Theory Behind the Bridge Principles

Author(s):  
Hans Russ ◽  
Johannes Clouth ◽  
Franz Porzsolt
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
pp. 265-297
Author(s):  
Timothy Williamson

The slogan ‘Evidence of evidence is evidence’ is obscure. It has been applied to connect evidence in one situation to evidence in another. The link may be diachronic or interpersonal. Is present evidence of past or future evidence for p present evidence for p? Is evidence for me of evidence for you for p evidence for me for p? The chapter discusses intra-perspectival evidential links. Is present evidence for me of present evidence for me for p present evidence for me for p? Unless the connection holds between a perspective and itself, it is unlikely to hold between distinct perspectives. Evidence will be understood probabilistically, using formal models from epistemic logic. Bridge principles between first-level and higher-level epistemic conditions often imply versions of controversial principles, such as positive and negative introspection. Formalizations of intra-perspectival principles that evidence of evidence is evidence have similarly implausible connections.


1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 465-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ausonio Marras

I take nonreductive materialism to be the conjunction of two theses, the first ontological, the second epistemological. The ontological thesis - token physicalism- is that mental events (processes, states, etc.) are tokenidentical to physical events; the epistemological thesis is that psychology is not reducible to physical theory in the classic sense of 'reduction,' according to which we reduce a theory to a another theory by deriving the laws of the former from the laws of the latter via 'bridge principles' linking the predicates of the reducing theory with the predicates of the reduced theory.


1976 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 586 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Mosenthal
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 361-374
Author(s):  
Bernhard Schwarz ◽  
Alexandra Simonenko

Revising a proposal by Guerzoni (2003), we propose to derive universal projectionof presuppositions in wh-questions, where attested, from a family of three felicity conditions onquestion use. Assuming that these felicity conditions can be violated under certain conditions,this proposal predicts a typology of contexts where universal projection can exceptionally beunattested. We propose that this prediction is correct, presenting a family of scenarios wherethe expected absence of universal projection is observed.Keywords: wh-questions, universal presupposition projection, felicity conditions, bridge principles.


Author(s):  
Charles Pigden

Hume contends that you can’t get an ought from an is. Searle professed to prove otherwise, deriving a conclusion about obligations from premises about promises. Since can’t derive a substantive ought from an is by logic alone, Searle is best construed as claiming that there are analytic bridge principles linking premises about promises to conclusions about obligations. But we can no more derive a moral obligation to pay up from the fact that a promise has been made than we can derive a duty to fight a duel from the fact that a challenge has been issued—just conclusions about what we ought to do according to the rules of the relevant games. Hume suggests bridge principles that would take us from the rules of the games to conclusions about duties, but these are distinctly dubious. The argument features an obtreperous earl, an anarchist philosopher and a dueling Prime Minister.


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