Why We Should Promote Irrationality

2017 ◽  
Vol 94 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-615
Author(s):  
Sebastian Schmidt

The author defends the claim that there are cases in which we should promote irrationality by arguing (1) that it is sometimes better to be in an irrational state of mind, and (2) that we can often (purposefully) influence our state of mind via our actions. The first claim is supported by presenting cases of irrational belief and by countering a common line of argument associated with William K. Clifford, who defended the idea that having an irrational belief is always worse than having a rational one. In support of the second claim, the author then explains how the control we have over our beliefs could look like. In conclusion, the author suggests that the argument of this essay is not restricted to the irrationality of beliefs, but can be applied to irrational states of mind in general (like desires, intentions, emotions, or hopes). In an outlook on the “ethics of belief” debate, the author points out that the argument of this essay need not conflict with evidentialism, but does so when combined with another plausible claim about the meaning of doxastic ought-statements.

2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 387-399
Author(s):  
Jonathan Adler

James’ The Will to Believe is the most influential writing in the ethics of belief. In it, James defends the right and rationality to believe on non-evidential grounds. James’ argument is directed against Clifford’s “Evidentialism” presented in The Ethics of Belief in which Clifford concludes that “[i]t is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence”. After an overview of the James-Clifford exchange and James’ argument, I reconstruct his argument in detail. Subsequently, I examine four steps in James’ argument, and try to show that these amount to fallacies – enticing to reason, but not cogent.


Ratio ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-159
Author(s):  
Nicholas Nathan

1999 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 1105
Author(s):  
M. Jamie Ferreira ◽  
Nicholas Wolterstorff

1991 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roderick M. Chisholm

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jodi Martin ◽  
Jean-François Bureau ◽  
Marie-France Lafontaine ◽  
Paula Cloutier ◽  
Celia Hsiao ◽  
...  

AbstractIn this investigation the factor structure of the Adult Attachment Interview was studied in a partially at-risk sample of 120 young adults. More specifically, 60 participants had engaged in nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI; 53 females, M age = 20.38 years), and 60 were non-self-injuring controls matched by age and sex. Theoretically anticipated differential associations between preoccupied (but not dismissing) states of mind and NSSI were then examined. Exploratory factor analyses identified evidence for two weakly correlated state of mind dimensions (i.e., dismissing and preoccupied) consistently identified in factor analyses of normative-risk samples. As hypothesized, results further showed that preoccupied (but not dismissing) states of mind were associated with NSSI behavior. Findings support existing arguments suggesting that the regulatory strategy adults adopt when discussing attachment-related experiences with primary caregivers, particularly passive, angry, or unresolved discourse patterns, is uniquely correlated with NSSI.


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Lee Raby ◽  
Heather A. Yarger ◽  
Teresa Lind ◽  
R. Chris Fraley ◽  
Esther Leerkes ◽  
...  

AbstractThe first aim of the current study was to examine the latent structure of attachment states of mind as assessed by the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) among three groups of parents of children at risk for insecure attachments: parents who adopted internationally (N= 147), foster parents (N= 300), and parents living in poverty and involved with Child Protective Services (CPS;N= 284). Confirmatory factor analysis indicated the state of mind rating scales loaded on two factors reflecting adults’ preoccupied and dismissing states of mind. Taxometric analyses indicated the variation in adults’ preoccupied states of mind was more consistent with a dimensional than a categorical model, whereas results for dismissing states of mind were indeterminate. The second aim was to examine the degree to which the attachment states of mind of internationally adoptive and foster parents differ from those of poverty/CPS-referred parents and low-risk parents. After controlling for parental age, sex, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, (a) internationally adoptive parents had lower scores on the dismissing dimension than the sample of community parents described by Haltigan, Leerkes, Supple, and Calkins (2014); (b) foster parents did not differ from community parents on either the dismissing or the preoccupied AAI dimension; and (c) both internationally adoptive and foster parents had lower scores on the preoccupied dimension than poverty/CPS-referred parents. Analyses using the traditional AAI categories provided convergent evidence that (a) internationally adoptive parents were more likely to be classified as having an autonomous state of mind than low-risk North American mothers based on Bakermans-Kranenburg and van IJzendoorn's (2009) meta-analytic estimates, (b) the rates of autonomous states of mind did not differ between foster and low-risk parents, and (c) both internationally adoptive and foster parents were less likely to be classified as having a preoccupied state of mind than poverty/CPS-referred parents.


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