Some diophantine forms of gödel's theorem

1980 ◽  
Vol 22 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 51-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Verena H. Dyson ◽  
James P. Jones ◽  
John C. Shepherdson
Keyword(s):  
Gödel’S Theorem

scholarly journals Why Gödel's theorem cannot refute computationalism

1998 ◽  
Vol 104 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 265-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey LaForte ◽  
Patrick J. Hayes ◽  
Kenneth M. Ford
Keyword(s):  
Gödel’S Theorem

Gödel's Theorem and the Mind

1982 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER SLEZAK
Keyword(s):  
The Mind ◽  
Gödel’S Theorem

The Mind's I Has Two Eyes

Philosophy ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 65 (254) ◽  
pp. 510-515 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. E. Martin ◽  
K. H. Engleman
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Process ◽  
Formal System ◽  
System L ◽  
Gödel’S Theorem

In ‘Minds, Machines and Gödel’, 1961, J. R. Lucas proposed that Godel's theorem made possible a refutation of mechanism—the thesis that mind is wholly comprehensible as a consistent, rule-governed machine. A sympathetic reading of Lucas's argument might run something as follows: ‘If I am a machine then it will be possible in principle to give a specification of the consistent formal system, L, that represents me. If this formal system were handed to me, I would be able to prove a Gödel sentence, G, which L could not generate—that is, L could not model my proving G. But since I have proved G, L is inadequate as a model of my cognitive process.’

Gödel's Theorem in focus. By S. G. Shanker / A Course in Modern Geometries. By Judith N. Cederberg

1992 ◽  
Vol 99 (8) ◽  
pp. 797-803
Author(s):  
C. Smoryński ◽  
Gudlaugur Thorbergsson
Keyword(s):  
Gödel’S Theorem
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