The significance of A Theory of Justice for philosophy of education

This article offers retrospective and prospective commentary on the significance of A Theory of Justice for philosophy of education. It addresses the progress that Anglophone philosophy of education has made since the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, and the ways this progress has been facilitated by the transformation of political philosophy that Rawls set in motion. It offers examples of ongoing lines of inquiry and unfinished projects in philosophy of education for which Rawls’ methods and positions remain important.

Using social domain theory to seek critical consciousness with young children

The question of ‘developmental appropriateness’ in education can be both empowering and inhibiting. When are students ‘ready’ to talk about social injustices and systemic inequalities? How might educators introduce social inequities using developmental findings about reasoning? This article presents social domain theory as a lens through which educators can approach critical consciousness education with young children. An overview of Freire’s critical consciousness construct is presented, including educational interventions, methods, and approaches that support critical consciousness. An overview of social domain theory is also presented. Social domain theory is a developmental theory of sociomoral reasoning that describes three domains of social knowledge that develop independently, and get applied/coordinated/prioritized differently in context by individuals. This theory, and the research stemming from it, has shown that there are developmental transition points during which children come to view their previous logic as inadequate, and are likely to shift their understandings of moral, conventional, and personal issues. A parallel is drawn between these transition points and the process of wrestling with and overturning ‘contradictions’ in critical consciousness education. Contradictions are theorized as dehumanizing power dynamics that show up in students’ everyday circumstances. This article provides tables outlining example contradictions for young children, key domain–related reasoning shifts for young children, and examples for how to create lesson plans that take these two factors into account. Finally, we propose a method of facilitating self-assessment of critical consciousness with young children. Self-reflection questions are provided for teachers and students.

Rawls’ traces in contemporary philosophy of education

This article examines the many traces of John Rawls’ theory of justice in contemporary philosophy of education. Beyond work that directly explores the educational implications of justice as fairness and political liberalism, there are many interesting debates in philosophy of education that make use of Rawlsian concepts to defend views that go well beyond those advocated in justice as fairness. There have also been methodological debates on Rawls’ distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory which concern the proper balance between empirically informed discussion and fruitful normative reflection.

Gotta know why! Preliminary evidence supporting a theory of virtue learning as applied to intellectual curiosity

Virtue education is gaining popularity in institutions of higher education. Given this growing interest, several theoretical accounts explaining the process of virtue learning have emerged. However, there is scant empirical evidence supporting their applicability for intellectual virtue. In this study, we apply a theory of virtue learning to the development of intellectual curiosity among undergraduates. We find that learning why virtue is relevant and important to one’s education is consistently and moderately correlated with increases in intellectual curiosity across time points and analytic approaches. A weaker yet still positive association is found with increases in knowledge of intellectual curiosity. The implications of these results connect with pedagogical recommendations stressed across intellectual and moral virtue education.

An ameliorative analysis of the concept of education

Ameliorative analysis is a powerful new approach to understanding concepts, stemming from cutting-edge work at the intersection of philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and metaphysics. It offers the potential to improve our understanding of a range of subject matters. One topic to which it has not yet been applied is the concept of education. Doing so can enhance our understanding of this vital subject matter and, in particular, help in the push for educational justice. While philosophers and policymakers alike have preferred a broad understanding of education that encompasses many aspects of human development, ameliorative considerations favour a narrower concept, tightly connected to formal schooling. This is because effective pursuit of an egalitarian agenda requires education working alongside a range of other welfare priorities, and it is important that our concept of education does not muddy the waters or undermine other aspects of the pursuit of justice.

Two limits to the application of Rawls’s concepts of autonomy and the difference principle in contemporary philosophy of education

The concept of justice that Rawls discussed in his famous book “A Theory of Justice” has had a profound influence on contemporary political and moral philosophy, as well as, to some extent, philosophy of education. Many philosophers of education have applied or criticized Rawls’s concepts – above all the concepts of autonomy, the person, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle – which he developed as an essential part of his theory of justice. In this paper I will discuss very briefly only one of the problems that philosophers of education face when applying his concepts of the autonomous person and the difference principle. The essence of this problem is expressed in the question of whether or not to respect the limits of the applicability of these concepts set by Rawls himself.

The take-up of Rawls’ theory of the good in philosophy of education

Personal well-being is a central concept in philosophical discussions of education and its aims. Although the work of general philosophers like Nussbaum, Griffin, Raz and Sen on the topic has been influential here, there has been next-to-no interest among philosophers of education in John Rawls’s work on ‘the good’ – in great contrast to interest in his work on ‘the right’, and despite the key place that his theory of the good has in his Theory of Justice (TJ), Chapter 7. This paper explores a likely reason for this lack of interest. This is connected with Rawls’s 1942 undergraduate thesis on the meaning of sin and faith. While there are many continuities between this – eg. to do with communitarianism and equality – and the theory of the right in TJ, there are none in the area of the good, since the thesis rejected the notion for theological reasons. In writing TJ, therefore, having long abandoned his Christian belief, Rawls had a rich background of earlier work on the right which he was able to work up into a powerful argument, while in the area of the good he had to start from scratch. The result, drawing on Josiah Royce’s ideas about plans of life, is disappointing and open to fairly obvious objections. In the light of this, it is not surprising that Rawls’s views on the good have had so little influence in philosophy of education.