A Group Utility Maximizer Mechanism for Land Assembly

2012 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 466-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Usha Sridhar ◽  
Sridhar Mandyam
2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Flavio Menezes ◽  
Rohan Pitchford

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (03) ◽  
pp. 1850013 ◽  
Author(s):  
CAROLE BERNARD ◽  
STEVEN VANDUFFEL ◽  
JIANG YE

We derive the optimal portfolio for an expected utility maximizer whose utility does not only depend on terminal wealth but also on some random benchmark (state-dependent utility). We then apply this result to obtain the optimal portfolio of a loss-averse investor with a random reference point (extending a result of Berkelaar et al. (2004) Optimal portfolio choice under loss aversion, The Review of Economics and Statistics 86 (4), 973–987). Clearly, the optimal portfolio has some joint distribution with the benchmark and we show that it is the cheapest possible in having this distribution. This characterization result allows us to infer the state-dependent utility function that explains the demand for a given (joint) distribution.


2016 ◽  
Vol 95 ◽  
pp. 16-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Mark Isaac ◽  
Carl Kitchens ◽  
Javier E. Portillo
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 69-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leah Brooks ◽  
Byron Lutz

Because cities are constrained by the boundaries of land ownership, fundamental urban modifications require land delineation changes. We evaluate whether there is enough land assembly—the joining together of two or more parcels of land—to put land to its highest value use. We hypothesize that in the absence of market frictions such as holdouts, the price of land sold for assembly should not exceed the price of land sold for other uses. Empirically, we find that to-be-assembled land in Los Angeles trades at a 15 to 40 percent premium and conclude that significant frictions prevent assembly. (JEL K11, P14, Q21, R14, R30, R52, R58)


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