Belief revision in a framework for default reasoning

2005 ◽  
pp. 206-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerhard Brewka
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Default Reasoning

A unified approach to default reasoning and belief revision

1993 ◽  
pp. 226-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria R. Cravo ◽  
João P. Martins
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Default Reasoning ◽  
Unified Approach

Default reasoning and belief revision in the CIN Project

1996 ◽  
pp. 691-693
Author(s):  
G. Antoniou ◽  
M. A. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Default Reasoning

scholarly journals PSEUDO EXTENSION AND BELIEF REVISION IN DEFAULT REASONING

10.5109/13408 ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 24 (1/2) ◽  
pp. 15-25
Author(s):  
Hiroko Yuasa ◽  
Setsuo Arikawa
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Default Reasoning

Unifying default reasoning and belief revision in a modal framework

1994 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig Boutilier
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Default Reasoning

scholarly journals Structured argumentation dynamics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stipe Pandžić
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Default Reasoning ◽  
Justification Logic ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Reasoning Under Uncertainty ◽  
New Information ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Structured Argumentation ◽  
Revision Operations ◽  
Logic Reasoning

AbstractThis paper develops a logical theory that unifies all three standard types of argumentative attack in AI, namely rebutting, undercutting and undermining attacks. We build on default justification logic that already represents undercutting and rebutting attacks, and we add undermining attacks. Intuitively, undermining does not target default inference, as undercutting, or default conclusion, as rebutting, but rather attacks an argument’s premise as a starting point for default reasoning. In default justification logic, reasoning starts from a set of premises, which is then extended by conclusions that hold by default. We argue that modeling undermining defeaters in the view of default theories requires changing the set of premises upon receiving new information. To model changes to premises, we give a dynamic aspect to default justification logic by using the techniques from the logic of belief revision. More specifically, undermining is modeled with belief revision operations that include contracting a set of premises, that is, removing some information from it. The novel combination of default reasoning and belief revision in justification logic enriches both approaches to reasoning under uncertainty. By the end of the paper, we show some important aspects of defeasible argumentation in which our logic compares favorably to structured argumentation frameworks.

Default reasoning and belief revision: A syntax-independent approach

2000 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 430-438 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dongmo Zhang ◽  
Zhaohui Zhu ◽  
Shifu Chen
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Default Reasoning

scholarly journals Qualitative probabilities for default reasoning, belief revision, and causal modeling

1996 ◽  
Vol 84 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 57-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moisés Goldszmidt ◽  
Judea Pearl
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Causal Modeling ◽  
Default Reasoning

Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one’s own knowledge and belief revision.

2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (12) ◽  
pp. 2319-2332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Hagá ◽  
Kristina R. Olson
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Learning Perceptions
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