The policy framework of the European Central Bank (ECB) attracted both bouquets and brickbats in the pre-crisis era. This chapter aims to assess those arguments with hindsight: was policy successful in delivering the objective or was it instead ‘inattentive’, as some critics at the time claimed? We argue that the euro area economy faced a series of inflationary supply shocks and the policy framework was helpful in those conditions. The perceived asymmetry of the inflation objective—with a hard ‘ceiling’ at 2%—allowed automatic adjustments in underlying conditions, including inflation expectations, to do a large part of the stabilization job. However, we show that this self-stabilizing mechanism also admits a second regime: if the economy enters a situation where negative demand shocks dominate, the ‘ceiling’ ceases to bind and act as a stabilizer, leading inflation to drift downwards. We contend that the ECB may have entered such a regime after the financial crisis.
Loan Supply Shocks During the Financial Crisis: Evidence for the Euro Area