A transitory phenomenon: German commanders and chiefs of staff, 1866–1918

This article examines the relationship between commanders and chiefs of staff during the period of the Wars of German Unification and the entirety of the Kaiserreich. The practice of pairing up a commander and a chief of staff was one that was specific to Germany. Traditional scholarship holds that in many cases, it was really the chief of staff who did all the thinking, while the commander was nothing more than a front man. The primary example of this was the relationship between Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff. The problem is that unthinking historians have projected relationship of this particular duo on the rest of the imperial German army. One of the reasons for this was the presence of members of German royal families in high command positions. This article suggests that first, commanders, including royal family members, were far more influential than their chiefs of staff. In addition, the power wielded by chiefs of staff also reflected the nagging problem of battlefield communications, especially given the limitations of telephone and early wireless radio. Once these difficulties were eliminated by the collapse of the imperial regime, and the development of radio, the power of chiefs of staff was severely curbed by 1939. Thus, the relationship between commanders and chiefs of staff was at best a transitory phenomenon.

Operation Devon, Termoli 1943: ‘A catalogue of errors’?

The little-known World War II battle for Termoli, code named Operation Devon, took place in early October 1943 and began with the only Allied amphibious landing on Italy’s Adriatic coast. It was a joint operation between newly formed elite groups and regular units of the Allied armed forces. A brigade made up of two units of commandos and the 1st Special Air Service, known during this operation as the Special Raiding Squadron, was given the task of making the first landing. Despite the initial success of the operation, a drawn out and fierce battle ensued. With the help of archival material from the Imperial War Museum, London, and The National Archives, Kew, this article reconstructs the key elements of a battle that has received little scholarly attention, particularly in relation to the role of conventional forces in the fighting. In doing so, it provides an overview of the battle, analysing the main factors that led to a chaotic handover between special and regular infantry forces and what made the action ultimately successful. Finally, it reveals how the operation was part of an evolutionary process for special forces and helped to cement their role in UK military doctrine.

Dennis Showalter and the history of armour during Second World War

Whenever one thinks of the World War II, the image of dark menacing panzers cutting deep swathes into enemy forces comes up to the mind. No amount of interpretation and overinterpretation can belittle the extraordinary role-played by the panzers in World War II. Similarly, despite the presence of numerous good works by various historians and introduction of exotic methodologies, Professor Dennis Showalter’s place in the world of academic writings on World War II can never be marginalized. The present article humbly attempts to highlight one aspect of Professor Showalter’s research: history of tanks during the World War II. This essay has two sections. The first section evaluates Showalter’s three works dealing with armour during the World War II. In the next section, the present author, inspired by Showalter’s works on armoured war, attempts to recount the evolution of armoured branch in the Indian Army until the end of World War II. Indian tank units, as this article argues, played a crucial role in the capture of Meiktila and the subsequent ‘Race to Rangoon’.

Where does theory go in military history?

This article presents a critique of Whiggish approaches to military history. It begins with this quotation from Dennis Showalter – ‘military history is arguably the last stronghold of what historiographers call the “Whig interpretation”’ – and notes that Showalter’s assessment was a reflection on both the general absence of theory and the linked poverty of the fallback theoretical basket of the subject, with such staples as War and Society, Face of Battle, and Military Revolutions. Recognizing the shortcomings of numerous approaches to military history, the author identifies the challenge – writing military history that incorporates multiple regions and takes a global approach. As the author concludes, the problem for the historian remains how best to address the complex interactions of, in particular, change and continuity, structure and conjuncture, the West and the wider world, and to do so to produce an account that is able to identify and probe crucial issues and key questions.

Scharnhorst and Showalter: A tale of two enlightened scholars

Gerhard von Scharnhorst was the intellectual father of the Prussian and later German armies. Professor Dennis E. Showalter was a noted scholar of German, American, and military history. Both mentored countless students and authored a number of seminal works in military history. Both demonstrated the enduring importance of military history in the minds of policy makers, military personnel, and the public. Both were truly enlightened scholars.