The Humean Theory of Motivation Rejected1

2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. F. SCHUELER
Keyword(s):  
Humean Theory Of Motivation ◽  
Humean Theory ◽  
Theory Of Motivation

scholarly journals Colloquium 2 How to Argue about Aristotle about Practical Reason

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-58
Author(s):  
Giles Pearson
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Humean Theory Of Motivation ◽  
The Third ◽  
Humean Theory ◽  
Theory Of Motivation

Abstract In this paper, I consider Aristotle’s views in relation to the Humean theory of motivation (HTM). I distinguish three principles which HTM is committed to: the ‘No Besires’ principle, the ‘Motivation Out—Desire In’ principle, and the ‘Desire Out—Desire In’ principle. To reject HTM, one only needs to reject one of these principles. I argue that while it is plausible to think that Aristotle accepts the first two principles, there are some grounds for thinking that he might reject the third.

Why Moral Status Matters for Metaethics

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 471-490
Author(s):  
CAROLINE T. ARRUDA
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Humean Theory Of Motivation ◽  
Humean Theory ◽  
Judgment Internalism ◽  
Theory Of Motivation

AbstractI show that an overlooked feature of our moral life—moral status—provides a route to vindicating naturalist moral realism in much the same way that the Humean theory of motivation and judgment internalism are used to undermine it. Moral status presents two explanatory burdens for metaethical views. First, a given view must provide an ecumenical explanation of moral status, which does not depend on the truth of its metaethical claims (say, that there are mind-independent facts about moral status). Second, its explanation must be consistent with persistent normative ethical disagreement about what constitutes moral status. I conclude that naturalist moral realism succeeds, while quasi-realism fails because it cannot meet the latter requirement. This argument has three results: we have a new route for metaethical vindication more generally and for naturalist moral realism in particular; quasi-realism's plausibility is undermined by an inability to explain disagreement, but not for the familiar reasons.

The inertness of reason and Hume’s legacy

2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (S1) ◽  
pp. 117-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Humean Theory Of Motivation ◽  
Humean Theory ◽  
Theory Of Motivation

Hume argues against the seventeenth-century rationalists that reason is impotent to motivate action and to originate morality. Hume's arguments have standardly been considered the foundation for the Humean theory of motivation in contemporary philosophy. The Humean theory alleges that beliefs require independent desires to motivate action. Recently, however, new commentaries allege that Hume's argument concerning the inertness of reason has no bearing on whether beliefs can motivate. These commentaries maintain that for Hume, beliefs about future pleasurable and painful objects on their own can produce the desires that move us to action. First, I show that this reading putsHumeat odds withHumeans, since the latter are committed, not only to the view that beliefs and desires are both necessary to action, but also to the view that beliefs do not produce desires. Second, I review textual, philosophical and historical grounds for my interpretation of Hume's argument for the inertness of reason. I argue that the new line on Hume, while consistent with a certain reading of the Treatise, is not supported by the Dissertation on the Passions and the second Enquiry, where Hume argues that all motivation has an origin in “taste”, which I take to be different from belief. Thus, Hume's arguments do support the contemporary Humean theory of motivation.

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