Analysis of Terms as an Instrument of Comparative Philosophy

The article continues the polemics on the problems of interaction of philosophical cultures in the era of globalization, which was started at the meetings of the Round Table "Geography of Rationality". The author gives answers to critical questions, explains the methodology and principles of her work with Indian philosophical texts. A short research of the meta-term "cognitive subject" is an example of her methods. The analysis of cognitive subject aimed to justify the absence of the concepts of reason and rationality in Indian epistemic culture, the cornerstones of Western epistemic culture, since Modern times. The justification was carried out by comparing the generalized model of the cognitive subject, abstracted from the writings of empiricists and rationalists of the XVII–XVIII centuries, with the generalized models of the cognitive subject, reconstructed on the basis of authoritative writings of three variants of Indian epistemological teachings: Advaita Vedānta, Jainism and Buddhism. From the author's point of view, the absence of the concepts of reason and rationality in India leads to the non-classical problem of pluralism of epistemic cultures, and the exploration of the meta-term "cognitive subject" allows us to find, on the one hand, intersections in the contents of epistemologies in Indian philosophy and Western metaphysics of Modern times, and on the other, their incompatible contents, which are specific manifestations of pluralism of epistemic cultures. For her reconstruction of the cognitive subject models the author takes the principle of "double perspective" in combination with the methods of hermeneutical and logical analysis of philosophical terms. The principle determinates the consideration of the theoretical object from two sides: European and Indian. Having appeared in the Western epistemic culture, these methods effectively work to objectify the results of socio-humanitarian research, thanks to which they are becoming increasingly widespread among non-Western cross-cultural philosophers. When the author applies the method of logical analysis to justify the absence of the concepts of reason and rationality in India, she is guided by the rules of logical semantics and the principles of semiotics. The compared terms, Western and Indian, are considered as signs with their own meanings and senses. The senses are understood as sets of predicates important for solving the author’s task. The author of the article, taking into account the experience of famous philosophers, negatively assesses the possibility of solving the problem of unambiguously correct translation.

Introduction: Skepticism in India

Introduces the topic of skepticism in Indian philosophy as well as the contents of a special issue of the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism: “Skepticism in India.”

Nyāya’s Response to Skepticism

The classical Indian school called Nyāya (literally “logic” or “right reasoning”), is arguably the leading anti-skeptical tradition within all of Indian philosophy. Defending a realist metaphysics and an epistemology of “knowledge sources” (pramāṇa), its responses to skepticism are often appropriated by other schools of thought. This paper examines its responses to skeptical arguments from dreams, from “the three times,” from justificatory regress, and over the problem of induction.

A. C. Mukerji on the Problem of Skepticism and Its Resolution in Neo-Vedānta

This paper examines the work of the unsung modern Indian Philosopher A. C. Mukerji, in his major works Self, Thought and Reality (1933) and The Nature of Self (1938). Mukerji constructs a skeptical challenge that emerges from the union of ideas drawn from early modern Europe, neo-Hegelian philosophy, and classical Buddhism and Vedānta. Mukerji’s worries about skepticism are important in part because they illustrate many of the creative tensions within the modern, synthetic period of Indian philosophy, and in part because they are truly profound, anticipating in interesting ways the worries that Feyerabend was to raise a few decades later. Arguing that Humean, Kantian, neo-Hegelian, and Buddhist philosophy each fail to provide an adequate account of self-knowledge, Mukerji leverages this finding to further argue that these systems fail to offer a proper account of knowledge more generally. His solution to skepticism centers on a distinctively modern interpretation of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta.

The Madhyamaka Contribution to Skepticism

This paper examines the work of Nāgārjuna as interpreted by later Madhyamaka tradition, including the Tibetan Buddhist Tsongkhapa (1357–1419). It situates Madhyamaka skepticism in the context of Buddhist philosophy, Indian philosophy more generally, and Western equivalents. Find it broadly akin to Pyrrhonism, it argues that Madhyamaka skepticism still differs from its Greek equivalents in fundamental methodologies. Focusing on key hermeneutical principles like the two truths and those motivating the Svātantrika/Prāsaṅgika schism (i.e., whether followers of Nāgārjuna should offer positive arguments or should proceed on a purely “negative” basis), it argues that the Svātantrika commitment to mere conventional practice is robust and allows for a skepticism consistent with the scientific practices we must take seriously in the modern world. These findings are put forth as an illustration of what the Western tradition might gain by better understanding of non-Western philosophy.

Past Continuous or Present Perfect? Continuity and Change in Contemporary Indian Philosophy

Contemporary Indian philosophy is a distinct genre of philosophy that draws both on classical Indian philosophical sources and on Western materials, old and new. It is comparative philosophy without borders. In this paper, I attempt to show how contemporary Indian philosophy works through five instances from five of its protagonists: Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya (his new interpretation of the old rope-snake parable in his essay “Śaṅkara’s Doctrine of Maya”, 1925); Daya Krishna (I focus on the “moral monadism” that the theory of karma in his reading leads to, drawing on his book Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy, 2004); Ramchandra Gandhi (his commentary on the concept of Brahmacharya in correspondence with his grandfather, the Mahatma, in his essay “Brahmacharya”, 1981); Mukund Lath (on identity through—not despite—change, with classical Indian music, Rāga music, as his case-study, in his essay “Identity through Necessary Change”, 2003); and Rajendra Swaroop Bhatnagar (on suffering, in his paper “No Suffering if Human Beings Were Not Sensitive”, 2021). My aim is twofold. First, to introduce five contemporary Indian philosophers; and second, to raise the question of newness and philosophy. Is there anything new in philosophy, or is contemporary philosophy just a footnote—à la Whitehead—to the writings of great thinkers of the past? Is contemporary Indian philosophy, my protagonists included, just a series of footnotes to classical thinkers both in India and Europe? Footnotes to the Upaniṣads, Nāgārjuna, Dharmakīrti and Śaṅkara, as much as (let us not forget colonialism and Macaulay) to Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Hegel? Footnotes can be creative and work almost as a parallel text, interpretive, critical, even subversive. However, my contention is that contemporary Indian philosophy (I leave it to others to plea for contemporary Western philosophy) is not a footnote, it is a text with agency of its own, validity of its own, power of its own. It is wholly and thoroughly a text worth reading. In this paper, I make an attempt to substantiate this claim through the philosophical mosaic I offer, in each instance highlighting both the continuity with classical sources and my protagonists’ courageous transgressions and innovations.

How Things Are

This work is designed to introduce some of the more important fruits of Indian Buddhist metaphysical theorizing to philosophers with little or no prior knowledge of classical Indian philosophy. It is widely known among non-specialists that Buddhists deny the existence of a self. Less widely appreciated among philosophers currently working in metaphysics is the fact that the Indian Buddhist tradition contains a wealth of material on a broad assortment of other issues that have also been foci of recent debate. Indian Buddhist philosophers have argued for a variety of interesting claims about the nature of the causal relation, about persistence, about abstract objects, about the consequences of presentism, about the prospects for a viable ontological emergentism. They engaged in a spirited debate over illusionism in the philosophy of consciousness. Some espoused global anti-realism while others called its coherence into question. And so on. This work is meant to introduce the views of such major Buddhist philosophers as Vasubandhu, Dharmakīrti, and Nāgārjuna on these and other issues. And it presents their arguments and analyses in a manner meant to make them accessible to students of philosophy who lack specialist knowledge of the Indian tradition. Analytic metaphysicians who are interested in moving beyond the common strategy of appealing to the intuitions of “the folk” should find much of interest here.

The Problem of the Stability of the Social System in Ancient Indian Philosophy

Introduction. The purpose of the article is to show the effect of the law of correspondence as a factor of stability of the social system and the relevance of this problem for ancient Indian philosophy. The problem of the stability of society was not directly considered in ancient Indian philosophy or in modern literature, especially through the prism of the law of correspondence.Methodology and sources. The work uses content analysis, system approach, dialectics and the concept of self-organization. In addition, the main analysis of the problem of stability in ancient Indian philosophy is carried out on the basis of the law of correspondence between the real relations that connect people at a given moment and the essence of the “social”. This law was formulated and proposed by V.V. Tuzov. The essence of the “social” could be conditionally expressed through the concepts of “equality”, “humanism”, mutual assistance, “justice”. Real relations may deviate from the essence, but by a certain amount, a measure. Going beyond the limits of the measure deprives the system of stability, and it becomes uncontrollable. The main source of analysis is the academic edition of the text Arthashastra (ancient Indian political and economic treatise), as well as “History of political and legal doctrines”, “Development of ideas about management in philosophical thought”.Results and discussion. The article analyzes the ancient Indian philosophical texts to reveal in them, in a latent or explicit form, the concern of philosophers with the problem of maintaining the stability of the state and society. Attention is focused on the fact that there is a need to observe the law of conformity in the recommendations for rulers on how to govern the people.Analysis of the main source of ancient Indian philosophy, which deals with the problems of governance, shows that the recommendations to the king, which are set forth by the author of Arthashastra Kautilya, imply, in the end result, the need to maintain a balance of interests between the ruling class and the people, that is, to observe the measure for which society loses its stability due to for the impoverishment of the people. In other words, in the management recommendations, the law of conformity, which was discussed above, appears in a latent form.Conclusion. The problem of the stability of the social system in a class society was and remains extremely relevant. The philosophical law of correspondence between real relations and the essence of social relations, which ensures the stability of society while observing the measure, requires justification. Since the principle of forming relationships and the nature of interaction has remained unchanged for centuries, the reflections of ancient philosophers on management, on the structure of society, on the relationship between different groups in it, and on the interaction of interests, on the one hand, confirm the operation of this law, on the other hand, could be useful for modern management.