In the aftermath of the First World War, two schools of divergent
thought emerged
among Whitehall's Middle East policy-makers. One, propounded by T.
E. Lawrence, found support
in the Foreign Office, where many favoured Arab national ideals
and backed the Hashemite family for
rulership positions in the region. The other, epitomized by
Arnold Wilson, the civil commissioner for
Iraq, was thought to reflect the India Office view that direct
British rule in Iraq was essential and that
Hashemite pretensions should be opposed. In this article, the
author shows that the lines separating the
India and Foreign Offices were not so clearly drawn. Many
senior officials in the India Office were
disturbed by Wilson's imperial programme for Iraq and some were prepared
to support Hashemite
aspirations. But Lawrence's 1920 campaign for Hashemite
rule and his hyperbolic press attacks on
Wilson's policies had the paradoxical effect of moving the
India Office to defend Wilson and to revert
to their anti-Hashemite stance. The article concludes with
an analysis of the reasons behind the
triumph of the Lawrentian over the Wilsonian schools at the end of
1920, when Wilson was removed
from Iraq and Middle East policy-making was consolidated in the Colonial
Office.
