Some remarks on restricting the knowability principle

Synthese ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 190 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Knowability Principle

scholarly journals Truth, Demonstration and Knowledge. A Classical Solution to the Paradox of Knowability

2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elia Zardini
Keyword(s):  
Classical Solution ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Knowability Principle ◽  
Paradox Of Knowability ◽  
Bhk Semantics

After introducing semantic anti-realism and the paradox of knowability, the paper offers a reconstruction of the anti-realist argument from the theory of understanding. The proposed reconstruction validates an unrestricted principle to the effect that truth requires the existence of a certain kind of “demonstration”. The paper shows that the principle fails to imply the problematic instances of the original unrestricted knowability principle but that the overall view still has unrestricted epistemic consequences. Appealing precisely to the paradox of knowability, the paper also argues, against BHK semantics, for the non-constructive character of the demonstrations envisaged by anti-realists, and contends that, in such a setting, one of the most natural arguments in favour of a revision of classical logic loses all its force.

scholarly journals Transcendental Knowability and A Priori Luminosity

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Andrew Stephenson
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Special Kind ◽  
Formal Epistemology ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Knowability Principle ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

Abstract This paper draws out and connects two neglected issues in Kant’s conception of a priori knowledge. Both concern topics that have been central to contemporary epistemology and to formal epistemology in particular: knowability and luminosity. Does Kant commit to some form of knowability principle according to which certain necessary truths are in principle knowable to beings like us? Does Kant commit to some form of luminosity principle according to which, if a subject knows a priori, then they can know that they know a priori? I defend affirmative answers to both of these questions, and by considering the special kind of modality involved in Kant’s conceptions of possible experience and the essential completability of metaphysics, I argue that his combination of knowability and luminosity principles leads Kant into difficulty.

scholarly journals The Knowability Paradox and Unsuccessful Updates

2020 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-71
Author(s):  
Arkadiusz Wójcik
Keyword(s):  
Knowability Paradox ◽  
Knowability Principle ◽  
The Church

Abstract In this paper we undertake an analysis of the knowability paradox in the light of modal epistemic logics and of the phenomena of unsuccessful updates. The knowability paradox stems from the Church-Fitch observation that the plausible knowability principle, according to which all truths are knowable, yields the unacceptable conclusion that all truths are known. We show that the phenomenon of an unsuccessful update is the reason for the paradox arising. Based on this diagnosis, we propose a restriction on the knowability principle which resolves the paradox.

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