The Dominance Principle in Epistemic Decision Theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 763-775 ◽  
Author(s):  
R.A. Briggs
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Dominance Principle ◽  
Epistemic Decision Theory

scholarly journals Epistemic Decision Theory

Mind ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 122 (488) ◽  
pp. 915-952 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Greaves
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Epistemic Decision Theory

Epistemic Newcomb Problem and Epistemic Decision Theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 95-118
Author(s):  
Jaemin Jung
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Newcomb Problem ◽  
Epistemic Decision Theory

scholarly journals Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 178 (2) ◽  
pp. 407-426
Author(s):  
Mattias Skipper
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Epistemic Decision Theory

Stability and Epistemic Decision Theory

2017 ◽  
pp. 237-264
Author(s):  
Hannes Leitgeb
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Epistemic Decision Theory

scholarly journals Epistemic decision theory applied to multiple-target tracking

1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 234-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.K. Moon ◽  
S.E. Budge ◽  
W.C. Stirling ◽  
J.B. Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Target Tracking ◽  
Multiple Target Tracking ◽  
Multiple Target ◽  
Epistemic Decision Theory

scholarly journals The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory

Mind ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 128 (509) ◽  
pp. 69-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Konek ◽  
Benjamin A Levinstein
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Epistemic Decision Theory

scholarly journals Accuracy-dominance and conditionalization

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Nielsen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
The One ◽  
Epistemic Decision Theory

AbstractEpistemic decision theory produces arguments with both normative and mathematical premises. I begin by arguing that philosophers should care about whether the mathematical premises (1) are true, (2) are strong, and (3) admit simple proofs. I then discuss a theorem that Briggs and Pettigrew (Noûs 54(1):162–181, 2020) use as a premise in a novel accuracy-dominance argument for conditionalization. I argue that the theorem and its proof can be improved in a number of ways. First, I present a counterexample that shows that one of the theorem’s claims is false. As a result of this, Briggs and Pettigrew’s argument for conditionalization is unsound. I go on to explore how a sound accuracy-dominance argument for conditionalization might be recovered. In the course of doing this, I prove two new theorems that correct and strengthen the result reported by Briggs and Pettigrew. I show how my results can be combined with various normative premises to produce sound arguments for conditionalization. I also show that my results can be used to support normative conclusions that are stronger than the one that Briggs and Pettigrew’s argument supports. Finally, I show that Briggs and Pettigrew’s proofs can be simplified considerably.

Representation, abstraction, and simple-minded sophisticates

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Dayan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Predictive Coding ◽  
Bayesian Decision Theory ◽  
Bayesian Decision ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Model Free

Abstract Bayesian decision theory provides a simple formal elucidation of some of the ways that representation and representational abstraction are involved with, and exploit, both prediction and its rather distant cousin, predictive coding. Both model-free and model-based methods are involved.

Giving advice: Decision theory perspectives on sexual assault.

1992 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baruch Fischhoff
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Assault ◽  
Decision Theory

Rational Uses of Decision Theory

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (42) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Pitz
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory
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