scholarly journals How Does Risk Hedging Impact Operations? Insights from a Price-Setting Newsvendor Model

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liao Wang ◽  
Erich Yao ◽  
Xiaowei Zhang

2010 ◽  
Vol 207 (2) ◽  
pp. 946-957 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minghui Xu ◽  
Youhua (Frank) Chen ◽  
Xiaolin Xu


2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 2337-2361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Yu ◽  
Jun Pei ◽  
Xinbao Liu ◽  
Wenjuan Fan ◽  
Panos M. Pardalos


2014 ◽  
Vol 154 ◽  
pp. 100-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles X. Wang ◽  
Scott Webster ◽  
Sidong Zhang




Author(s):  
Xiuyan Ma

In this paper, we consider a manufacturer who produces and sells a kind of innovative product in the monopoly market environment. Because the life cycle of innovative product is usually shorter than its procurement lead time, one unique demand quantity (scenario) will occur in the selling season, thus there is only one chance for the manufacturer to determine both optimal production quantity and optimal sale price. Considering this one-time feature of such a decision problem, a price-setting newsvendor model for innovative products is proposed. Different to the existing price-setting newsvendor models, the proposed models determine the optimal production quantity and sale price based on some specific state (scenario) which is most applicable for the manufacturer. The theoretical analysis provides managerial insights into the manufacturers’ behaviors in a monopoly market of an innovative product and several phenomena in the luxury goods market are well explained.





2019 ◽  
Vol 128 ◽  
pp. 877-885
Author(s):  
I.A. Shaban ◽  
Z.X. Wang ◽  
F.T.S. Chan ◽  
S.H. Chung ◽  
T. Qu


Mathematics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (9) ◽  
pp. 814 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiuyan Ma

In this paper, we consider a manufacturer who produces and sells a kind of innovative product in the monopoly market environment. Because the life cycle of an innovative product is usually shorter than its procurement lead time, one unique demand quantity (scenario) will occur in the selling season; thus, there is only one chance for the manufacturer to determine both optimal production quantity and optimal sale price. Considering this one-time feature of such a decision problem, a price-setting newsvendor model for innovative products is proposed. Different to the existing price-setting newsvendor models, the proposed models determine the optimal production quantity and sale price based on some specific state (scenario) which is most applicable for the manufacturer. The theoretical analysis provides managerial insights into the manufacturers’ behaviors in a monopoly market of an innovative product, and several phenomena in the luxury goods market are well explained.



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