This chapter explores how German economists and statisticians of the historical school viewed the idea of social or statistical law as the product of confusion between spirit and matter or, equivalently, between history and nature. That the laws of Newtonian mechanics are fully time-symmetric and hence can be equally run backwards or forwards could not easily be reconciled with the commonplace observation that heat always flows from warmer to cooler bodies. James Clerk Maxwell, responding to the apparent threat to the doctrine of free will posed by thermodynamics and statistics, pointed out that the second law of thermodynamics was only probable, and that heat could be made to flow from a cold body to a warm one by a being sufficiently quick and perceptive. Ludwig Boltzmann resisted this incursion of probabilism into physics but in the end he was obliged, largely as a result of difficulties presented by the issue of mechanical reversibility, to admit at least the theoretical possibility of chance effects in thermodynamics. Meanwhile, the American philosopher and physicist C. S. Pierce determined that progress—the production of heterogeneity and homogeneity—could never flow from rigid mechanical laws, but demanded the existence of objective chance throughout the universe.
How stable is objective chance?
