletes, sports agents, disputes over the specifics of transfer activities, agreements on the transfer or distributionof television and other media rights, etc., and group II – disciplinary disputes considered by the Court of Arbitrationfor Sport as a court of the first instance or a court of appeal in the case of a dispute between national authorities.It is concluded that to protect the rights and legitimate interests of sports entities, there is an extensivesystem of national and international out-of-court bodies for resolving sports disputes. Despite this, Ukraine has anunderdeveloped system of such bodies, as only the football sphere has an effective mechanism for resolving sportsdisputes at the national level, and therefore there is a significant need to establish a Sports Arbitration Court underthe National Olympic Committee of Ukraine to protect the rights of other sports.

Secretary of State for Justice v A Local Authority and others: disability and access to sex workers

This is a commentary on Secretary of State for Justice v A Local Authority and others, where the decision of the Court of Protection has been overturned by the Court of Appeal. The judgment has implications for (i) the article 8 and article 14 rights of those who lack capacity to arrange lawful sexual services; (ii) the criminal liability of their carers who are enlisted to assist with such arrangements; and, potentially, (iii) the ban on payment for sexual services in Northern Ireland.

Commercial Common Sense in Contract Interpretation: Observations on the Court of Appeal in Technix v Fitzroy and The Malthouse v Rangatira

The contemporary principles of contract interpretation require courts to have regard to a number of factors to determine the meaning of a contract, including the plain meaning of the express contractual language, the contract's context, and commercial common sense. These principles superseded the narrower plain meaning rule, which directed courts to interpret contracts in a manner largely consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of their express words. Since their manifestation some 20 years ago, these principles have undergone change, development and elaboration to the extent that some commentators now claim the approach to contract interpretation more closely resembles the former plain meaning rule, with courts giving "primacy" to the words of the contract in order to deliver "commercial certainty". This article argues that while courts must give primacy to the express contractual language, that does not mean courts should maintain an unwavering loyalty to the plain meaning of those words, even if their meaning is clear. Courts that adopt this approach, referred to by some as the "conservative approach", risk obscuring the true meaning of a contract that can only be obtained through the careful balancing of a contract's internal and external factors, including commercial common sense. This article demonstrates the problem with the "conservative approach" through the analysis of two Court of Appeal decisions, and argues that courts should not overstate the circumstances in which departure from the plain meaning of a contract should occur.

Obligations in Contract, Tort and Equity: Reliance, Responsibility, and the Moral Dimension: Essay in honour of Sir John McGrath

I publish this essay to honour the memory of Sir John McGrath. I sat with Sir John for a number of years, first in the Court of Appeal and then in the Supreme Court. Professional respect soon turned into friendship. While we did not always agree, I always respected his views. They were carefully considered and fully researched. John gave detailed consideration to the opinions of others but was very much his own man when it came to his ultimate conclusion. His innate caution in departing from the well-trodden path was a valuable contribution in a final appellate court. Stability is an important feature of any legal system. And John provided that quality, but not at the expense of innovation when that was clearly desirable and could be achieved in a principled way. John's passing, so soon after his retirement, was a great loss, not only to his wife and family, but also to his many friends and colleagues, both in the law and beyond.

One Boat, Two Captains: Implications of the 2020 Samoan Land and Titles Court Reforms for Customary Law and Human Rights

Samoa's 2020 Land and Titles Court reforms, which contributed to the Human Rights Protection Party losing support at the April 2021 elections after almost 40 years of government, have recentred attention on the tensions of legal pluralism in the South Pacific. Although Samoa maintains a system of English common law, 81 per cent of Samoan land falls under the traditional matai titles system, giving a central role to the customary Land and Titles Court (LTC). In December 2020, the Samoan parliament passed three Acts – the Constitution Amendment Act 2020, the Land and Titles Act 2020 and the Judicature Act 2020 – establishing the LTC in a parallel court hierarchy with equivalent status to the Samoan Supreme Court and Court of Appeal. This proposal has prompted debate between those favouring incorporation and promotion of Samoan custom over Western legal norms, and others who argue the amendments undermine human rights protections and the rule of law. This article evaluates the effects of these changes on the role and administration of custom in Samoa, contextualising them within broader socio-legal debates around customary legal systems. It first analyses the effect of the three Acts with regard to the bifurcation of the court system, procedural reforms in the LTC hierarchy and the introduction of a judicial guidance clause. This leads into a critical evaluation of these changes, highlighting impacts upon judicial coherence; constitutional human rights; consistency between customary and common law procedures; and resourcing constraints. The article concludes by providing broad options for future reform. It does not focus on issues which have received attention elsewhere, such as the amendments' potential impacts on judicial independence.

SOME CLARITY ON THE ACCRUAL OF LIVING ANNUITIES AT DEATH OR DIVORCE CM v EM (1086/2018) [2020] ZASCA 48; [2020] 3 All SA 1 (SCA); 2020 (5) SA 49 (SCA) (5 May 2020)

A conventional life annuity is a contract in terms whereof an annuity underwriter guarantees a periodical payment to an insured in exchange for an initial non-refundable premium. The insurer pools all the annuity premiums together and assumes both the investment performance and the mortality risk by way of actuarial comparisons. The annuitant’s income is guaranteed for life or for a minimum period.Living annuities on the other hand are regulated by the Long-Term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 and are market-linked investments (with no income guarantee) in respect of which the annuitant annually chooses the drawdown rate – currently between 2.5 and 17.5 per cent per annum (compare Regulations in terms of s 36 of the Pensions Act 24 of 1956 and s 106(1)(a) read with s 108(1) of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017.) When an annuitant dies, the death benefit is payable to a nominated beneficiary or the estate of the insured. A pension-interest benefit is an asset for the purposes of the division of an estate at divorce, and includes both pension and provident funds. Living annuities, however, do not fall within the definition of “pension interest” as defined in s 1 of the Divorce Act.In CM v EM ((1086/2018) [2020] ZASCA 48; [2020] 3 All SA 1 (SCA); 2020 (5) SA 49 (SCA) (5 May 2020)), the Supreme Court of Appeal, in an appeal from the full court of the Gauteng Division of the High Court, sitting as court of appeal, had the opportunity to determine where the ownership of capital invested in the form of a living annuity vests, as well as whether the value of an annuitant spouse’s right to future annuity payments is an asset in his or her estate and therefore subject to accrual. Accrual in respect of an estate is the amount by which the net value of the estate at the dissolution of a marriage exceeds the net value of that estate at the commencement of the marriage. At the dissolution of a marriage owing to death and subject to the accrual system, the spouse whose estate shows no accrual, or a smaller accrual than the estate of the other spouse, has a claim against the other spouse or his or her deceased estate.It is submitted that some implications of the accrual dispensation, particularly within the context of certain pension and financial products, are still in their discovery phase, nearly 40 years after their introduction. In the absence of any reference to a living annuity in an antenuptial contract, the question was always whether such an investment is subject to the accrual system at divorce or death. In the context of a life assurance policy, the surrender value of the policy was taken into account in the event of divorce, but in the event of death, the question was whether, for accrual purposes, the factor taken into account should be the surrender value or the policy proceeds. As only assets that form part of the estate of a spouse can be considered for accrual purposes, the very nature of a living annuity had to be investigated in the matter of CM v EM (supra). This case was an application for special leave to appeal from the full court in the matter of Emilio Pietro Valfredo Montanari v Charmaine Helen Montanari (Montanari v Montanari).

Police officers’ discretion and its (in)adequacy as a safety valve against unnecessary arrest

The Supreme Court of Appeal has ended the recent uncertainty on whether there is a need for the fifth jurisdictional fact in the process of arrest. The result is that South African law is back at the well-known four jurisdictional facts that must be present before a lawful warrantless arrest may take place. This article assesses whether, after the demise of the fifth jurisdictional fact, police discretion can adequately protect the right to liberty. The discussion starts with a contextual background outlining the role of the jurisdictional facts and the emergence and demise of the fifth jurisdictional fact. This is followed by an outline of the legislative framework applicable to arrest, pointing out that the law bestows wide discretion on police officers in the exercise of their duties, including securing the court attendance of accused persons. Relying on relevant decided cases, it is submitted that the courts focus on the police discretion exercised at the point of arrest, not in the process preceding that stage (for example, the choice of method). The central submission is that, given that the only viable pre-court appearance protective mechanism against unnecessary arrests is the proper exercise of police discretion, focus on the exercise of discretion at the point of arrest is not the most prudent and/or effective approach in the quest to protect the right to liberty.