ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE, CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE OF COPRA IN PARIGI – MOUTONG REGENCY

This study aims to find out and investigate how copra farmers receive in Parigi – Moutong Regency. In this study the data used is primary data and secondary data, primary data is taken using questionnaire list. This research uses IHH and CR4 analysis approach, with the aim to find out the market share and market formed in each copra marketing institution in Parigi – Moutong Regency. The results of the research showed from the results of the analysis conducted is the market formed in copra farmers institutions are a perfect competition market, in the institution of traders collectors (middlemen) market formed is a monopoly market, just as the market formed in large traders is also monopoly. The cr4 value obtained is farmers by 30.82%, collectors by 100%, large traders by 100%. From the results obtained the structure of the market is already affecting the market counduct copra, where the merchant become the determinant haraga copra is a collector to be the recipient of the price.in addition, traders do bond in terms of capital (dwon paymen).Copra market performance is inefficient, where copra farmers in Parigi – Moutong are more dominant in selling copra in three marketing lines that have many marketing agencies involved, with a margin of Rp 2,000. referring to the results, it is fair that the weak still of farmers reaching the market information, especially prices, as a result of the share received by farmers is low. Related to this, there needs to be strengthening in farmers institutions related to copra marketing system.

Sales Disclosure and Pricing Policies in the Presence of Social Learning

This study analyzes the role of sales disclosure and social learning (SL) in firms’ optimal responsive pricing policies and profits. If sales quantities are disclosed, potential customers will increase (decrease) their willingness to pay for the product based on the observation of relatively high (low) sales. In a monopoly market, a firm can control initial sales through the initial price, thus influencing consumers’ SL outcomes. We find that disclosing sales quantities and enhancing SL are always beneficial for a firm in a monopoly context. With an increase in the intensity of SL, a monopoly firm has a higher incentive to decrease the initial price of a product to attract early buyers, which is beneficial for consumers. However, consumer surplus may decrease if consumers’ purchase intentions are strongly driven by historical sales quantities. In a duopoly market, learning based on historical sales quantities can encourage potential customers but intensify competition between firms. Thus, in a competitive market, sales disclosure and SL are only beneficial to firms when consumers’ intrinsic valuation of a product is relatively low. Otherwise, SL harms firms.

Too Much of a Good Thing: Quality-Differentiated Demand and Monopoly Bias

Previous teaching notes focused on the logic and mechanics of a quality-differentiated linear demand structure. This note takes up the question of potential bias in how markets respond to quality-related aspects of consumer choice. Earlier examples demonstrated instances where monopoly interests might conflict with those of consumers in matters of quality choice. This article points to a more general propensity toward excessively high levels of quality under a monopoly market structure. JEL Classifications: D4, D41, D42

Pricing and Return Policies in a Competitive Market: A Consumer-Valuation Based Analysis with Valuation Uncertainties

In this study, we develop a series of consumer-valuation-based models to investigate the pricing and return policies of the sellers in a competitive e-commerce market. Differing from the competition models in literature, a novel two-dimensional valuation structure is built, which considers the valuations of a consumer on two products and the valuation differentiation of all consumers on each product. We consider both monopoly and duopoly (competitive) markets. In each market, two models are respectively developed, one with and one without the return policies. We derive the solutions for the four models, and conduct some analytical and numerical investigations. The results show that return policy with a partial refund is always chosen by the sellers in both monopoly and duopoly markets. Return policy benefits the seller in a monopoly market, but may not benefit the sellers in a duopoly market. In the duopoly models, one seller can be considered as a monopoly seller who meets a new competitor. Our results show that the monopoly seller will reduce its price by no more than 20% when there comes a competitor, and, counter-intuitively, it will meanwhile adopt a severer return policy to the consumers.

Research on Competitiveness of China’s Social Commerce Enterprises Based on Macro- and Micro-Niche

Imbalance of development and resources allocation can emerge during the rapid expansion of social commerce enterprises, which significantly reduces their competitiveness and sustainability. In this paper, we put forward the concept of social commerce ecosystem and propose a model composed of macro-niche and micro-niche to empirically analyze the performance of different social commerce enterprises in China. The results show that: (1) The social sharing e-commerce sub-industry is a monopoly market while the social retail e-commerce sub-industry tends to be a perfectly competitive market; (2) Compared with using only macro-niche or micro-niche, our model shows a more comprehensive insight of enterprise competitiveness, which provides a better niche evaluation for other industries.

ANALISIS PASAR SEMPURNA DAN TIDAK SEMPURNA PT.PLN MEDAN, JAMBI 1991

<p>The market is a place where sellers and buyers meet. This study describes research on the vegetable market in Medan and the PT.PLN monopoly market in Jambi. This report presentsome data regarding the market and access to market data. The purpose of this research is the market situation, the condition of buyers and sellers, market access for new sellers and the ability of sellers to determine market prices. This research is a qualitative research with literature review through elaboration, descriptive analysis to see and examine in detail how the pattern of PT.PLN Medan and Jambi usesthe patterns in the application ofservise performance to the community and how the impact isfelt. This research still needs to be development as a medium for academic development and management-management at PT.PLN in general and PT.PLN Medan and Jambi in particular. The results showed that the implementation of a perfect and imperfect market application pattern was done intentionally unintentionally by PT.PLN Medan and Jambi as a form of application that was adjusted tothe respentive Regional Laws and Perpu so that all matters of implementation became market reaction to follow the rules and accept the consequences if they occur on the rules applied by PT.PLN</p><p><strong>Keywords:</strong> perfect market; imperefect market; price; price mechanism.</p>

Western Media Monopolies and Diversification of Production in the Media: Methodological Disputes

The article deals with the problem of media monopoly market impact upon merging and acquisition processes, diversification being the core of Big Business strategic management. This problem of monopolized markets indirectly influences media texts contents. Examples of ambivalent deals in Western mass media and examples of contradictory methodological discussions of these processes are scrutinized. The conclusions are drawn about ambivalent gist of monopolization in periods of scientific and technological revolutions. The purpose of this article is to consider a number of economic and sociocultural conflicts in the process of merging media enterprises and structures that claim a monopoly or oligopoly place in the market.

Monopoly

This chapter describes the theory of monopoly. In a monopoly market, there are many buyers and a single vendor of a good. The single vendor is called the monopoly. Buyers are assumed to be price takers, and their demand as a function of price is given, as in the case of perfect competition, by an aggregate demand function. One reason one might find a monopoly industry is because, while other companies can enter this industry, the monopoly acts in a way that forestalls potential competitors. If substitute products are produced and sold, they restrain the monopoly's market power by flattening and shifting-in the monopoly's demand curve. The idea of substitutes for a monopoly product comes up in another context — that of multigood monopolies. The chapter then looks at nonlinear pricing.