The Relative Efficiency of Skilled Labor across Countries: Measurement and Interpretation

I study how the relative efficiency of high- and low-skill labor varies across countries. Using microdata for countries at different stages of development, I document that differences in relative quantities and wages are consistent with high-skill workers being relatively more productive in rich countries. I exploit variation in the skill premia of foreign-educated migrants to discriminate between two possible drivers of this pattern: cross-country differences in the skill bias of technology and in the relative human capital of skilled labor. I find that the former is quantitatively more important, and discuss the implications of this result for development accounting. (JEL I26, J24, J31, J61, L16, O15)

Consumption Response to Credit Expansions: Evidence from Experimental Assignment of 45,307 Credit Lines

In a field experiment that constructs a randomized credit limit shock, participants borrow to spend 11 cents on the dollar in the first quarter and 28 cents by the third year. Effects extend to those far from the limit, those who had the new limits as available credit, and those with a liquid asset buffer. In the short-run, flexible and installment contracts are used in tandem, with unconstrained using installments more. Long-run borrowing is predominantly using installments. Near limits, participants borrow when credit expands but save out of constraints when limits are tight. Findings support a buffer-stock interpretation emphasizing precautionary saving. (JEL C93, E21, G21, G51, O12, O16)

When Should There Be Vertical Choice in Health Insurance Markets?

We study the welfare effects of offering choice over coverage levels—“vertical choice”—in regulated health insurance markets. We emphasize that heterogeneity in efficient coverage level is not sufficient to motivate choice. When premiums cannot reflect individuals’ costs, it may not be in consumers’ best interest to select their efficient coverage level. We show that vertical choice is efficient only if consumers with higher willingness to pay have a higher efficient level of coverage. We investigate this condition empirically and find that as long as a minimum coverage level can be enforced, the welfare gains from vertical choice are either zero or economically small. (JEL D82, G22, H75, I13, I21)

Employment Structure and the Rise of the Modern Tax System

This paper builds a new microdatabase that covers 100 countries at all income levels and long-run time series in the United States (1870–2010) and Mexico ( 1960–2010) to document how the modern tax system arises over development. I establish a new set of stylized facts, which show that the income tax exemption threshold decreases in the income distribution as a country develops, tracking growth in the employee share of employment that occurs gradually further down the income distribution. Additional evidence supports the interpretation that the rise in third-party covered income through increases in employee share drives expansions of the income tax base over development. (JEL D31, H23, H24, H71, J22, J23, N40)

Information Networks and Collective Action: Evidence from the Women’s Temperance Crusade

How do social interactions shape collective action, and how are they mediated by networked information technologies? We answer these questions studying the Temperance Crusade, a wave of anti-liquor protest activity spreading across 29 states between 1873 and 1874. Relying on exogenous variation in network links generated by railroad accidents, we provide causal evidence of social interactions driving the diffusion of the movement, mediated by rail and telegraph information about neighboring activity. Local newspaper coverage of the crusade was a key channel mediating these effects. Using an event-study methodology, we find strong complementarities between rail and telegraph networks in driving the movement’s spread. (JEL D83, J16, L92, L96, N31, N41, N71)

Imperfect Competition, Compensating Differentials, and Rent Sharing in the US Labor Market

We quantify the importance of imperfect competition in the US labor market by estimating the size of labor market rents earned by American firms and workers. We construct a matched employer-employee panel dataset by combining the universe of US business and worker tax records for the period 2001–2015. Using this panel data, we identify and estimate an equilibrium model of the labor market with two-sided heterogeneity where workers view firms as imperfect substitutes because of heterogeneous preferences over nonwage job characteristics. The model allows us to draw inference about imperfect competition, worker sorting, compensating differentials, and rent sharing. (JEL D24, H24, H25, J22, J24, J31, J42)

College Tuition and Income Inequality

This paper evaluates the role of rising income inequality in explaining observed growth in college tuition. We develop a competitive model of the college market, in which college quality depends on instructional expenditure and the average ability of admitted students. An innovative feature of our model is that it allows for a continuous distribution of college quality. We find that observed increases in US income inequality can explain more than half of the observed rise in average net tuition since 1990 and that rising income inequality has also depressed college attendance. (JEL D31, I22, I23, I24)

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

We describe a methodology for making counterfactual predictions in settings where the information held by strategic agents and the distribution of payoff-relevant states of the world are unknown. The analyst observes behavior assumed to be rationalized by a Bayesian model, in which agents maximize expected utility, given partial and differential information about the state. A counterfactual prediction is desired about behavior in another strategic setting, under the hypothesis that the distribution of the state and agents’ information about the state are held fixed. When the data and the desired counterfactual prediction pertain to environments with finitely many states, players, and actions, the counterfactual prediction is described by finitely many linear inequalities, even though the latent parameter, the information structure, is infinite dimensional. (JEL D44, D82, D83)

Measuring the Welfare Effects of Shame and Pride

Public recognition is frequently used to motivate desirable behavior, yet its welfare effects—such as costs of shame or gains from pride— are rarely measured. We develop a portable empirical methodology for measuring and monetizing social image utility, and we deploy it in experiments on exercise and charitable behavior. In all experiments, public recognition motivates desirable behavior but creates highly unequal image payoffs. High-performing individuals enjoy significant utility gains, while low-performing individuals incur significant utility losses. We estimate structural models of social signaling, and we use the models to explore the social efficiency of public recognition policies. (JEL C93, D64, D82, D91)