Matrioska: A Compiler for Multi-key Homomorphic Signatures

Author(s):  
Dario Fiore ◽  
Elena Pagnin
2021 ◽  
pp. 327-345
Author(s):  
Chengjun Lin ◽  
Rui Xue ◽  
Xinyi Huang

Author(s):  
Fuqun Wang ◽  
Kunpeng Wang ◽  
Bao Li ◽  
Yuanyuan Gao

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jae Hong Seo ◽  
Keita Emura ◽  
Keita Xagawa ◽  
Kazuki Yoneyama

IEEE Access ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 119431-119447
Author(s):  
Caifen Wang ◽  
Bin Wu ◽  
Hailong Yao

Cryptography ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Georgia Tsaloli ◽  
Gustavo Banegas ◽  
Aikaterini Mitrokotsa

Often clients (e.g., sensors, organizations) need to outsource joint computations that are based on some joint inputs to external untrusted servers. These computations often rely on the aggregation of data collected from multiple clients, while the clients want to guarantee that the results are correct and, thus, an output that can be publicly verified is required. However, important security and privacy challenges are raised, since clients may hold sensitive information. In this paper, we propose an approach, called verifiable additive homomorphic secret sharing (VAHSS), to achieve practical and provably secure aggregation of data, while allowing for the clients to protect their secret data and providing public verifiability i.e., everyone should be able to verify the correctness of the computed result. We propose three VAHSS constructions by combining an additive homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) scheme, for computing the sum of the clients’ secret inputs, and three different methods for achieving public verifiability, namely: (i) homomorphic collision-resistant hash functions; (ii) linear homomorphic signatures; as well as (iii) a threshold RSA signature scheme. In all three constructions, we provide a detailed correctness, security, and verifiability analysis and detailed experimental evaluations. Our results demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed constructions, especially from the client side.


2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (12) ◽  
pp. 1871-1885
Author(s):  
Cheng-Jun Lin ◽  
Rui Xue ◽  
Shao-Jun Yang ◽  
Xinyi Huang ◽  
Shimin Li

Abstract Linearly homomorphic signatures (LHSs) allow any entity to linearly combine a set of signatures and to provide authentication service for the corresponding (combined) data. The public key of the current known LHSs from lattices in the standard model requires $O(l)$ matrices and $O(k)$ vectors, where $l$ is the length of file identifier and $k$ is the maximum data set size that linear functions support. In this paper, we construct two lattice-based LHS schemes with provable security in the standard model and both schemes can authenticate vectors defined over finite field. First, we present a basic LHS scheme satisfying selective security, based on the full-rank difference hash functions. Second, we modify the chameleon hash function constructed by (Cash, D., Hofheinz, D., Kiltz, E. and Peikert, C. (2010) Bonsai Trees, or How to Delegate a Lattice Basis. In Proc. EUROCRYPT 10, Monaco/French Riviera, May 30 to June 3, pp. 523–552. Springer, Berlin) to construct a linearly homomorphic chameleon hash function (LHCHF), which can be applied to all transformations from selectively secure LHS scheme that authenticates vectors defined over finite field $\mathbb{F}_{p}$ ($p=poly(n)$) to fully secure one, except for a new one that authenticates vectors defined over a small field. Starting from LHCFH and the basic scheme as above, we obtain a fully secure LHS scheme. Both schemes can be used to sign multiple files and have relatively short public keys consisting of $O(1)$ matrices and $O(k)$ vectors.


2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yujue Wang ◽  
Qianhong Wu ◽  
Bo Qin ◽  
Xiaofeng Chen ◽  
Xinyi Huang ◽  
...  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document