Truthmaker maximalism and the truthmaker paradox

Synthese ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 197 (4) ◽  
pp. 1647-1660 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elke Brendel
Keyword(s):  
Truthmaker Paradox ◽  
Truthmaker Maximalism

scholarly journals There are no fundamental facts

Analysis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Loss
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Truthmaker Maximalism

Abstract I present an argument proving that there are no fundamental facts, which is similar to an argument recently presented by Mark Jago for truthmaker maximalism. I suggest that this argument gives us at least some prima facie, defeasible reason to believe that there are no fundamental facts.

Truthmaker Maximalism defended

Analysis ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 260-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Rodriguez-Pereyra
Keyword(s):  
Truthmaker Maximalism

The cost of truthmaker maximalism

2013 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 460-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Jago
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Truthmaker Theory ◽  
The Cost ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Negative Facts ◽  
Truthmaker Maximalism ◽  
Negative Truths

According to truthmaker theory, particular truths are true in virtue of the existence of particular entities. Truthmaker maximalism holds that this is so for all truths. Negative existential and other ‘negative’ truths threaten the position. Despite this, maximalism is an appealing thesis for truthmaker theorists. This motivates interest in parsimonious maximalist theories, which do not posit extra entities for truthmaker duty. Such theories have been offered by David Lewis and Gideon Rosen, Ross Cameron, and Jonathan Schaffer. However, it will be argued here that these theories cannot be sustained, and hence maximalism comes with a serious ontological cost. Neither Armstrong's invocation of totality facts nor the Martin-Kukso line on absences can meet this cost satisfactorily. I'll claim that negative facts are the best (and perhaps only) way out of the problem for the truthmaker maximalist.

scholarly journals A short argument for truthmaker maximalism

Analysis ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Jago
Keyword(s):  
Significant Cost ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Truthmaker Maximalism

Abstract Each truth has a truthmaker: an entity in virtue of whose existence that truth is true. So say truthmaker maximalists. Arguments for maximalism are hard to find, whereas those against are legion. Most accept that maximalism comes at a significant cost, which many judge to be too high. The scales would seem to be balanced against maximalism. Yet, as I show here, maximalism can be derived from an acceptable premise which many will pre-theoretically accept.

scholarly journals Truthmaker Maximalism defended again

Analysis ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Barrio ◽  
G. Rodriguez-Pereyra
Keyword(s):  
Truthmaker Maximalism

A Short Argument against Truthmaker Maximalism

Metaphysica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oleh Bondar
Keyword(s):  
Truthmaker Maximalism

Abstract Mark Jago has introduced a short Fitch-style argument for truthmaker maximalism – the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker. In response to Jago, Trueman argues that the Fitch-style reasoning allows us to prove the opposite – no truth has a truthmaker. In the article, we consider the debates between Jago’s truthmaker maximalism and Trueman’s truthmaker nihilism. Also, we introduce a short Grim-style argument against Jago’s truthmaker maximalism.

scholarly journals Traditional Christian Theism and Truthmaker Maximalism

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Pawl
Keyword(s):  
Original Formulation ◽  
Truthmaker Theory ◽  
Truthmaker Maximalism

I argue that Traditional Christian Theism is inconsistent with the conjunction of Truthmaker Necessitation and Truthmaker Maximalism, the thesis that all truths have truthmakers. Though this original formulation requires extensive revision, the gist of the argument is as follows. Suppose for reductio Traditional Christian Theism and the sort of Truthmaker Theory that embraces Truthmaker Maximalism are both true. By Traditional Christian Theism, there is a world in which God, and only God, exists. There are no animals in such a world. Thus, it is true in such a world that there are no zebras. That there are no zebras must have a truthmaker, given Truthmaker Maximalism. God is the only existing object in such a world, and so God must be the truthmaker for this truth, given that it has a truthmaker. But truthmakers necessitate the truths they make true. So, for any world, at any time at which God exists, God makes that there are no zebras true. According to Traditional Christian Theism, God exists in our world. In our world, then, it is true: there are no zebras. But there are zebras. Contradiction! Thus, the conjunction of Traditional Christian Theism with Truthmaker Necessitation and Truthmaker Maximalism is inconsistent.

Truthmaker Maximalism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Jago
Keyword(s):  
Truthmaker Maximalism

If the theory of truth as truthmaking is to be plausible, then all truths must have a truthmaker. This is truthmaker maximalism. It is a difficult idea to defend (§3.1), and existing arguments for it are not sufficiently strong (§3.2). I’ll offer a more powerful argument, showing that the maximalist’s opponent is committed to a maximalist ontology (§3.4, §3.6). I consider some objections to the argument in §3.5.

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