Is “voting with your feet” an effective mutual fund governance mechanism?

2011 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meijun Qian
2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-66
Author(s):  
D.K. Malhotra ◽  
Vivek Bhargava ◽  
Rand Martin

2014 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 543-567 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiong Gong ◽  
Ping Jiang ◽  
Shu Tian
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 194-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saurin Patel ◽  
Sergei Sarkissian

Abstract Using U.S. equity mutual fund data, we show that portfolio pumping—an illegal trading activity that artificially inflates year- and quarter-end portfolio returns—is more pronounced among single-managed funds compared with team-managed ones. The return inflation by team-managed funds is 45% lower than by single-managed funds at year-ends. Also, portfolio pumping decreases as team size increases. These results are driven by peer effects among teams and, sometimes, amplified by less convex flow-performance relation in team-managed funds. Our findings are robust to differences in fund governance, manager career concerns, local networks, fund family policies, and changes in the SEC’s enforcement policies.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document