Abstract
The article is an analysis of: 1) the Kiev operation from late April and early May 1920, 2) Tukhachevsky’s first offensive in May 1920, 3) Tukhachevsky’s second offensive launched in July 1920. All the three operations were attempts at undertaking strategic and operational initiative during the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920. The first offensive pertained to the Polish army, in the subsequent two cases it was the Soviet Western Front. Tukhachevsky’s second offensive resulted in the battle of the Bug in late July and early August 1920. By discussing each of the operations, the author presents the fighting potential of the armies involved, the tactical and operational goals, the course of the fighting, the turning points, both parties’ planning mistakes and the consequences of the operations.
The Kiev operation and Tukhachevsky’s two offensives in 1920 as attempts at undertaking strategic and operational initiative during the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920
