A Short Argument against Truthmaker Maximalism

Mark Jago has introduced a short Fitch-style argument for truthmaker maximalism – the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker. In response to Jago, Trueman argues that the Fitch-style reasoning allows us to prove the opposite – no truth has a truthmaker. In the article, we consider the debates between Jago’s truthmaker maximalism and Trueman’s truthmaker nihilism. Also, we introduce a short Grim-style argument against Jago’s truthmaker maximalism.

There are no fundamental facts

I present an argument proving that there are no fundamental facts, which is similar to an argument recently presented by Mark Jago for truthmaker maximalism. I suggest that this argument gives us at least some prima facie, defeasible reason to believe that there are no fundamental facts.

A short argument for truthmaker maximalism

Each truth has a truthmaker: an entity in virtue of whose existence that truth is true. So say truthmaker maximalists. Arguments for maximalism are hard to find, whereas those against are legion. Most accept that maximalism comes at a significant cost, which many judge to be too high. The scales would seem to be balanced against maximalism. Yet, as I show here, maximalism can be derived from an acceptable premise which many will pre-theoretically accept.

Truthmakers

Truthmaker theory says that what is true depends on what exists. This chapter spells out this thesis, its implications, and why we should believe it. It looks at the connection between truth-making and the in virtue of relation. It looks at reasons to accept or reject truthmaker maximalism—the claim that absolutely every truth has a truthmaker—and truthmaker necessitarianism—the claim that if A makes p true then it is impossible for A to exist without p being true. It asks what views on essentialism are compatible with truthmaker theory. Three reasons for accepting the view are discussed. The views that truthmaker theory is required by the correct theory of truth, and that it is a commitment of realism, is rejected. It is argued that the best reason to accept truthmaker theory is that it yields a parsimonious account of what truths are brute.

Truthmaker Maximalism

If the theory of truth as truthmaking is to be plausible, then all truths must have a truthmaker. This is truthmaker maximalism. It is a difficult idea to defend (§3.1), and existing arguments for it are not sufficiently strong (§3.2). I’ll offer a more powerful argument, showing that the maximalist’s opponent is committed to a maximalist ontology (§3.4, §3.6). I consider some objections to the argument in §3.5.

The cost of truthmaker maximalism

According to truthmaker theory, particular truths are true in virtue of the existence of particular entities. Truthmaker maximalism holds that this is so for all truths. Negative existential and other ‘negative’ truths threaten the position. Despite this, maximalism is an appealing thesis for truthmaker theorists. This motivates interest in parsimonious maximalist theories, which do not posit extra entities for truthmaker duty. Such theories have been offered by David Lewis and Gideon Rosen, Ross Cameron, and Jonathan Schaffer. However, it will be argued here that these theories cannot be sustained, and hence maximalism comes with a serious ontological cost. Neither Armstrong's invocation of totality facts nor the Martin-Kukso line on absences can meet this cost satisfactorily. I'll claim that negative facts are the best (and perhaps only) way out of the problem for the truthmaker maximalist.