Introduction to Max Weber’s article ‘The “Threatening” of the Reich Constitution’

In May 1904 Max Weber published a short article in the Frankfurter Zeitung. It has gone unnoticed in the extensive Weber literature and it appears here in English translation for the first time. It is an important statement of Weber’s political views after his withdrawal from his active political engagement in the 1890s. He defends the Reich Constitution from attack and a possible coup d’état. He demands that the German Parliament (Reichstag) stand up to autocratic plans, closely linked to Emperor William II, to suppress democracy and voting rights. A constitutional conflict would require not a great statesman but an ‘unscrupulous idiot or a political adventurer’ who would undermine ‘all our institutions and the security of law for many generations’. The article marks the start (earlier than previously assumed in the literature) of Weber’s consistent championing of Parliament and democratic institutions.

Veblen, Marshall and neoclassical economics

Alfred Marshall is often depicted as a pioneer of neoclassical economics almost as if this is a label he embraces and promotes. Yet neoclassical economics is not a category Marshall deploys but a term Thorstein Veblen introduces in characterising Marshall. Veblen coins the term neoclassical to identify an ontological discrepancy in the work of a specific group of his contemporaries, a prominent figure among whom is Marshall. Veblen’s view is that Marshall and other neoclassicals discern features of social reality that suggest a tentative recognition of a causal processual social ontology of the type Veblen associates with modern evolutionary approaches and yet also remain staunchly committed to a taxonomic conception of science underpinned by a quite different set of ontological presuppositions. Veblen’s assessment of Marshall is brief and assertive. In this paper it is argued that the ontological discrepancy interpretation of Marshall, that Veblen first sketched, can convincingly be filled out, has substantial merit and is of importance in developing an adequate appreciation of Marshall.

Introduction to the special issue on existence theory

After exploring the main tenets of existence theory and the affinities between this theory and other philosophical traditions, this introduction lists the central points of each contribution to this special issue. In what follows, we provide a brief synopsis of the critical commentaries by David Inglis, Simon Susen, Robin Wagner-Pacifici, Bryan S. Turner, William Outhwaite, and Thomas Kemple.

Milestones and cornerstones: Queering the life course

Rather than refuting or challenging the claims by Baert, Morgan, and Ushiyama to originality, the objective of this commentary is to flesh out “existence theory” by extending its repertoire of examples and by expanding on its classical and philosophical sources. Drawing on precedents in canonical statements by Vico, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, and Marx, this response poses questions about the model’s implied assumption of a time-line that traces a “straight” path from the past to the present and future by invoking the alternative imagery of a circular history, cyclical time, or “queer” life course. To support this argument, contemporary queer theories are invoked to supplement the concept-metaphor of “existential milestones” with that of “existential cornerstones,” which do not always suggest that human development follows a single path or a binding timeline. The civil institutions of religion, marriage, and burial, as discussed by both classical sociologists and queer theorists, for instance, may be defined by a sense of necessity and inevitability but also by contingency and coincidence.

Existentialising existence theory and expanding the sociology of existential milestones

This paper responds to the ‘existence theory’ proposed by Baert, Morgan and Ushiyama. It considers their proposals in light of two main thematics: the general account of human existence, and the more empirical sociology of existential milestones. Both elements are appraised in light of existentialist philosophy and earlier attempts at ‘existentialist sociology’. It is suggested that the authors engage with generational theory, and also give an account of the commodification of significant life-stages by the milestones culture industry.

Existence as a predicament

This short critical commentary on the article raises some questions about the authors’ model of temporality and the linear conception of ‘milestones’, while endorsing this conception in cases where people feel deprived of something they might have expected to obtain.

Critical remarks on existence theory: Between existentialism and phenomenology

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the ‘existence theory’ proposed by Patrick Baert, Marcus Morgan, and Rin Ushiyama. To this end, it focuses on some key issues that could, and arguably should, be explored in more detail, especially if the authors decide to develop their project further, permitting them to establish a new interdisciplinary branch of inquiry. The comments and suggestions made in this paper are meant to be constructive, supporting the idea that Baert, Morgan, and Ushiyama’s outline could, and should, be turned into a bold, systematic, and long-term research programme. More specifically, the in-depth analysis of Baert, Morgan, and Ushiyama’s theoretical framework demonstrates that their undertaking, which draws on central insights from both existentialism and phenomenology, contributes to bridging the disciplinary gap between philosophy and sociology. The paper concludes by asserting that Baert, Morgan, and Ushiyama’s model provides a solid foundation for an ambitious, but viable, project that may result in the creation of a new current of research, capable of generating valuable insights into the tension-laden confluence of existential milestones, existential ladders, and existential urgencies in the theatre of human life.

At the intersection of existence, events, and milestones: A response to “Existence theory”

This paper responds to Baert, Morgan, and Ushiyama’s article, “Existence theory: Outline for a theory of social behaviour,” by drawing out and examining the paper’s identification of the importance of existential milestones and the dangers of their elusiveness for some leading to a sense of incomplete lives. Alternative perspectives on frustrated existential milestones are proposed via a focus on the relationship between existence and events.

Vulnerability and existence theory in catastrophic times

‘Existence theory’ is a bold and imaginative contribution to social theory. Baert, Morgan and Ushiyama (hereafter ‘the authors’) draw on a broad range of existing approaches from Heidegger to Schutz to build a social theory that draws attention to time, the stages of life and the unavoidably precarious nature of human existence. At the same time, they pay careful attention to the social context in which time and existential precariousness combine to form what they call ‘the existential ladder’. Our lives are to some degree measured by the ‘existential milestones’ that we confront over time. These are not invariable stages, but they traditionally included entry into the work force, courtship and marriage, parenthood and maturity, and old age and death. There are in addition norms that attend these transitions. For example, procreation and parenthood are not for the elderly. Old fathers with young children are regarded as foolish if not reprehensible. Failure to pass through the milestones at the appropriate time may result in disappointments, stress and unhappiness.

Existence theory revisited: A reply to our critics

In this essay, we provide a comprehensive reply to the critical commentaries by David Inglis, Thomas Kemple, William Outhwaite, Simon Susen, Bryan S. Turner, and Robin Wagner-Pacifici. Our reply is structured along three main pillars. Firstly, we clarify what we aim to achieve with existence theory. Drawing on neo-pragmatist philosophy, our aim is to present a new and useful perspective on a wide range of social phenomena; we do not attempt to tackle or resolve broad philosophical issues. Secondly, we demonstrate that we do not subscribe to an algorithmic notion of society which posits that people’s trajectories have to fit a neat, linear pathway. Related, we do not wish to impose a normative model that endorses the existential milestones that are dominant in any particular society. Thirdly, building on various helpful pointers from our critics, we elaborate on various ways in which the theory could be enriched and further developed: for instance, by bringing in insights from the sociology of generations, critical theory, and sociological studies of the body.