Inference and Inductive Risk

Several types of inferences are common in the diagnosis and prognosis of brain injuries. These inferences, although necessary, introduce epistemic uncertainty. This chapter details the various inferences and considers the concept of inductive risk, introduced by Richard Rudner in the 1950s, and the problem of inductive risk: given uncertainty, what is the appropriate epistemic standard of evidence for accepting a scientific (or medical) hypothesis? Two principles of inductive risk are proposed to tackle the problem of inductive risk present in disorders of consciousness (and other medical contexts): the First Principle calls on us to index epistemic risk-taking to the level of ethical risk, thus constraining acceptable epistemic risk-taking. The Second Principle tells us to index ethical risk-taking to the level of epistemic risk, thus constraining ethical risk-taking to a level commensurate with epistemic uncertainty.

Epistemic evaluation and the need for ‘impure’ epistemic standards

That knowledge ascriptions exhibit some form of sensitivity to context is uncontroversial. How best to account for the context-sensitivity at issue, however, is the topic of heated debates. A certain version of nonindexical contextualism seems to be a promising option. Even so, it is incumbent upon any contextualist account to explain in what way and to what extent the epistemic standard operative in a particular context of epistemic evaluation is affected by non-epistemic factors (such as practical interests). In this paper, I investigate how non-epistemic factors come into play when knowledge is ascribed. I argue that knowledge ascriptions often serve the purpose of providing actionable information. This, in turn, requires that epistemic interests be balanced against non-epistemic interests. Moreover, it raises the question of whose interests matter, those of the ascriber, the addressee (of the knowledge ascription), or the subject of ascription. Eventually, an answer to the question is suggested.

Expertise as a Form of Knowledge: A Response to Quast

Christian Quast has presented what he describes as a ‘role-functional’ account of expertise as a form of knowledge that purports to take into account prior discussions within recent analytic social epistemology and allied fields. I argue that his scrupulousness results in a confused version of the role-functional account, which I try to remedy by presenting a ‘clean’ account that clearly distinguishes such an account from what Quast calls a ‘competence-driven’ one. The key point of my account is that ‘competence’ pertains to knowledge in closed systems and ‘expertise’ in open systems. I observe that the invocation of ‘reliability’ as an epistemic standard simply serves to confuse the difference between the competence-driven and role-functional accounts.

Wrongful ways to raise the epistemic standard

This paper is concerned with identifying and accounting for cases where the epistemic standard is raised inappropriately. The first section is concerned with identifying a notion of a variable epistemic standard that is neutral regarding a range of theoretical issues. The second section argues that the possibility the epistemic standard could be raised in some epistemic inappropriate way warrants further investigation. The third section outlines and provides a partial explanation of such a case: one in which a climate change denier attempts to raise the epistemic standard in order to shut down inquiry.

The Game of Belief

It is plausible that there is a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also plausible that there is a range of practical reasons bearing on belief. These theses are often thought to be in tension with each other. To resolve the tension, the authors draw on an analogy with a similar distinction between types of reasons for actions in the context of activities. This motivates a two-level account of the structure of normativity. The account relies upon a further distinction between normative reasons and authoritatively normative reasons. Only the latter constitutively play the functional role of explaining what state one just plain ought to be in. The authors conjecture that all and only practical reasons are authoritative. Hence, in one important sense, all reasons for belief are practical reasons. But this account also preserves the autonomy and importance of epistemic reasons.

Теолингвистика в контексте метамоделирования интегративных дисциплин в современном гуманитарном познании

В статье проводится эпистемологический анализ оснований и путей формирования новой интегративной дисциплины теолингвистики, направленной на изучение взаимосвязи языка и религии вее конфессиональном многообразии. Теолингвистика рассматривается в широком культурно-историческом контексте, в единстве ее различных форм и аспектов как необходимый момент в развитии гуманитарного познания и духовной жизни современного общества. На основе становления православно-христианской теолингвистики поднимается вопрос о создании эпистемологического стандарта для метамоделирования интегративных дисциплин всовременной науке. Цель такого стандарта выработка критериев для оценки целесообразности, а также научности-ненаучности интегративных построений вгуманитарном познании. С позиций данного стандарта актуальная для современного познания тема Лингвистика и нелингвистика предстает как металингвистическая проблема поиска разумных самоопределений науки о языке в условиях смены научных парадигм.The article deals with epistemic analysis of the ways of formation of a new integrative branch of knowledge theolinguistics, which is aimed at studying the connection between language and religion with its confessional diversity. Theolinguistics is addressed in the broad framework of cultural and historical context, in the unity of its various forms and aspects, as a necessary element in the development of human sciences and spititual life of modern society. The article brings up the issue of epistemic standard on the basis of the formation of Orthodox-Christian theolinguistics. The objective of this standard is the development of the evaluation criteria of the viability and scientific relevance of such formations. In terms of this standard, the currently important issue of the opposition Linguistics-Non-linguistics is considered a metalinguistic issue connected with the self-identification of linguistics during scientific paradigm shift.

Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger

Much work in moral epistemology is devoted to explaining apparent asymmetries between moral and non-moral epistemology. These asymmetries include testimony, expertise, and disagreement. Surprisingly, these asymmetries have been addressed in isolation from each other, and the explanations offered have been piecemeal, rather than holistic. In this paper, I provide the only unified account on offer of these asymmetries. According to this unified account, moral beliefs typically have a higher epistemic standard than non-moral beliefs. This means, roughly, that it is typically more difficult for agents to receive the relevant positive epistemic credit (e.g. knowledge) for moral beliefs than for non-moral beliefs. After presenting this account, I consider two alternative unified accounts. According to the first alternative, moral matters are more cognitively demanding; according to the second, moral beliefs have more defeaters. I argue that neither of these alternative accounts succeed, and that my higher standards account is the best unified explanation.

The Goals of Philosophy of Religion: A Reply to Ireneusz Zieminski

In a recent article, Ireneusz Zieminski (2018) argues that the main goals of philosophy of religion are to (i) define religion; (ii) assess the truth value of religion and; (iii) assess the rationality of a religious way of life. Zieminski shows that each of these goals are difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Hence, philosophy of religion leads to scepticism. He concludes that the conceptual tools philosophers of religion employ are best suited to study specific religious traditions, rather than religion more broadly construed. But it’s unclear whether the goals Zieminski attributes to philosophy of religion are accurate or even necessary for successful inquiry. I argue that an essentialist definition of religion isn’t necessary for philosophy of religion and that philosophers of religion already use the conceptual analysis in the way Zieminski suggests that they should. Finally, the epistemic standard Zieminski has in view is often obscure. And when it is clear, it is unrealistically high. Contemporary philosophers of religion rarely, if ever, claim to be offering certainty, or even evidence as strong as that found in the empirical sciences.

“Knowledge”

This chapter explains contextualism about knowledge ascriptions—the idea that the content expressed by a sentence containing “knows” varies according to the conversational context of the speaker. It articulates and develops a form of contextualism based closely on David Lewis's “relevant alternatives” approach to knowledge. Special attention is given to the idea and proper understanding of an “epistemic standard”—important questions about the relationship between contextualism and rival views turn on this notion. On the approach of the chapter, epistemic standards interact with subject situations to produce sets of relevant alternatives. The chapter also provides some novel linguistic motivations for a contextualism of this sort, and raises questions about how it fits into ideas about broader theoretical roles for knowledge. Those questions define the project of the remainder of the book.

Political Philosophy and Epistemology

Public reason theorists in political philosophy—roughly, Rawlsians—often make what sure sound like epistemological statements. They talk about justifying principles to others, about the uncertainty with which we should hold our evaluative commitments, about reasonable persons and comprehensive doctrines, about a morally politically motivated higher epistemic standard, about intellectual modesty, and, of course, about the burdens of judgment. But they rarely explain, let alone defend, these seemingly epistemological commitments, nor do they engage contemporary epistemological literature. This paper exposes these commitments to epistemological scrutiny, arguing that at the end of the day they cannot be vindicated. It focuses on what, on such theories, a reasonable person who is nevertheless committed to a comprehensive doctrine believes, and on what epistemic standard may be politically relevant in this context.