Joe Salerno (ed): New Essays on the Knowability Paradox

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 383-387
Author(s):  
Mark Jago
Keyword(s):  
Knowability Paradox

The Knowability Paradox

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Keyword(s):  
Knowability Paradox

scholarly journals The Knowability Paradox

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-165
Author(s):  
Igor Douven
Keyword(s):  
Knowability Paradox

New Essays on the Knowability Paradox

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-196
Author(s):  
Alexandre Costa-Leite
Keyword(s):  
Knowability Paradox

New Essays on the Knowability Paradox

2012 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-104
Author(s):  
Jens Christian Bjerring
Keyword(s):  
Knowability Paradox

Paradoxes, epistemic

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Keyword(s):  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
Similar Reasoning ◽  
Knowability Paradox ◽  
Thursday Evening ◽  
Epistemic Paradoxes ◽  
The Preface Paradox ◽  
The Lottery Paradox

The four primary epistemic paradoxes are the lottery, preface, knowability, and surprise examination paradoxes. The lottery paradox begins by imagining a fair lottery with a thousand tickets in it. Each ticket is so unlikely to win that we are justified in believing that it will lose. So we can infer that no ticket will win. Yet we know that some ticket will win. In the preface paradox, authors are justified in believing everything in their books. Some preface their book by claiming that, given human frailty, they are sure that errors remain. But then they justifiably believe both that everything in the book is true, and that something in it is false. The knowability paradox results from accepting that some truths are not known, and that any truth is knowable. Since the first claim is a truth, it must be knowable. From these claims it follows that it is possible that there is some particular truth that is known to be true and known not to be true. The final paradox concerns an announcement of a surprise test next week. A Friday test, since it can be predicted on Thursday evening, will not be a surprise yet, if the test cannot be on Friday, it cannot be on Thursday either. For if it has not been given by Wednesday night, and it cannot be a surprise on Friday, it will not be a surprise on Thursday. Similar reasoning rules out all other days of the week as well; hence, no surprise test can occur next week. On Wednesday, the teacher gives a test, and the students are taken completely by surprise.

The Knowability Paradox - By Jonathan Kvanvig

Theoria ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 255-262
Author(s):  
Fredrik Stjernberg
Keyword(s):  
Knowability Paradox

Review: The Knowability Paradox

Mind ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 115 (460) ◽  
pp. 1141-1147
Author(s):  
Carrie S. Jenkins
Keyword(s):  
Knowability Paradox

scholarly journals The Knowability Paradox and Unsuccessful Updates

2020 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-71
Author(s):  
Arkadiusz Wójcik
Keyword(s):  
Knowability Paradox ◽  
Knowability Principle ◽  
The Church

Abstract In this paper we undertake an analysis of the knowability paradox in the light of modal epistemic logics and of the phenomena of unsuccessful updates. The knowability paradox stems from the Church-Fitch observation that the plausible knowability principle, according to which all truths are knowable, yields the unacceptable conclusion that all truths are known. We show that the phenomenon of an unsuccessful update is the reason for the paradox arising. Based on this diagnosis, we propose a restriction on the knowability principle which resolves the paradox.

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