Redeeming Agnosticism: Richard Kearney’s Anatheistic Wager

This chapter explores whether there is more to agnosticism than a failure to take a position. Philosophy and theology are often faced with an impossible choice between the Scylla of theism and the Charybdis of atheism. Concentrating on metaphysical and epistemological agnosticism rather than psychological agnosticism leads to an exploration of Richard Kearney’s anatheistic wager. Drawing deeply on continental philosophy, Kearney offers a way of drawing theism and atheism into a constructive dialogue. Kearney, it is argued, redeems agnosticism by presenting it as an essential truth about the nature of philosophical thought about the divine. Against the oppositional logic that contrasts theism and atheism, Kearney’s anatheism shows how both theism and atheism are necessary in the search for the divine. In contrast to the certainty of both new atheists and old fideists, Kearney’s anatheistic wager inscribes agnosticism at the heart of the quest for God.

What is Wrong with Agnostic Belief?

One who thinks that our foreseeable sources of evidence could not indicate whether something is true is a sort of agnostic about that thing. If one also believes that thing, one has an ‘agnostic belief’. This chapter argues that not all agnostic beliefs must be irrational. Three reasons for thinking that all agnostic beliefs are irrational are considered: agnostic beliefs are always unjustified, always involve a sort of akrasia or incoherence, or always commit one to absurd ‘Moore-paradoxical’ judgements. But, none of these reasons pan out. So, some agnostic belief might fail to be irrational. However, such an agnostic belief, if it is to be defensible, must have some interesting features, which are discussed in the conclusion.

Aquinas and Agnosticism

Surprisingly little attention has been paid to clarifying the nature of agnosticism. As a stance in the philosophy of religion, it clearly emerged in the nineteenth century, although the earlier philosophical work of Hume and Kant paved the way for it. However, there is also an older, related tradition in philosophy and theology, called apophaticism, which makes the notion of ‘not knowing’ about God central to its concerns. How do these approaches relate to each other, if at all? To attempt an answer to this question, this chapter will explore an interpretation of the work of Thomas Aquinas which emphasizes apophaticism, and a related interpretation of his work which results in one of the most systematically articulated versions of contemporary agnosticism.

‘New Agnosticism’, Imaginative Challenge, and Religious Experience

This chapter makes a contribution to recent discussions within new conceptual territory for agnosticism opened up by John Schellenberg’s work in the philosophy of religion. Critics have recently questioned whether Schellenberg’s defence of non-doxastic imaginative faith in ultimism is the most adequate non-doxastic faith stance or the most adequate proposal for a new research programme in the philosophy of religion. I consider here two possible challenges to ultimism as a non-doxastic faith stance and as a research programme: one from Kantian-inspired religious pluralism; and one from the claim that a broader religious framework proposition (‘ietsism’) is more adequate for these purposes than ultimism. The analysis pays particular attention to the role of religious experience. I conclude that notwithstanding the prima facie force of these two objections, it is still appropriate for an agnostic to embrace ultimistic non-doxastic faith.

Introduction

This Introduction provides a general contextual background to the question of agnosticism. It addresses the question of definition: how the term ‘agnosticism’ has been variously defined, and some of the various sub-divisions of different types of agnosticism that have appeared in scholarly literature. The Introduction also considers contextual historical issues, identifying the origins of the term in the nineteenth century, and its subsequent development. It considers the relationship of agnosticism to both theism and atheism, identifying strains of agnosticism within theology, and looking at the relationship of agnosticism to recent manifestations of ‘New Atheism’. Finally, the Introduction discusses the essays that follow, identifying both convergences and divergences between them. It suggests that although the essays employ different methodologies and reach distinct conclusions, many of them suggest that agnosticism may not be as incompatible with religious belief and practices as has sometimes been assumed.

Hegel, Wittgenstein, and the Question of Agnosticism

Hegel and Wittgenstein are two philosophers for whom the possibility of agnosticism would appear, in principle, to be excluded. This is because the position of agnosticism is predicated on understandings of metaphysics and of the knowing subject that both philosophers reject. At the same time, however, their reasons for rejecting these metaphysical and epistemological models differ markedly. This chapter will explore how these apparently divergent thinkers actually partake of some deep affinities, particularly as manifested in their dispositions towards agnosticism. But it will also argue that Hegel’s philosophy allows for a form of agnosticism—albeit a form of agnosticism that differs from conventional understandings—in a way that Wittgenstein does not. This chapter will also suggest that it is precisely this that exemplifies the advantages of Hegel’s critique of metaphysics over that of Wittgenstein.

If Agnosticism, Then What?

This chapter will proceed from, rather than argue towards, agnostic convictions. It will outline those convictions, characterizing agnosticism as the rational position. Given this, what attitudes and practices may we rationally adopt? This chapter will reject that indifference necessarily follows from agnosticism. This chapter will also argue that agnosticism, as it has been characterized, is not rationally consistent with sustained religious belief. We have another option, whose source we can find in religious ambivalence (as opposed to indifference). Agnosticism finds the case for God’s existence unconvincing, but remains unconvinced of God’s non-existence. The latter suggests openness towards religious views and even experiences. Citing precedent in metaphor, history, and everyday epistemological attitudes, this chapter will show how one can refrain from accepting a belief in general while entertaining it in particular instances, discuss the constraints of such ambivalence, and justify as rational certain forms of religious attitude and practice.

The New Agnosticism

What is agnosticism? Is it compatible with a genuinely religious life? Here is a conventional answer to these questions: ‘Agnosticism is the view that we do not, and perhaps cannot, know whether God exists. Provided we think the epistemic probability of God’s existence is not negligible, engagement in religious discourse and practice is entirely rational’. Agnosticism so defined is quite different from fictionalism, which takes religious discourse to be fictional discourse, and religious practice a game of make-believe. Fictionalism, it seems, would have to offer a completely different justification for a religious life. This paper explores a hybrid between these positions, a hybrid that might be called ‘religious semantic agnosticism’, but which is perhaps more memorably called ‘New Agnosticism’. It is suggested that this hybrid position combines the advantages of both traditional agnosticism and fictionalism, but does not inherit their disadvantages.