GAME THEORETIC BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS FOR EVACUEES' EXIT SELECTION

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (01) ◽  
pp. 113-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
HARRI EHTAMO ◽  
SIMO HELIÖVAARA ◽  
TIMO KORHONEN ◽  
SIMO HOSTIKKA
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Formulation ◽  
Response Functions ◽  
Response Dynamics ◽  
Emergency Evacuations ◽  
Best Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Theoretic Concept ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Pure Strategies ◽  
Number Of Iterations

We present a model for evacuees' exit selection in emergency evacuations. The model is based on the game theoretic concept of best-response dynamics, where each player updates his strategy periodically by reacting optimally to other players' strategies. A fixed point of the system of all players' best-response functions defines a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game. In the model, the players are the evacuees and the strategies are the possible target exits. We present a mathematical formulation for the model and show that the game has a NE with pure strategies. We also analyze different iterative methods for finding the NE and derive an upper bound for the number of iterations needed to find the equilibrium. Numerical simulations are used to analyze the properties of the model.

scholarly journals Crime, punishment, and evolution in an adversarial game

2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL MCBRIDE ◽  
RYAN KENDALL ◽  
MARIA R. D'ORSOGNA ◽  
MARTIN B. SHORT
Keyword(s):  
Multiple Equilibrium ◽  
Response Dynamics ◽  
Alternative Strategies ◽  
Cooperative Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Refinements ◽  
Best Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Response Dynamic ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Best Response Dynamic

We examine the game theoretic properties of a model of crime first introduced by Short et al. (2010 Phys. Rev. E82, 066114) as the SBD Adversarial Game. We identify the rationalizable strategies and one-shot equilibria under multiple equilibrium refinements. We further show that SBD's main result about the effectiveness of defecting-punishers (“Informants”) in driving the system to evolve to the cooperative equilibrium under an imitation dynamic generalizes to a best response dynamic, though only under certain parameter regimes. The nature of this strategy's role, however, differs significantly between the two dynamics: in the SBD imitation dynamic, Informants are sufficient but not necessary to achieve the cooperative equilibrium, while under the best response dynamic, Informants are necessary but not sufficient for convergence to cooperation. Since a policy of simply converting citizens to Informants will not guarantee success under best response dynamics, we identify alternative strategies that may help the system reach cooperation in this case, e.g., the use of moderate but not too severe punishments on criminals.

scholarly journals Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk–dove game

2017 ◽  
Vol 153 ◽  
pp. 61-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Benndorf ◽  
Ismael Martínez-Martínez
Keyword(s):  
Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response

Modeling Evacuees’ Exit Selection with Best Response Dynamics

2009 ◽  
pp. 309-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harri Ehtamo ◽  
Simo Heliövaara ◽  
Simo Hostikka ◽  
Timo Korhonen
Keyword(s):  
Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response
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