Epistemic contextualism can be stated properly

AbstractIt has been frequently suggested that epistemic contextualists violate the knowledge norm of assertion; by its own lights contextualism cannot be known and hence not be knowingly stated. I have defended contextualists against this objection by showing that it rests on a misunderstanding of their commitments (Freitag 2011, 2012, 2013b). In M. Montminy's and W. Skolits' recent contribution to this journal (2014), their criticism of my solution forms the background against which the authors develop their own. The present reply ventures to demonstrate that their objections are ineffective, since they rest on a confusion of two different ways in which contextualism is unknowable. The precise nature of the original problem will be clarified and my solution briefly restated.

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From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism

Philosophical Studies ◽

10.1007/s11098-005-2012-3 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 135 (2) ◽

pp. 225-254 ◽

Cited By ~ 44

Author(s):

Matthew Chrisman

Keyword(s):

Epistemic Contextualism ◽

Epistemic Expressivism

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Epistemic Contextualism, Unarticulated Constituents and Hidden Variables

Dialogue ◽

10.1017/s0012217315000116 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 54 (2) ◽

pp. 225-246

Author(s):

AHMAD REZA HEMMATI MOGHADDAM

Keyword(s):

Hidden Variables ◽

Epistemic Contextualism ◽

Truth Conditions ◽

Epistemic Standard ◽

Hidden Variable ◽

Unarticulated Constituents

Epistemic contextualism was devised mainly to provide a solution to the problem of skepticism based on a thesis about the truth conditions of knowledge attributing sentences. In this paper, I’ll examine two possible semantic bases of epistemic contextualism i.e., (i) the epistemic standard is an unarticulated constituent, (ii) the epistemic standard is a hidden variable. After showing that the unarticulated constituent thesis is incompatible with epistemic contextualism, I’ll argue that the hidden variable account remains unconvincing. My aim in this paper is to show that questions remain that must be answered before epistemic contextualism can claim success in the project of resolving skepticism.

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