Party families and greenhouse gas emissions: a new perspective on an old concept

Partisan theory is not easy to apply to environmental issues. One reason for this is that party families are usually structured according to the left-right dimension. However, such a perspective ignores the fact that the concept of party families stems from a multi-dimensional historical analysis. In order to determine the relevance of the influence of party families on greenhouse gas emissions (GHGEs), we use a new data set that differentiates between ten party families. An organization theoretical analysis shows that the participation of green parties in government reduces GHGEs. Left parties have much less impact. In contrast, non-Christian center parties have a negative effect on GHGEs. Methodologically, we show that the party effect does not appear in the short term, but only takes effect after more than two years

Parties

This chapter focuses attention on short-term and long-term impacts of political parties on social policy in advanced democracies. According to a wide variety of both comparative research and in-depth country studies, partisan effects have influenced the structure and expansion of the welfare state in the post-Second World War period to a large extent. Particularly strong have been these effects in the ‘Golden Age’ of the welfare state in the 1960s, 1970s, and in some countries also in the 1980s—mainly due to policy choices of leftist and Christian democratic parties. More mixed has been the explanatory power of partisan theory after the ‘Golden Age’. In view of critical circumstances, such as a major fiscal crisis of the state and the pressure generated by demographic ageing, but also due to massive changes in their social constituencies, a considerable number of pro-welfare state parties accepted recalibration and cutbacks in social policy in order to consolidate budgets.

Bringing agency back into the study of partisan politics: A note on recent developments in the literature on party politics

The question of whether political parties make a systematic difference in terms of public policies is one of the classics of comparative public policy research. However, unstable class cleavages and changing party strategies challenge the assumptions of traditional partisan theory, namely that parties represent a stable group of voters and implement policies according to the preferences of this group. Against this backdrop, several recent studies have called for an “electoral turn” in partisan theory and suggest establishing a party–voter link on the microlevel, depending on the policy area at stake. In this article, we propose a different view on partisan effects. While we do not argue that public opinion is unimportant for parties, we maintain that the electoral turn literature has a tendency to black-box the political actors and their preferences, because they become mere agents of voter preferences. Our argument builds on a growing literature that shows that political actors both at the party member and the elite level do have preferences and that these may or may not be coherent with those of the voters. Hence, the effect of partisan ideology on public policies may also be situated on the level of the parties or policy-makers themselves.

Parties matter but institutions live on: Labour’s legacy on Conservative immigration policy and the neoliberal consensus

The drivers of immigration policy have long been contested. While partisan theory contends that policy is a product of parties’ interests, historical institutionalism places explanatory value on the norms of policymaking and path dependency. Examining Conservative-led immigration policy, I argue that while parties matter for defining policy objectives, institutions explain policy outputs. Despite a shift from Labour’s expansive managed migration regime to the Coalition’s restrictive policy, there was remarkable confluence in policy and policymaking. Challenging the parties matter school of thought, I argue that institutional legacies inherited from New Labour explain policy stability and that these are reflective of an emerging political consensus on neoliberal migration management, including outsourcing and commodifying migration controls, maintaining an indirect corporatist agreement with employers, underpinned by a policy paradigm predicated on economic worthiness. This article demonstrates how inherited institutions persist and how ideational legacies evolved to a political consensus of neoliberal migration management.

The partisan ties of lobbying firms

This article examines lobbying firms as intermediaries between organized interests and legislators in the United States. It states a partisan theory of legislative subsidy in which lobbying firms are institutions with relatively stable partisan identities. Firms generate greater revenues when their clients believe that firms’ partisan ties are valued highly by members of Congress. It hypothesizes that firms that have partisan ties to the majority party receive greater revenues than do firms that do not have such ties, as well as that partisan ties with the House majority party lead to greater financial returns than do partisan ties to the Senate majority party. These hypotheses are tested using data available under the Lobbying Disclosure Act from 2008 to 2016. Panel regression analysis indicates that firms receive financial benefits when they have partisan ties with the majority party in the House but not necessarily with the Senate majority party, while controlling for firm-level covariates (number of clients, diversity, and organizational characteristics). A difference-in-differences analysis establishes that Democratically aligned lobbying firms experienced financial losses when the Republican Party reclaimed the House in 2011, but there were no significant differences between Republican and Democratic firms when the Republicans reclaimed the Senate in 2015.

Domestic Politics and Changes in Foreign Aid Allocation: The Role of Party Preferences

Resources for foreign aid come under attack when parties that care little for international affairs come to power. Internationally focused parties of the left and right, however, prefer to use aid as a tool to pursue their foreign policy goals. Yet varying goals based on left–right ideology differentiate the way donors use foreign aid. We leverage sector aid to test hypotheses from our Partisan Theory of Aid Allocation and find support for the idea that domestic political preferences affect foreign aid behavior. Left-internationalist governments increase disaster aid, while parochial counterparts cut spending on budget assistance and aid that bolsters recipients’ trade viability. Conservative governments favor trade-boosting aid. We find consistent, nuanced, evidence for our perspective from a series of Error Correction Models (ECMs) and extensive robustness checks. By connecting theories of foreign aid to domestic politics, our approach links prominent, but often disconnected, fields of political research and raises important questions for policymakers interested in furthering the efficacy of development aid.

Government ideology and party priorities: the determinants of public spending changes in Italy

The literature developed by scholars dealing with policy agendas suggests that it is more important to look at changes in governments’ priorities rather than in their ideology, and criticizes the partisan theory as inadequate. However, hypotheses based on conventional wisdom and normative theories, holding that the identity of the governing parties matters for the allocation of public expenditures, are still recurrent in the debate. And many empirical studies found mixed evidence on the importance of party ideology. Focussing on Italy (1948–2009), this article empirically tests whether shifts in governments’ ideology and policy priorities are related to public spending changes in four policy sectors. The results indicate that shifts in governments’ priorities are related with public spending changes in welfare and defence, while they are not relevant to explain changes in public order and education spending. Government ideology is relevant only when it comes to defence spending, but this influence can be hindered by veto players. We argue that these findings do not disprove the importance of partisan politics but warn us against relying too much on the distinction between left and right parties. At the same time, more research is needed to understand under which conditions partisan preferences translate into changing public policies.