Hegel, Wittgenstein, and the Question of Agnosticism

Hegel and Wittgenstein are two philosophers for whom the possibility of agnosticism would appear, in principle, to be excluded. This is because the position of agnosticism is predicated on understandings of metaphysics and of the knowing subject that both philosophers reject. At the same time, however, their reasons for rejecting these metaphysical and epistemological models differ markedly. This chapter will explore how these apparently divergent thinkers actually partake of some deep affinities, particularly as manifested in their dispositions towards agnosticism. But it will also argue that Hegel’s philosophy allows for a form of agnosticism—albeit a form of agnosticism that differs from conventional understandings—in a way that Wittgenstein does not. This chapter will also suggest that it is precisely this that exemplifies the advantages of Hegel’s critique of metaphysics over that of Wittgenstein.