AbstractThis paper scrutinizes the relationship between inconsistency and incoherence with a special focus on probabilistic measures of coherence. As is shown, while the majority of extant coherence measures face problems regarding the assessment of inconsistent sets of propositions, it is possible to adapt the measures in order to improve their performance. Furthermore, different intuitions regarding the degree of incoherence of inconsistent sets of propositions are surveyed and assessed with respect to extant measures. In this context, a refined approach to measuring coherence is introduced. As is argued, by means of this approach one can account for the diverging coherence intuitions regarding inconsistent sets independently of the discussion on the adequacy of different probabilistic explications of coherence. The last part of the paper is devoted to the question of whether there is a covariation between degrees of inconsistency and degrees of incoherence in the sense that the higher the degree of inconsistency of a set of propositions, the higher its degree of incoherence. Focusing on two straightforward measures of the degree of inconsistency, this latter question is answered in the negative.
Inconsistency as a Touchstone for Coherence Measures
