Weaponizing Water in the Middle East

Chapter 7 presents a closed case study on warfare in Syria and Iraq to contextualize the practice of weaponization of water by the so-called Islamic State (IS) discovering that with very few exceptions, the warring parties have used it as a weapon—in various ways, for multiple reasons, and with different impact in scale and scope resulting in severe humanitarian, environmental, and economic consequences. Nonetheless, the assessment of historical and regional records herein contributes to an understanding of IS’s role as a kind of front runner – frequently, systematically and openly weaponizing water to achieve its political and military goals. Ultimately, the chapter frames broader implications for water resources and water infrastructures as applied to future conflicts in the Middle East leading to a better understanding of the risks, threats, and mechanisms that may potentially allow the prevention of such acts –that are indeed orchestrated on a more frequent basis in the Middle East—from encouraging norm construction in the conduct of modern warfare.

Conclusion

Chapter 9 summarizes the volume asserting that the chapters herein provide compelling evidence that alters our conceptualization of hydropolitics in the Middle East. Understanding that the regional power structure, always in flux, is changing significantly today the authors offer critical insights into the future of water conflict, often in the context of growing water inequalities both between nations and within the nations themselves of the type that were a critical factor in the incitement of wide-scale unrest across the region, including the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 and the Syrian civil war. The chapter amplifies the authors’ arguments concluding that, without decisive international agreements over water sharing, dam construction, and improvements in national water governance policy, the world will face a future of dangerous growth in inequalities across the Middle East, and their attendant consequences in the form of insecurity and more conflict.

A Watershed Moment

Chapter 4 establishes Iraqi Kurdistan as a de-facto riparian actor the Tigris and Euphrates River System explaining that it is blessed with abundant water resources that are now under increasing stress. Changing demographics, dam building in neighbouring countries, and drought have brought Kurdish hydropolitics to a critical juncture where two distinct water futures of abundance or scarcity are possible depending in large part on policy decisions limited by regional security concerns. The chapter problematizes a spectrum of potential water conflict in this context and finds that outbreaks might be sparked by three historical realities: (1) systemic precedence for hydro-hegemonic behaviour—the monopolization of water by a single country—in the Tigris and Euphrates River Basin (2) a record of deployment of the water weapon during contemporary conflicts in Syria and Iraq and (3) conflicting views of ownership and rights to the Tigris and Euphrates river among the riparian countries. Ultimately, the chapter argues that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) must recognize these realities, and use this understanding to develop a comprehensive strategy that will guarantee sufficient water for Iraqi Kurdistan’s people while maintaining the ability to use water as political leverage in support of designs toward autonomy or, more altruistically, to improve the quality of life for all Iraqis.

Malthus in the Middle East

Using a Malthusian framework, Chapter 3 draws parallels between political economy of the Southeast Anatolian (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi or GAP) dam project in Turkey that affects water flow to the downstream neighbors of Syria and Iraq on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) nearing completion on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia – a project that will impound waters destined for Egypt. It finds that in each case, geographical and hydropolitical positioning are the essential elements of downstream state insecurity and therefore a significant causes of deteriorating relations within the respective river basins. While noting that although the riparian states in question have long histories of tension and distrust, the historical record shows that the vast majority of global water disputes are settled peacefully. The chapter presents evidence that in the lower riparian states, rapid population growth, infrastructure development, and climate change present adverse and cumulative effects on water supplies and water management. The author concludes with the argument that the convergence of these factors points to a likely future of water scarcity-induced conflict absent the introduction of policies to boost irrigation efficiency and improve water governance.

In Pursuit of Security and Influence

Chapter 8 focuses on the United Arab Emirates (UAE), led by Mohamed bin Zayed, and its newly assertive power projection strategy that includes establishment naval and military bases on the Red Sea, in the chokepoints of the Bab al-Mandab one of the most important global shipping lanes and the Gulf of Aden and its littoral territory—the arid nations of Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia to achieve dual geostrategic and economic goals including the acquisition of operational and management rights over ports and economic zones. The theoretical framework used in this chapter to asses foreign policy change employs simultaneous levels of inquiry taking into account regional and systemic effects, domestic influences, and the role of leadership adding to the literature on international relations and the Middle East in two distinct ways (1) by addressing understudied theoretical questions concerning foreign policy change in small states and (2) exploring the nature and motivations of the emerging trend of securitizing waterspace and shipping lanes in the Middle East.

Introduction

Recognizing that water has been intrinsic to Middle Eastern civilization since at least the times of Mesopotamian civilization, the chapter frames 7 contemporary case studies by regional experts that shed new light on important political and hydrological trends. Taken as a whole, the case studies illustrate that while regional water conflict has diverse roots, the time is ripe for reconceptualization of how basic assumptions of water’s role are challenged by an essentially new hydropolitics. The chapter argues that policymakers must act promptly to mitigate conflict in the face of political shocks, inequalities and rapidly dwindling water supplies that are explored in greater depth by the volume’s authors.

Community-Based Water Practices in Yemen

Based on extensive in-country observations, the premise of this chapter is that the mismanagement of Yemen’s water resources has been a major underlying contributing factor to the social tensions that exploded first in the uprisings of 2011 and later the descent into civil war since 2015. The chapter finds that alongside other neoliberal interventions, water management policies were major elements in the emergence of acute social differentiation between a microscopic group of beneficiaries who enriched themselves massively at the expense of the vast majority of Yemenis and that this has happened thanks to the synergy of political decisions supporting the powerful, combined with modern water extraction technologies. The role of technology is addressed emphasizing that while policymakers, analysts, and citizens still frequently call for the revival of traditional water management mechanisms, these are no longer applicable in their original form due to the technological changes of the past half-century. The conclusion is therefore, that any revitalization of these practices must include significant adjustments, and even fundamental transformation in view of the combination of socioeconomic polarization with technological innovations. If this is not the case, Yemen’s water crisis could cascade into mass environmental migration that could further destabilize the entire region.

Turkish Hydro-Hegemony

Chapter 3 explores how Turkey, the beneficiary of nearly completed major dam projects, and situated at the headwaters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, is nearly in a position as the upstream state to complete its long march to full hydro-hegemony – physical control over flow of water into Syria and Iraq and the Kurdish enclaves that is needed to meet much of their water requirements. Noting that the Turkish government has already used its control over water flow as leverage to pressure Syria to drop its support of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a separatist militia, the chapter presents evidence that hydro-hegemony can actually be operationalized to create both positive and negative outcomes for the downstream entities. Turkey’s motivations to choose either path are based on a complicated and rapidly evolving regional security architecture surveyed in the chapter.

Groundwater Resources

Acknowledging academic research on water and conflict is largely focused on surface waters in shared river basins, this chapter is to provides insights into some of the political dimensions of groundwater and its use and overuse in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. First, it provides an overview of current knowledge of groundwater resources, highlighting the rapid transformation in the way groundwater data and information is collected and shared outside of traditional official channels. Next, the chapter discusses the domestic political implications of groundwater overuse for food security and food price stability, and the additional challenges created when aquifers, or the rivers which feed them, are transboundary in nature. While the chapter recognizes the possibilities for technology to provide new data and information for groundwater decision making, it also acknowledges that groundwater governance and management is problematic worldwide. The chapter thus ends not with a vague call for “better” groundwater governance, policy, and management, but rather explores options for reducing the negative impacts of continued overuse.