Asset pricing with incomplete information and fat tails

2009 ◽  
Vol 33 (6) ◽  
pp. 1314-1331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prasad V. Bidarkota ◽  
Brice V. Dupoyet ◽  
J. Huston McCulloch
2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (6) ◽  
pp. 1156-1177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexis Akira Toda ◽  
Kieran James Walsh

Author(s):  
Prasad V. Bidarkota ◽  
Brice V. Dupoyet ◽  
J. Huston Mcculloch

2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 409-449 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiguang (Gerald) Wang ◽  
Prasad V. Bidarkota

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (8) ◽  
pp. 2823-2854 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Morris ◽  
Muhamet Yildiz

We study the informational events that trigger equilibrium shifts in coordination games with incomplete information. Assuming that the distribution of the changes in fundamentals has fat tails, we show that majority play shifts either if fundamentals reach a critical threshold or if there are large common shocks, even before the threshold is reached. The fat-tail assumption matters because it implies that large shocks make players more unsure about whether their payoffs are higher than others. This feature is crucial for large shocks to matter. (JEL C72, C73, D83)


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