Econometrics of Buy-Price English Auctions

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng Chou
Keyword(s):  
English Auctions

scholarly journals Projection of Private Values in Auctions

2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (10) ◽  
pp. 3256-3298
Author(s):  
Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch ◽  
Marco Pagnozzi ◽  
Antonio Rosato
Keyword(s):  
Allocative Efficiency ◽  
Reserve Price ◽  
English Auctions ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Optimal Reserve ◽  
Intensity Of Competition

We explore how taste projection—the tendency to overestimate how similar others’ tastes are to one’s own—affects bidding in auctions. In first-price auctions with private values, taste projection leads bidders to exaggerate the intensity of competition and, consequently, to overbid—irrespective of whether values are independent, affiliated, or (a)symmetric. Moreover, the optimal reserve price is lower than the rational benchmark, and decreasing in the extent of projection and the number of bidders. With an uncertain common-value component, projecting bidders draw distorted inferences about others’ information. This misinference is stronger in second-price and English auctions, reducing their allocative efficiency compared to first-price auctions. (JEL D11, D44, D82, D83)

scholarly journals Dynamic Logic for Data-aware Systems: Decidability Results

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Belardinelli ◽  
Andreas Herzig
Keyword(s):  
Model Checking ◽  
Dynamic Logic ◽  
English Auctions ◽  
First Order ◽  
Formal Framework ◽  
Data Content ◽  
Order Extension

We introduce a first-order extension of dynamic logic (FO-DL), suitable to represent and reason about the behaviour of Data-aware Systems (DaS), which are systems whose data content is explicitly exhibited in the system’s description. We illustrate the expressivity of the formal framework by modelling English auctions as DaS, and by specifying relevant properties in FO-DL. Most importantly, we develop an abstraction-based verification procedure, thus proving that the model checking problem for DaS against FO-DL is actually decidable, provided some mild assumptions on the interpretationdomain.

scholarly journals Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (5) ◽  
pp. 1911-1929 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Bergemann ◽  
Benjamin Brooks ◽  
Stephen Morris
Keyword(s):  
Lower Bound ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
English Auctions ◽  
Revenue Comparison ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Auction Formats

We revisit the revenue comparison of standard auction formats, including first-price, second-price, and English auctions. We rank auctions according to their revenue guarantees, i.e., the greatest lower bound of revenue across all informational environments, where we hold fixed the distribution of bidders’ values. We conclude that if we restrict attention to the symmetric affiliated models of Milgrom and Weber (1982) and monotonic pure-strategy equilibria, first-price, second-price, and English auctions are revenue guarantee equivalent: they have the same revenue guarantee, which is equal to that of the first-price auction as characterized by Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2017). If we consider all equilibria or if we allow more general models of information, then first-price auctions have a greater revenue guarantee than all other auctions considered. (JEL D44, D83)

An “Alternating Recognition” Model of English Auctions

2000 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald M. Harstad ◽  
Michael H. Rothkopf
Keyword(s):  
English Auctions ◽  
Recognition Model

Bayesian inference in repeated English auctions

Test ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 193-211
Author(s):  
Gian Luigi Albano ◽  
Frédéric Jouneau-Sion
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Inference ◽  
English Auctions

EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON ENGLISH AUCTIONS: ORAL OUTCRY VERSUS CLOCK

2010 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 313-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo Gonçalves ◽  
John Hey
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
English Auctions

scholarly journals Irrationality in English auctions

2008 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 180-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo Gonçalves
Keyword(s):  
English Auctions

Semiparametric identification and estimation in multi-object, English auctions

2007 ◽  
Vol 141 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bjarne Brendstrup ◽  
Harry J. Paarsch
Keyword(s):  
English Auctions

scholarly journals Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions

2003 ◽  
Vol 111 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip A. Haile ◽  
Elie Tamer
Keyword(s):  
English Auctions ◽  
Incomplete Model
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